

What Happens When the Taliban Leave?

Survey and Field Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

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Abstract

From newborns to the elderly, exposure to violence and conflict has been found to have deleterious effects. In this study, we explore a unique type of violence: exposure to the Taliban. Pairing a field experiment with a field survey among citizens in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan, we examine how exposure to violence affects general trust, subjective well-being, and confidence in institutions. In our field experiment, we observe that exposure to conflict significantly alters the relative valuation of monetary rewards for oneself compared to those for a comparable peer. Specifically, individuals subjected to violence demonstrate a marked tendency to prioritize their own financial gain over that of a similar other. In the survey, we find that exposure to violence is associated with reduced general trust, trust in informal institutions, and subjective well-being. Interestingly, being exposed to violence increases trust in formal institutions. Our combined results highlight that the interplay between violence and trust dynamics is complex and highly consequential. In turn, the policy implications highlight the need for a multifaceted strategy to support individuals and communities affected by violence, ensuring both immediate relief and long-term resilience.

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“Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”

– Kenneth Arrow

1 Introduction

Trust and subjective well-being are essential pillars of social and economic resilience, especially in regions grappling with chronic violence. Trust facilitates economic activities by reducing transaction costs and minimizing the need for costly verification processes, allowing smoother exchanges. The literature extensively documents the positive effects of trust on economic development and societal well-being (Arrow 1972; Besley 2020; Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso 2016; Putnam, Nanetti, and Leonardi 1994; Ray and Esteban 2017; Tabellini 2010; Verwimp and Van Bavel 2014). For instance, research highlights the connection between trust and economic growth, as well as its significant role in the efficient management of large organizations (Algan and Cahuc 2010; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004).

Like trust, life satisfaction is a crucial indicator of well-being. A growing body of research proxies life satisfaction using statements of subjective well-being. This work shows that such statements are a reliable measure of overall well-being (Krueger and Schkade 2008) and significantly affected by changes in real income or living standards (Killingsworth 2021; Sacks, Stevenson, and Wolfers 2010). More broadly, subjective well-being has been used to assess the impact of government policies on the target population (Courtemanche et al. 2025; Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields 2004; Galiani, Gertler, and Undurraga 2018; Gruber and Mullainathan 2005) and shown to be inversely related to a variety of get-me-out-of here behaviors such as changes in one’s job or place of residence (Kaiser and Oswald 2022).

In regions facing prolonged conflict, such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in Pakistan, understanding the impact of violence on trust and subjective well-being is vital. Over the past decades, KP has experienced significant turmoil and instability due to extremist militancy, particularly from the Taliban, which has potentially eroded public trust in institutions and diminished individual well-being. There is by now a prominent literature that highlights the effects of conflict exposure on general trust levels (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Glaeser et al. 2000) and subjective well-being (Dolan and Metcalfe 2012; Frey and Stutzer 2009).

In this paper, we investigate how exposure to violence from the Taliban and other extremist groups influences trust, life satisfaction, and perceptions of governmental institutions among residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). By analyzing the response of these factors to sustained violence, our research contributes to the literature on economic development in conflict zones, offering insights into the potential long-term effects of violence on social and institutional trust.

To explore these relationships, we begin by conducting a comprehensive survey among a cross-section of the adult population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to capture multiple dimensions of trust and subjective well-being. Stated preference data were collected using detailed in-person questionnaires administered by the University of Peshawar in 2014. Despite the challenges posed by endemic conflict in the north-west tribal regions, which often limit access, this survey provides unique insights into a region that remains understudied in the context of violence and social trust. Consequently, our analysis sheds new light on the impacts of prolonged insurrection on trust in formal institutions and individual well-being.

Our survey results fall into three bins. First, we find that exposure to violence significantly reduces general trust and trust in informal institutions. This result highlights how violence undermines social cohesion and community relationships. Trust is fundamental for societal functioning, and its erosion can have long-lasting impacts. Second, there is a negative effect on subjective well-being. The detrimental effect on subjective well-being indicates that exposure to violence has profound psychological and emotional repercussions, affecting individuals' quality of life and mental health. Finally, we find an intriguing shift in trust dynamics. Specifically, we find an increase in trust in formal institutions. This result suggests that in the face of violence, people may turn to formal structures for stability and protection, potentially influencing policy and governance.

