Craig Gallet, John A List, Peter Orazem
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The 1987 academic market was strong, whereas the 1997 market was weak. A multimarket theory of optimal search suggests that job seekers will respond to a weakening market by changing their search strategies at the extensive margin (which markets to enter) and the intensive margin (how many applications to submit per market). Employers respond to the weakening market by raising their hiring standards. High-quality applicants will obtain an increased share of academic interviews in weak markets while applicants from weaker schools will increasingly secure interviews outside of the academic market. Empirical results show that in the bust market, graduates of elite schools shifted their search strategies to include weaker academic institutions, while graduates of lower-ranked schools shifted their applications away from academia and toward the business sector. In bust conditions, academic institutions increasingly concentrate their interviews on elite school graduates, women, and U.S. residents
Laura Derksen, Adamson Muula, Joep van Oosterhout
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The HIV epidemic in southern Africa has important consequences for economic development. The epidemic could be stopped by a universal test and treat policy, as antiretroviral drugs block the spread of the virus. However, demand for HIV testing and treatment are surprisingly low. This paper develops a model in which the decision to seek an HIV test is a signal of infection, and those who seek a test are subject to statistical discrimination from potential sexual partners. We evaluate an information experiment designed to test the theory, and find evidence that this form of discrimination is a significant barrier to HIV testing. In particular, we provide information at the community level on the public benefit of antiretroviral therapy: because the drugs prevent HIV transmission, a person who is tested and treated for HIV is a relatively safe sexual partner. This information reduces discrimination and increases HIV testing, with the strongest effects in communities where the new information becomes common knowledge. The results demonstrate that discrimination towards HIV positive individuals can be due to rational behavior by a misinformed public, and that providing new information can be an effective way to mitigate its effects.
Omar Al-Ubaydli, Steffen Andersen, Uri Gneezy, John A List
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Constructing compensation schemes for effort in multi-dimensional tasks is complex, particularly when some dimensions are not easily observable. When incentive schemes contractually reward workers for easily observed measures, such as quantity produced, the standard model predicts that unrewarded dimensions, such as quality, will be neglected. Yet, there remains mixed empirical evidence in favor of this standard principal-agent model prediction. This paper reconciles the literature by using both theory and empirical evidence. The theory outlines conditions under which principals can use a piece rate scheme to induce higher quantity and quality levels than analogous fixed wage schemes. Making use of a series of complementary laboratory and field experiments we show that this effect occurs because the agent is uncertain about the principal's monitoring ability and the principal's choice of a piece rate signals to the agent that she is efficient at monitoring.
Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis, Bettina Rockenbach
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The degree of human cooperation among strangers is a major evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is that cooperation maintained because many individuals have a predisposition to punish those violating group-beneficial norms. A critical condition for cooperation to evolve in evolutionary models is that punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Here we present evidence from a field experiment with real-life interactions that, unlike in lab experiments, altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of the violation, regardless of whether it is direct (confronting a violator) or indirect (withholding help). We also document growing concerns for counter-punishment as the severity of the violation increases, indicating that the marginal cost of direct punishment increases with the severity of violations. The evidence suggests that altruistic punishment may not provide appropriate incentives to deter large violations. Our findings thus offer a rationale for the emergence of formal institutions for prompting large-scale cooperation among strangers.
Ufuk Akcigit, Fernando Alvarez, Stephane Bonhomme, George M Constantinides, Douglas W Diamond, Eugene F Fama, David W Galenson, Michael Greenstone, Lars Peter Hansen, Uhlig Harald, James J Heckman, Ali Hortacsu, Emir Kamenica, Greg Kaplan, Anil K Kashyap, Steven D Levitt, John A List, Robert E Lucas Jr., Magne Mogstad, Roger Myerson, Derek Neal, Canice Prendergast, Raghuram G Rajan, Philip J Reny, Azeem M Shaikh, Robert Shimer, Hugo F Sonnenschein, Nancy L Stokey, Richard H Thaler, Robert H Topel, Robert Vishny, Luigi Zingales
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No abstract available
Cody Cook, Rebecca Diamond, Jonathan Hall, John A List, Paul Oyer
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The growth of the "gig" economy generates worker flexibility that, some have speculated, will favor women. We explore one facet of the gig economy by examining labor supply choices and earnings among more than a million rideshare drivers on Uber in the U.S. Perhaps most surprisingly, we find that there is a roughly 7% gender earnings gap among drivers. The uniqueness of our data - knowing exactly the production and compensation functions - permits us to completely unpack the underlying determinants of the gender earnings gap. We find that the entire gender gap is caused by three factors: experience on the platform (learning-by-doing), preferences over where/when to work, and preferences for driving speed. This suggests that, as the gig economy grows and brings more flexibility in employment, women's relatively high opportunity cost of non-paid-work time and gender-based preference differences can perpetuate a gender earnings gap even in the absence of discrimination.
