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John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 13

No abstract available

Lester Lusher

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 20

Procrastination, an issue linked to poor performance and decreased well-being, is a pervasive problem in education. This paper examines the role of commitment and motivation by evaluating a program called CollegeBetter.com which acts as a commitment device and monetary incentive to help college students battle problems of present bias. The zero-sum mechanism is based off a parimutuel betting market, where students join a pool by placing a monetary wager on themselves to achieve the pool's "commitment challenge." Students who successfully commit to the challenge 1) recover their wagers and 2) split losing wagers proportionally. Through a series of lab and field experiments, I find that students interested in the mechanism were low-achieving, overconfident, self-identified procrastinators, while traditional measures of time-preferences were weak predictors of selection. Across all pools, students randomly selected to participate were more likely to achieve the commitment challenge than students who applied for a spot but were randomly excluded. Consistent with loss aversion, having the student risk their own money is a principal contributor to the effectiveness of the mechanism.

Ronald G Cummings, Paul J Ferraro

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 24

Economists have paid increasing attention to the role of cultural diversity in explaining the variability of economic outcomes across societies. We develop an experimental framework that complements existing research in this area. We implement the framework with two cultures that coexist in an industrialized society: the Hispanic and Navajo cultures in the southwestern United States. We vary the ethnic mix of our experimental sessions in order to infer the effect of intercultural interactions on economic behavior and outcomes. We control for demographic differences in our subject pools and elicit beliefs directly in order to differentiate between statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination. We present clear evidence that Hispanic and Navajo subjects behave differently and that their behavior is affected by the ethnic composition of the experimental session. Our experimental framework has the potential to shed much needed light on economic behavior and outcomes in societies of mixed ethnicity, race and religion.

Pieter A Gautier, Bas van der Klaauw

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We use data from a promotion campaign of NH-Hoteles to study self-selection of participants in a gift-exchange experiment. The promotion campaign allowed guests to pay any non negative amount of money for a stay in one of 36 hotels in Belgium and the Netherlands. The data allow us to distinguish between `regular guests', who booked prior to the announcement of the promotion campaign and guests who booked after the campaign was announced. During the promotion campaign we varied the posted price of a room that was communicated to the guests. Only the regular guests respond to the exogenous variation in the posted price and they pay substantially more on average. This different behavior cannot be explained by differences in satisfaction or observed compositional differences between both groups. We argue that the promotion campaign mainly attracted individuals who find it relatively unimportant to be viewed of as prosocial.

Omar Azfar, Clifford Zinnes

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 5

One conjecture in the theory of incentives is that incentives based on broader outcomes may be better at motivating agents than incentives based on narrow measures. We designed an experiment to test these hypotheses using a ""prospective randomized evaluation procedure"" (PREP). We then apply PREP to training programs as typically funded by donors of economic development assistance. We randomly assigned 274 participating entrepreneurs in the Philippines to one of 26, simultaneous, one-day, training classes in marketing. Trainers were given cash incentives based on the average score of their ""students"" on a standardized test containing an alternative number of questions, which were randomly assigned to each class. We then examined outcomes based on student satisfaction ratings of the trainer. Our results suggest that incentives based on broad outcomes are more effective than incentives based on narrow outcomes. We conclude with ways to improve our approach as well as with a discussion of the implications for using prospective randomized evaluation for improving the evaluation of donor projects.

Tobias Heldt

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 16

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals' voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers' actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual's own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others' contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Erwin Bulte, Aart de Zeeuw, Shelby Gerking, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 8

Measuring preferences via stated methods remains the only technique to obtain the total economic value of a non-marketed good or service. This study examines if alternative causes of an environmental problem affect individual statements of compensation demanded. Making use of a unique sample drawn from the Netherlands, we find that Hicksian equivalent surplus (ES) is not significantly affected by causes of environmental harm. While our finding that agents only care about outcomes, rather than causes, is consonant with standard applications of utility theory, it is at odds with some recent experimental findings measuring the effects of cause on Hicksian compensating surplus (CS).

Glenn W Harrison, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 6

No abstract available

Anne Alexander , Ralph d'Arge , John A List, Michael Margolis

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 6

The goal of this paper is to provide an investigation of several approaches to valuing ecosystem services and to contribute additional techniques which may be used in evaluating 'green' GDP accounts. Our estimates focus on the ecosystem as a productive economic input, not a stock which is depreciated or depleted over time; as such, it differs with other concepts more frequently employed in green GDP accounting. Most of our results are derived from the analytical fiction that a single owner of the biosphere establishes a market for all ecological resources. This monopolist then appropriates all rents from the human population. The maximum amount the monopolist charges is first assumed to be world gross product less the global human subsistence level. In addition, we examine the excess rents available in factor markets using the assumption of weak complementarity between factor inputs and ecosystem services. We also provide more conservative estimates of the value of ecosystem services by investigating the sustainable price the monopolist could charge the global population and by exploring the effects of compensating wage differentials and a non-monopolist owner of the ecosystem.