Our second data collection effort extends our analysis to investigate the impact of conflict exposure on revealed preferences, as inferred from allocation decisions with real financial consequences. This is accomplished by collecting data from a modified dictator game, embedded within a survey experiment conducted in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in March 2016. Our broad results align with the stated preference outcomes. For individuals not affected by conflict, the willingness to share remains comparable whether the recipient is another individual or a government agency. Conversely, exposure to conflict distinctly influences the relative importance assigned to personal monetary gain versus that allocated to the recipient. Notably, we observe that while respondents exhibit reduced altruism when paired with another individual, their altruism increases, and they share more when the recipient is a government agency.

Our stated and revealed preference results offer valuable insights for policymakers and humanitarian organizations, highlighting the intricate ways in which violence affects society. These findings emphasize the necessity for comprehensive strategies to support communities impacted by violence, rebuild trust, and enhance mental health services. Prioritizing the restoration of trust in affected communities could involve community engagement programs, governance transparency, and initiatives to bolster informal social networks. Furthermore, the observed increase in trust in formal institutions suggests that these entities can provide essential stability and security. Consequently, policies should aim to strengthen the capacity and credibility of formal institutions to meet the needs of affected populations. Additionally, given the observed impact on subjective well-being, there is an urgent need to expand mental

health services and support systems, including counseling, therapy, and community-based mental health programs. Overall, our results indicate that raising awareness about the consequences of violence and promoting education on conflict resolution and peace-building can help alleviate the adverse effects on trust and well-being.

The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. The next section describes our setting. Section 3 summarizes the survey and results. Section 4 moves the analysis from a stated preference approach to recovering revealed preferences via a field experiment. Section 5 concludes.

2 Empirical Setting

Since the mid-2000s, militancy has severely disrupted life in Pakistan’s north-western regions, particularly in the KP province. Historically known as the North-West Frontier Province until 2009, this area has long been an unsettled frontier. Militancy escalated from the conflict in neighboring Afghanistan post-2001, and by 2005, the region experienced unprecedented levels of violence, with a twenty-fold increase according to some estimates (Blair et al. 2013; Shapiro, Fair, and Rais 2011). Between 2005 and 2013, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) - which has been incorporated in KP officially since 2018 - suffered over 1 casualty per 1,000 residents, with some KP districts experiencing over a hundred attacks each. Once the most peaceful part of Pakistan, with only 0.9 casualties per 100,000 residents, during this time-period KP saw this rate surge to 3.3 per 100,000, reflecting a 46-fold increase in militant attacks (Yamin and Malik 2014).

The Pakistani Government has continuously struggled to combat militant control in these areas through military action and development initiatives. In 2009, the government conducted a Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) to create qualitative assessments and identify factors contributing to militancy. The findings highlighted several issues: (i) unreformed institutional legacies from the colonial past, (ii) radicalization and extremist ideologies, (iii) widespread availability of weapons, (iv) unresolved conflicts from the Soviet-Afghan War evolving into extremist groups, (v) creation of criminal syndicates, and (vi) the impact of ongoing civil unrest in Afghanistan.

Another key fact is that formal institutions in the region have been slow to evolve due to the tribal system of administration that relied on vicarious responsibility of the tribe and later due to the militancy that has affected the area for the past decade. The lack of a robust state with functioning institutions for dispute resolution fostered disenchantment and dissatisfaction, providing fertile ground for militancy sustained by rough justice. Allegiance to conservative social norms and religious extremism further propelled this trend. The absence of a fully developed legal system and the failure of public service delivery eroded trust in formal institutions, contributing to the spread of radicalization.

Militant groups capitalized on these institutional gaps, offering themselves as swift and

effective arbiters of disputes in contrast to the slow-moving and often inconsistent formal justice system. The rise of militancy in the region has, thus, been closely linked to perceived inefficiencies in traditional justice mechanisms, such as tribal councils or Jirgas, which militants have sought to replace by presenting their own brand of swift and enforceable justice.¹

3 Survey and Results

As our first source of data, we conducted a field survey after the Taliban left KP. We examine how exposure to violence and conflict impacts (i) general levels of trust, (ii) subjective well-being, and (iii) attitudes toward formal and religious institutions. Acts of violence have included bombings in public places, sectarian attacks, and other insurgency related incidents.² These frequent and often devastating acts, which range from high-casualty bombings to targeted assassinations, have had a profound impact on community life in the region.