Eszter Czibor, Sander Onderstal, Randolph Sloof, Mirjam van Praag
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We conduct a framed field experiment in a Dutch university to compare student effort provision and exam performance under the two most prevalent evaluation practices: absolute (criterion-referenced) and relative (norm-referenced) grading. Based on the empirical stylized fact of gender differences in competitiveness we hypothesize that the rank-order tournament created by relative grading will increase male, but not female, performance. Contrary to our expectations, we find no impact of competitive grading on preparation behavior or exam scores among either gender. Our result may be attributed to the low value students in our sample attach to academic excellence.
Pablo Celhay, Paul Gertler, Paula Giavagnoli, Christel Vermeersch
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We show that fixed costs of adjustment as opposed to low returns likely explain why better quality care practices diffuse slowly in the medical industry. Using a randomized field experiment conducted in Argentina, we find that temporary financial incentives paid to health clinics for the early initiation of prenatal care 'nudged' providers to test and develop new data driven strategies to locate and encourage likely pregnant women to seek care in the first trimester of pregnancy. These innovations raised the rate of early initiation of prenatal care by 34% while the incentives were being paid in the treatment period. We follow health clinics over time and find that this increase persisted for at least 24 months after the incentives ended. In the absence of incentives, even though it is in the clinics' interest to stimulate early initiation of care, the presence of hard to change habits and cost of experimentation made it too expensive to develop and implement new methods to increase early initiation of care. Despite the large increases in early initiation of prenatal care, we find no effects on health outcomes.
Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis, Bettina Rockenbach
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Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means of understanding the evolution of cooperation.
Michael J. Seiler, Eric Walden
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This study examines strategic mortgage default on a neurological level. Specifically, we test two mainstream behavioral finance/economic theories: sunk cost fallacy and cognitive dissonance. Using fMRI technology, we identify a number of substrates within the brain that provide a neurobiological explanation for why some homeowners exercise their mortgage put option while others do not. We find that borrowers rationally do not suffer from the sunk cost fallacy as it relates to strategic default in that stye significantly prioritize their negative equity position over the amount of their initial down payment. We do, however, find neurological support that cognitive dissonance is relevant in homeowners' thought processes as they toil with the hesitancy brought on by the belief that strategic default is immortal against strong financial incentive to walk away from a substantially underwater mortgage.
Julian Conrads, Tommaso Reggiani, Rainer M Rilke
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Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one treatment, people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e. the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment, this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations.
Charles Bellemare, Sabine Kroger
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This paper analyzes data for a random sample drawn from the Dutch population who reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest and reward investments by means of an economic experiment. We have three main results. First, we find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries men, the young and elderly, and low educated individuals invest relatively less, but reward significantly more investments. Second, higher expected levels of investments have a positive and significant effect on the level of investments themselves, corroborating the presence of social norms. Third, we compare our results with a laboratory experiment conducted with a student sample. We find that the student sample provides a lower bound of the population level of social capital.
Mark A. Lane, Michael J. Seiler, Vicky L Seiler
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This study is the first to examine the widely debated merits of staging a home for sale. We find that both homeowners and real estate agents believe staging conditions (furnishings and wall color) will significantly impact homeowners' willingness to pay for a property. Our results show that homeowners rationally do not significantly differ in their valuations based on staging conditions. However, staging conditions do influence the process, as we find a neutral wall color and good furnishings do significantly influence a buyers' perceived liability and overall opinion of the home. While these are a necessary condition for purchase, staging is not enough to result in a higher selling price.