David S Brookshire, Donald L Coursey, Howard Kunreuther

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 27

No abstract available

Simon Gachter, Henrik Orzen, Elke Renner, Chris Starmer

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 87

An extensive literature demonstrates the existence of framing effects in the laboratory and in questionnaire studies. This paper reports new evidence from a natural field experiment using a subject pool one might expect to be particularly resistant to such effects: experimental economists. We find that while the behaviour of junior experimental economists is affected by the description of the decision task they face, this is not the case for the more senior members of our subject pool.

Orana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Imran Rasul

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 19

We present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers' productivity through two channels. First, managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers, implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase. Second, managers select out the least able workers, implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease. In our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity. Analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers, and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment. These results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower-tier workers.

David P Tracer

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 56

In order to test the proposition that performance in bargaining experiments is significantly affected by degree of monetarization, market integration, and relative westernization, a one-shot Ultimatum Game was conducted during the months of June and July 1998 in two villages in a rural region of Papua New Guinea: Anguganak (where the people speak Au) and Bogasip (where they speak Gnau). Although the villages are located in close proximity to one another and are relatively homogeneous culturally, and both subsist using a mixture of foraging and horticulture and have an elaborate system of exchange relationships, they are distinguished by their average degree of exposure to and integration in a cash-based economy, as well as their degree of education (both are greater in Anguganak). The different sections of the chapter provide: an ethnographic account of the two villages; a description of the experimental methods employed; a presentation and analysis of the results in terms of various indicators of wealth and market integration; and a discussion of the implications of the results. The level of offers made in the Ultimatum Game data combined for Anguganak and Bogasip were between those in western industrialized populations and the Machiguenga of Peru. There was some indication that variability in the level of market integration between the two village populations may have influenced the results, although they appeared to be equally influenced by local beliefs on reciprocity, generosity, and indebtedness, and an unfamiliarity with impersonal transactions.

Nick Drydakis

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 3

In the spirit of the International Labour Organisation Code (2001) of decent work and respect for the human rights and dignity of persons infected or affected by HIV/AIDS, there should be no discrimination against applicants for work on the basis of real or perceived HIV status. Whilst, the successful implementation of an HIV/AIDS policy requires cooperation and trust between firms and employees, with the active involvement of workers infected and affected by HIV/AIDS (ILO [2007]). In the current study having considered the fundamental points the first ever correspondence testing was conducted in order to test whether job applicants living with HIV (still) face prejudices in the crucial stage of the selection process in Greece. Resumes differed only in applicants' health status were faxed to advertised job openings. We suggest that a HIV-positive applicant may want to identify whether firms are prone to provide any reasonable adjustments for the recruitment and interview process. Definitely, the outcomes must imply that employers use health condition as a factor when reviewing resumes, which matches the legal definition of discrimination. The rate of net discrimination against male (female) HIV positives is found to be between 82.6% and 97.8% (81.6%-98.8%) among sectors. Whilst, the degree of discrimination is randomly assigned across occupations disrelated to education level and job status. The current study initiates a key methodology which can drive world-wide researchers to conduct relevant surveys. As efforts grow up to address HIV discrimination, so does the need for a set of standard tested and validated discrimination indicators. Measurements and discrimination trends are a key tool for identifying effective anti-stigma programming.

Christopher Blattman, Julian C. Jamison, Margaret Sheridan

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 26

We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment.

Glenn W Harrison, Morten I Lau, Elisabet E Rutstrom

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 10

Randomization to treatment is fundamental to statistical control in the design of experiments. But randomization implies some uncertainty about treatment condition, and individuals differ in their preferences towards taking on risk. Since human subjects often volunteer for experiments, or are allowed to drop out of the experiment at any time if they want to, it is possible that the sample observed in an experiment might be biased because of the risk of randomization. On the other hand, the widespread use of a guaranteed show-up fee that is non-stochastic may generate sample selection biases of the opposite direction, encouraging more risk averse samples into experiments. We undertake a field experiment to directly test these hypotheses that risk attitudes play a role in sample selection. We follow standard procedures in the social sciences to recruit subjects to an experiment in which we measure their attitudes to risk. We exploit the fact that we know certain characteristics of the population sampled, adults in Denmark, allowing a statistical correction for sample selection bias using standard methods. We also utilize the fact that we have a complex sampling design to provide better estimates of the target population. Our results suggest that randomization bias is not a major empirical problem for field experiments of the kind we conducted if the objective is to identify marginal effects of sample characteristics. However, there is evidence that the use of show-up fees may have generated a sample that was more risk averse than would otherwise have been observed.