For this first analysis, we designed an in-person survey conducted in randomly selected villages throughout KP by the University of Peshawar in October 2014. A total of 1,823 surveys were administered across 33 villages (9 urban and 24 rural) located in 9 tehsils of the province.³ Table 1 in the Appendix lists the villages where the survey was conducted, and Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables of interest and demographics.

To gauge trust, we utilize well-established methodologies from the extant literature (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Glaeser et al. 2000) honing in on three critical questions within the in-person survey that pertain to individual trust, perceptions of fairness, and cooperative behaviors. To facilitate interpretation, we normalize family's reported exposure to violence. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between general levels of trust and exposure to violence, with vertical axes representing predicted probabilities from probit models. These estimates, which include household characteristics, confirm that exposure to

¹The literature has taught us that an equitable process of dispute resolution is integral for the establishment and protection of property rights, which are crucial for economic growth. Reforms within formal institutions with a focus on empowering the poor and other disadvantaged groups should be considered an essential component of an economic development strategy. From this perspective, investments in these institutions should be included among the strategies aimed at restoring confidence in the government.

²For example, in 2013, a bombing in Parachinar on July 26, in the outskirts of Peshawar, killed 57 people and injured many others. On June 30, 2013, there were a series of similar attacks in many cities, including Peshawar, during Prime Minister David Cameron's visit to the country. Sectarian attacks (for example, an attack on a Shiite mosque in Peshawar on June 21, 2013 killed 15 people), assassination attempts on political leaders (for example, a bombing on May 6, 2013 during an election rally of Jamiat-e-Ulema-Islam, which killed 25 people), and other horrendous incidents in public places (for example, a bombing in Mina Bazaar on October 28, 2009 that killed 137 people) have been regular during this time period. In 2013 alone, there were 499 terrorist attacks in KP, in which 706 people were killed and 1,745 were injured (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) 2013 Annual Security Report).

³A tehsil is an administrative unit in Pakistan and it usually consists of a city/town that serves as the administrative center and additional towns and villages.

violence is significantly associated with a lowering of trust across all three metrics.⁴ This finding aligns with previous studies demonstrating that exposure to trauma erodes trust (Alacevich and Zejcirovic 2020; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt 2013; Rohner, Thoenig, and Zilibotti 2013).

Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the marginal results of the probit regression models. The results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in exposure to violence is associated with a 5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that people can be trusted. Similarly, those more exposed to violence are 4.4 percentage points less likely to report that others are helpful. Regarding fairness, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to conflict decreases the probability of believing others are fair by 4 percentage points. All point estimates reveal an interesting negative association between violence exposure and various beliefs.

Next, we estimate the relationship between impacts of exposure to violence and subjective well-being. We follow past literature and measure subjective well-being using a question about overall life-satisfaction, with possible responses measured on a 5-point Likert scale. The use of self-reported life satisfaction is not beyond reproach (Deaton and Stone 2016). Yet, the measure has been posited as a useful proxy for changes in experience utility (Kahneman and Sugden 2005; Kimball and Willis 2023).⁵

First, we show in Panel B of Figure 1 the relationship between individual well-being and exposure to violence. Panel B of Table 3 reports the regression coefficients between these responses and exposure to violence. Similar to the findings in the previous literature, exposure to violence and subjective well-being are negatively related. On average, those who are more exposed to violence are 0.13 standard deviations less likely to report that they are satisfied with their life and 0.15 standard deviations less likely to indicate that they are satisfied with their community. Both of these responses are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. These results suggest that conflict has a negative association with trust and subjective well-being. Interestingly, we also find that exposure to violence has a significant impact on financial well-being.

Finally, we repeat the above analyses for formal and informal institutions. Previous literature has shown that conflict and exposure to violence could have positive effects on engagement with political participation and process (Bauer et al. 2016; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Voors et al. 2012). Moreover, information campaigns that highlight im-

⁴In particular, we estimated the following probit models: $Pr(y_i = 1|v_i^N, X_i)$ where y_i is the i th individual's responses to the trust questions, v_i^N is the normalized measure of violence and X_i is a vector of household characteristics. The demographic controls include age, education, ethnicity, gender, wealth, occupation, marital status and tehsil population. The standard errors in these models were clustered at the village level.