Nava Ashaf, Dean S Karlan, Wesley Yin
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Commitment devices for savings could benefit those with self-control as well as familial or spousal control issues. We find evidence to support both motivations. We examine the impact of a commitment savings product in the Philippines on household decision making power and self-perception of savings behavior, as well as actual savings. The product leads to more decision making power in the household for women, and likewise more purchases of female-oriented durable goods. We also find that the product leads women who appear time-inconsistent in a baseline survey to self-report being a disciplined saver in the follow-up survey. For impact on savings balances, we find that the 81% increase in savings after one year did not crowd out savings held outside of the participating bank, but that the longer-term impact over two and a half years on bank savings dissipated to only a 33% increase, which is no longer statistically significant. We discuss reasons why the effect dissipated and the implications for designing and implementing sustainable, equilibrium-shifting interventions.
Christopher Blattman, Julian C. Jamison, Margaret Sheridan
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We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment.
Eli Beracha, Michael J. Seiler
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In this study, we examine whether homebuyers favor homes associated with just below pricing strategies or those with rounded prices (e.g., $199,900 vs. $200,000). The inclination for just below pricing allows sellers that use just below pricing to set a higher asking price without driving away potential buyers. Rounded priced homes, on the other hand, sell significantly faster and at a smaller discount from list price compared with just below priced homes. We find that the just below pricing strategy yields the highest transaction price relative to the true underlying home value. This suggests sellers exploit buyers' preference for just below priced homes with a higher initial listing price that outweighs the lower discount and shorter time on market associated with similar round priced homes, making just below pricing the more effective pricing strategy.
Aaron Arndt, David M Harrison, Mark A. Lane, Michael J. Seiler, Vicky L Seiler
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We investigate whether customers' overall impression of online property listings can be influenced by the real estate agent, and whether this influence depends on the customer's demographic characteristics. A sample of 1,594 potential homebuyers took an online audio/visual tour of a typically priced home in their area. Subjects were shown one of eight conditions in which we varied agent gender (male/female), agent attractiveness (attractive/less attractive), and pathos (used/not used). The results show that segments of customers are drawn to different real estate agents, but contrary to our expectations, customers were not necessarily drawn to similar agents or more attractive ones.
Michael J. Seiler
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We test the disjunctive hypothesis as it relates to mortgage contracts and find that a liquidated damages clause shifts one's view of a mortgage from a promise to perform to either a promise to perform or pay compensatory damages. However, when a strategic mortgage default is responsible for the breach, the perceived immorality of this action overwhelms the liquidated damages clause effect in support of the disjunctive thesis. We also find that people's conscious "experimentally stated preference" moral stance on installment loan (mortgages, auto loans, credit card debt and even cell phone contracts) default significantly differs from their subconscious "experimentally revealed preference" moral stance indicating a difference between what people say they believe and what they actually believe.
Andris Saulitis
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This paper examines the extent to which a noncompliant debtor can be induced to pay back the debt by sending a randomly assigned message via mobile phone and e-mail, ranging from a simple reminder to personalized messages and a social norm. In cooperation with a debt-collector enterprise in Latvia, the field experiment was carried out on 24,781 unique cases of consumer debts with unpaid liabilities, ranging from one to 40,060.26 euros. Overall, sending a message to a debtor increases compliance in comparison of not sending a message at all. However, messages, which include debtor's name, agent's name or social norm, do not increase compliance in comparison to a simple reminder message. I also looked at the interaction effect between the content of the message and the debt amount, which has been hardly examined in previous experiments on compliance. Messages with a debtor's name significantly increase compliance in comparison to a simple reminder among the debts smaller than 170 euros. However, such a message is counter-effective for debts larger than 1,340 euros, the same trend is true for a message with the social norm. Hence, a different policy needs to be applied to the debtors who are extensively overindebted in comparison to those with comparatively small debt amounts.
Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, David W Nickerson
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 10

No abstract available