⁵For example, (Kimball and Willis 2023) develop a conceptual framework whereby life-satisfaction is the sum of two components: (i) elation or a transitory response to news/shocks that impact lifetime utility and (ii) baseline mood or long-run happiness. In our setting, exposure to conflict reflects a shock that could impact lifetime utility and hence stated life-satisfaction.

provement in efficacy of governance also impact perceptions towards governance (Acemoglu et al. 2020). Formal institutions in our survey include local (police, municipality, district courts, civil services) and national institutions (federal government); informal institutions are the mosque and other religious institutions. Respondents are asked on a Likert-scale of 1 to 10 about their attitudes towards these institutions where very high confidence takes a value of 10 and no confidence takes a value of 0. Similar to exposure to violence, these questions were standardized.

As shown in Figure 2, exposure to violence is positively associated with trust in formal institutions. Alternatively, confidence towards mosques (informal local institutions) is declining in v_i^N . This shift in trust dynamic is noteworthy, particularly from a policy perspective. The rise in trust towards formal institutions indicates that amidst violence, individuals may seek stability and protection through formal structures, which could have significant implications for policy and governance.

Table 4 complements these results. Here we find that exposure to conflict is significantly associated with an increase in trust of formal institutions, both at the local and federal level. Alternatively, trust in mosques in conflict-hit villages has significantly declined. For every one standard deviation increase in exposure to violence, on average, confidence in mosques decreased by 0.11 standard deviations. The robustness of these results is shown from the consistency of these results across several institutions. Pairing these results with the prior literature on confidence in public institutions and perceptions about quality and performance of these institutions (Hetherington 2005; Newton 2006), we view these perceptions about governance important from a policy perspective. The rise in trust toward formal institutions indicates their potential to offer stability and security. Consequently, policies should aim to bolster the capacity and credibility of these institutions to effectively serve the needs of affected communities.

A potential limitation in our empirical analysis is that exposure to violence may not be random; unobserved characteristics of conflict-prone villages, such as local institutional strength, quality of service delivery, and governance transparency, could influence levels of trust, well-being, and confidence in institutions. If this is the case, then the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are merely capturing correlations between conflict and perceptions. For example, if areas with weaker institutions are more likely to experience violence, then the relationship between conflict exposure and trust or well-being might be driven by this underlying institutional fragility, leading to downward-biased OLS estimates. Indeed, because of this fact, we have taken care to use non-structural language in our discussion of the empirical results.

To add a bit of structure on this problem, we also estimated instrumental variables (IV) models. The instruments are based on geographical distance between the respondent’s village and areas considered to be training and recruitment grounds for militants (and target areas for military operations). The three instruments we use are (i) distance to Torkham border,

(ii) distance to Swat, and (iii) distance to South Waziristan.

Our IV estimates, presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7, indicate that the results are not only consistent in direction but also larger in magnitude when using these geographic instruments. This is consistent with our original interpretation of the OLS results. The most notable difference is in the effect of violence on trust in district courts: with the IV approach we find a substantial and statistically significant positive effect. This robustness finding suggests that the reader interested in making causal inference concerning our results might take greater ease in arguing that these are causal impacts of conflict exposure on critical social variables.

A second potential limitation of our survey results and the field experiment below is external validity. Following the SANS conditions in (List 2020), we do have a highly selected sample. Yet, we view that as a strength not a weakness of our study. That is because it is inherently interesting to learn about the effects of exposure to violence from this particular group, the Taliban. Second, we do not have any attrition in our sample, and concerning the naturalness of task, we follow the literature in our survey approach. In the end, while one might view our results as overly parochial, what we argue is generalizable is that a comprehensive approach that addresses the economic, social, and psychological dimensions of violence exposure is essential. This includes integrating health, education, and social services to provide a holistic response to the challenges posed by violence.

4 From Stated to Revealed Preference: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Our analysis thus far has focused on stated preferences as inferred by responses to survey questions eliciting overall life-satisfaction and confidence in various institutions. In this section, we extend the analysis to examine the impact of exposure to conflict on revealed preferences as inferred from allocation decisions that have real, financial consequence. To do so, we report data from a modified dictator game that was embedded within a survey experiment conducted in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in March, 2016 (for more on the dictator game and relevant data interpretation see (List 2007)).

The tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have endured severe conflict and violence over the past two decades. The roots of the conflict lie in efforts of the Pakistani military to uproot al-Qaeda and other militants who fled Afghanistan and sought refuge in the north-western tribal areas of Pakistan after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. The conflict resulted in widespread, and often forced, displacement of the population to safe zones within the province or to other areas of the country. Displaced families were provided monetary aid by the government and assistance returning to their home village when deemed safe to do so.

4.1 The Experimental Design and Task

The experiment was embedded within a larger survey designed to measure the impact of displacement and a World Bank sponsored post-conflict rehabilitation program of citizens' trust in government and perceptions surrounding the quality of key government services. The survey was launched in March, 2016 and includes a random sample of 1,639 respondents. Respondents were selected to represent one of four types - displaced, rehabilitated, affected and non-displaced. The first type were respondents who were forced to leave their home due to the conflict and, at the time of the survey, were still displaced. The second type were respondents who were forced to leave their home due to the conflict but, by the time of the survey, had been returned to their home village. The third type were respondents who lived in areas that were affected by the conflict but who were not forced to leave their home. The final type were respondents who lived in the tribal areas that was unaffected by the conflict.

As part of the survey, every respondent was confronted with two versions of the dictator game. Payouts for each game were made as monetary transfers to the participant's cellular phone account. In the first version of the dictator game, the respondent was asked how to allocate 100 PKR between themselves and another individual from their home village.⁶ Once the subject had determined the allocation and verified that the money kept for themselves had been transferred, they proceeded to the second allocation game. In the second version of the dictator game, each respondent was asked how they would like to allocate another 100 PKR amongst themselves and one of three, randomly determined, government agencies - the local school authority, the local health authority, or the security administration.

Table 8 summarizes the marginal results from a series of linear regression models of the amount kept by the respondent in the first dictator game on indicators for the respondent's type. As noted in the first column of the table, individuals who were unaffected by the conflict (the constant in the regression model) keep approximately 76 percent of the endowment. In contrast, counterparts who were exposed to violence and affected by the conflict - the displaced, the rehabilitated, and the affected - keep approximately 12.4 to 15.3 percent more for themselves; differences that are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Results are qualitatively similar, albeit smaller in magnitude, when we include controls for the age and gender of the respondent (Column 2). These results suggest that exposure to conflict shift the relative weights placed on money for one's self vis-à-vis money for a like other.

Table 9 summarizes the marginal results from a series of linear regression models of the amount kept by the respondent in the second dictator game on indicators for the respondent's type. As noted in the first column of the table, individuals who were unaffected by the conflict (the constant in the regression model) keep approximately 76 percent of the endowment. Counterparts who were exposed to conflict and affected by the conflict - keep approximately

⁶For perspective, at the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was such that \$1 USD was the equivalent of around 105 PKR.

27.5 to 43.3 percent less for themselves; differences that are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Results are qualitatively similar, albeit smaller in magnitude, when we include controls for the age and gender of the respondent (Column 2).

Viewed in conjunction with results in Table 8, these results are consonant with the stated preference results. Amongst individuals who were not impacted by conflict, willingness to share is similar when the recipient is another individual or a government agency. In contrast, exposure to conflict has a differential impact on the relative weights placed on money allocated to one’s self vis-à-vis money allocated to the recipient. Specifically, we find that while respondents are less altruistic when matched with another person, they are more altruistic and share more when the recipient is a government agency.

5 Conclusion

Exposure to violence and conflict has potentially profound and far-reaching impacts on individuals across all stages of life, from the youngest infants to the elderly. In this study, we delve into a particularly insidious form of violence: exposure to the Taliban. To uncover how exposure to violence influences both stated and revealed preferences around general trust, subjective well-being, confidence in various institutions, and generosity toward others, we collect data from both an in-person survey as well as a field experiment.

Our overarching findings reveal a troubling reality: exposure to Taliban violence significantly erodes general trust and trust in informal institutions, while concurrently diminishing subjective well-being and consideration of others. Paradoxically, this exposure appears to bolster trust in formal institutions, suggesting a complex and nuanced interplay between violence and trust dynamics. These results underscore the necessity for a multi-faceted policy approach to support affected individuals and communities. Such strategies should address both immediate relief and long-term resilience, fostering an environment where trust and well-being can be restored and maintained.

Future research should explore the long-term impacts of government interventions on trust and well-being, as well as the role of specific public policies in mitigating the effects of conflict. Understanding the dynamics between formal and informal institutions in post-conflict settings is key to designing effective policies that promote social cohesion, economic development, and resilience against future conflicts. Our study contributes both stated and revealed preference evidence to the growing body of literature on the relationship between conflict, trust, and institutional dynamics. We trust that future research across the social sciences will build on our work to offer insights for policymakers and stakeholders working towards peace and stability in conflict-affected regions.

6 References

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
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
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7 Appendix

Figure 1: Conflict, trust and subjective-well being




Panel A: Exposure to violence and general levels of trust



Panel B: Exposure to violence and subjective well-being

Notes: The figures in Panel A were constructed using probit models and the figures in Panel B were constructed using estimates from a linear regression model. The shaded areas in the figures represent the 95% predicted intervals.

Figure 2: Exposure to violence and confidence in institutions



Notes: These figures were constructed using estimates from a linear regression model. The shaded areas in the figures represent the 95% predicted intervals.

Table 1: List of villages with in-person surveys in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Tehsil	Village	Survey count
Buner	Agarai	50
	Sura	49
	Charorai	50
	Nagrai	50
Battagram	Ajmera	44
Mastuj	Charun	53
Kohat	Urban 5	50
	Jerma	50
	Billitang	49
	Shah Pur	50
Balakot	Balakot	48
Mansehra	Mansehra City	67
	Dhodial	58
	Bufa	60
Tangi	Dhakkaki	51
	Tangi Bazar	47
	Mandani	49
Puran	Puran	51
Peshawar	Tehkal	61
	Gulbahar	60
	Gulahan Rehman	60
	Faqirabad	60
	Dalazaq	60
	Afghan Colony	60
	Pawakay	61
	Qisa Khwani	60
	Palosai	61
	Bazik Khel	56
	Safaid Dary	60
	Achini	58
	Ashpando	60
	Surizai Payan	58
	Musa Zai	58

Table 2: Summary statistics

	$v_i^s \leq 0$	$v_i^s > 0$	Difference
Trust			
Others can be trusted	0.605 (0.489)	0.463 (0.499)	-0.141*** (0.023)
Others are helpful	0.613 (0.487)	0.509 (0.500)	-0.104*** (0.024)
Others are fair	0.441 (0.497)	0.348 (0.477)	-0.093*** (0.023)
Subjective well-being			
Satisfaction w/ life	0.155 (1.029)	-0.187 (0.931)	-0.341*** (0.047)
Satisfaction w/ financials	0.122 (1.021)	-0.149 (0.953)	-0.271*** (0.047)
Satisfaction w/ community	0.168 (1.009)	-0.203 (0.951)	-0.371*** (0.046)
Confidence in institutions			
Police	-0.077 (0.984)	0.094 (1.012)	0.171*** (0.047)
Municipality	-0.122 (0.990)	0.149 (0.992)	0.272*** (0.047)
District court	-0.029 (1.015)	0.036 (0.980)	0.065 (0.047)
Civil services	-0.077 (1.057)	0.093 (0.918)	0.170*** (0.047)
Federal government	-0.100 (1.005)	0.119 (0.982)	0.219*** (0.047)
Mosque/religious institution	0.117 (0.961)	-0.143 (1.029)	-0.259*** (0.048)
Demographics			
18-25 years	0.307 (0.462)	0.349 (0.477)	0.042* (0.022)
26-35 years	0.296 (0.457)	0.253 (0.435)	-0.044** (0.021)
36-55 years	0.308 (0.462)	0.291 (0.454)	-0.018 (0.022)
≥55 years	0.088 (0.284)	0.107 (0.310)	0.019 (0.014)
Pashtun ethnicity	0.659 (0.474)	0.684 (0.465)	0.024 (0.022)
Married	0.572 (0.495)	0.543 (0.498)	-0.030 (0.023)
Male	0.689 (0.463)	0.711 (0.454)	0.021 (0.022)
No education	0.145 (0.352)	0.209 (0.407)	0.064*** (0.018)
Less than high school	0.194 (0.396)	0.167 (0.373)	-0.028 (0.018)
High school	0.125 (0.331)	0.119 (0.114)	-0.006 (0.015)
Some college	0.157 (0.364)	0.148 (0.355)	-0.009 (0.017)
College graduate or higher	0.370 (0.483)	0.351 (0.477)	-0.019 (0.023)
Observations	1003	820	

Table 3: Conflict, Trust and Subjective Well-being

Panel A			
	People can be trusted	People are helpful	People are fair
Violence standardized	-0.0502** (0.0219)	-0.0440*** (0.0165)	-0.0400** (0.0171)
Observations	1567	1544	1572
Log Likelihood	-1053.7938	-1026.2485	-1020.0830
Panel B			
	Financials	Community	Life
Violence standardized	-0.1104* (0.0563)	-0.1327** (0.0566)	-0.1515*** (0.0474)
Observations	1539	1541	1579
r ²	0.1386	0.1607	0.1082

Notes: The outcome variables in Panel A are binary. The reported coefficients are the marginal effects of exposure to violence from a probit regression model. The first two outcome variables in Panel B were asked on a scale of 1 - 10 (10 = very satisfied). The third outcome variable in Panel B was asked on a scale of 1 - 5 (5 = very satisfied). For ease of interpretation, all of these and the variable of interest were standardized. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, wealth, occupation, marital status and Tehsil population. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Conflict and Trust in Institutions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Municipality	Police	District Courts	Federal govt.	Civil Services	Mosque
Violence standardized	0.136** (0.057)	0.117** (0.052)	0.086 (0.055)	0.126*** (0.043)	0.097* (0.048)	-0.113** (0.042)
Observations	1565	1577	1557	1568	1569	1532
r2	0.058	0.053	0.098	0.054	0.035	0.105

Notes: The outcome variables were asked on a scale of 1 - 10, with 10 indicating high confidence /satisfaction. For ease of interpretation, all of these and the variable of interest were standardized. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, wealth, occupation, marital status and Tehsil population. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Conflict and Well-being IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Financials	Life	Community
Violence standardized	-0.793*** (0.214)	-0.672*** (0.219)	-0.784*** (0.141)
Observations	1539	1541	1579
r2	-0.308	-0.122	-0.275

Notes: The first two outcome variables were asked on a scale of 1 - 10 (10 = very satisfied). The third outcome variable in Panel B was asked on a scale of 1 - 5 (5 = very satisfied). For ease of interpretation, all of these and the variable of interest were standardized. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, wealth, occupation, marital status and Tehsil population. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Conflict and Trust IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	People can be trusted	People are fair	People are helpful
Violence standardized	-0.752** (0.303)	-0.492*** (0.152)	-0.484** (0.198)
Observations	1567	1572	1544
Log Likelihood	-3176.2961	-3158.5982	-3127.847

Notes: The outcome variables are binary. The reported coefficients are the marginal effects of exposure to violence from a instrumental variables probit regression model. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, wealth, occupation, marital status and Tehsil population. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Conflict and Trust in Institutions IV

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Municipality	Police	District Courts	Federal govt.	Civil Services	Mosque
Violence standardized	0.592*** (0.193)	0.887*** (0.291)	0.806*** (0.262)	0.491** (0.224)	0.562** (0.245)	-0.407* (0.246)
Observations	1565	1577	1557	1568	1569	1532
r ²	-0.146	-0.525	-0.400	-0.074	-0.173	0.020

Notes: The outcome variables were asked on a scale of 1 - 10, with 10 indicating high confidence/satisfaction. For ease of interpretation, all of these and the variable of interest were standardized. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age, education, ethnicity, gender, wealth, occupation, marital status and Tehsil population. Standard errors clustered at the village level are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: War and Generosity Towards Friends

	(1)	(2)
	Balance Kept	Balance Kept
BR	11.07*** (3.096)	10.53*** (3.119)
BD	9.350** (2.986)	8.938** (3.002)
BA	11.63*** (3.222)	11.51*** (3.230)
Constant	75.77*** (2.805)	91.06** (27.78)
Demographics	No	Yes
Observations	1573	1573

Notes: The outcome is the balance kept for self when playing the dictator game with friends. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age and gender. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: War and Generosity Towards Government

	(1)	(2)
	Balance Kept	Balance Kept
BR	-20.78*** (4.467)	-20.28*** (4.499)
BD	-25.31*** (4.304)	-24.63*** (4.328)
BA	-32.72*** (4.625)	-32.02*** (4.637)
Constant	75.56*** (4.043)	124.6** (40.43)
Demographics	No	Yes
Observations	1610	1610

Notes: The outcome is the balance kept for self when playing the second dictator game with a government agency. Demographic controls included in the regressions are: age and gender. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$