Mobilizing 18-35 Year Old Voters

An Analysis of the Michigan Democratic Party's 2002 Youth Coordinated Campaign

Ryan Friedrichs
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Professor Thomas Patterson, Harvard University, Seminar Leader
Professor David King, Harvard University, Faculty Advisor
David Nickerson, Yale University, Technical Advisor
Amanda Stitt, Michigan Democratic Party, YCC Director

A Report for the Michigan Democratic Party

April 1, 2003



Table of Contents

Executive Summary 4

Introduction 5

Voter Mobilization Studies 6

I. Observation vs. Experiment 6
II. Personal vs. Mass Marketing Tactics 7

Campaign Design & Methodology 10

I. Infrastructure 10

A. *Staff & Site Locations* 10
B. *Budget* 13

II. Evaluation Methodology 15

A. *Experiments* 15
B. *Staff Feedback* 16

Analysis 17

I. Mobilization vs. Implementation 17

A. *Door-to-Door* 17
B. *Volunteer Call* 18
C. *Door Hanger* 19

II. Additional Mobilization Tactics 20

A. *Message* 20
B. *Age* 21
C. *Volunteer Experience* 21
D. *Overlap: Phone & Door Hanger* 22
E. *Date* 22
F. *Other Factors* 23

III. Cost Effectiveness 25

A. *Spillover Votes* 25
B. *Dollars per Vote* 25

Recommendations 29

I. Apply Voter Mobilization Literature to Campaigns 29

II. Tactics for 2004 29

A. *Door-to-Door Primary Tactic* 29
B. *Include Older Voters in Door-to-Door* 29
C. *Calls Primary Tactic in Rural & Apartment Precincts* 30
D. *Limit Calls on College Campuses* 30
E. *Door Hangers Only Alongside Door-to-Door* 31
F. *Include Polling Place Information* 31

III. Administration 31

A. *Paid Site Captains Are Worth The Cost* 31
B. *Zero to Moderate Experience Equally Effective* 32
C. *Start Early & Peak in the Final Week* 32
D. *Synchronize Lists With Local Campaign* 32

IV. Additional Research 33

A. *Door-to-Door & Phone Overlap* 33
B. *Message* 33
C. *Messenger* 33
D. *Radio and TV Outreach* 34

Appendices 35

Appendix A: Sample Door-to-Door Experiment Sheet 35
Appendix B: Sample Phone Experiment Sheet 36
Appendix C: Sample Door Hanger Experiment Sheet 37
Appendix D: Phone Sample Scripts 38
Appendix E: Door-to-Door Sample Script 39
Appendix F: Door Hanger Sample 40

Executive Summary

The Youth Coordinated Campaign used randomized experiments to measure the impact of its three major tactics: 1) door-to-door conversations, 2) volunteer phone calls, and 3) door hangers. Results found the more personal tactics had the highest impact and were the most cost effective.

- At a total cost of $53,317, the campaign reached out to a total of 98,000 voters age 18-35, through 14,000 door knocks, 24,000 phone calls, and 60,000 door hangers.
- Door-to-door conversation increased turnout by 10% at a rate of $10 per vote.
- Volunteer phone calls increased turnout by 2.5% at a rate of $8 per vote.
- Door hangers increased turnout by 1% at a rate of $23 per vote.
- Messages with polling place information boosted turnout by 1.5% over pure issue messages.
- Volunteers with no experience were equally as effective as those with moderate experience.

<u>Recommended tactics for 18-35 year old voter mobilization in 2004</u>:

- Use door-to-door conversations as the primary outreach tactic.
- Use volunteer phone calls as the primary tactic in rural and apartment populated precincts.
- Increase cost effectiveness of door-to-door outreach with inclusion of older voter households.
- Synchronize walk and call lists with target campaign.
- Only distribute door hangers alongside door-to-door outreach.
- Begin outreach at least four weeks before the election and peak contacts in the final week.
- Conduct randomized experiments on the impact of TV and radio outreach.
- Use candidates: 18-35 year old turnout in ’98 doubled in ‘02 due in small part, a few thousand votes, to the YCC and likely in large part to outreach from candidates like Governor Granholm.

Introduction

An integral part of the Michigan Democratic Party's Coordinated Campaign in 2002 focused on the future of the Party and of the state – young voters. A targeted Youth Coordinated Campaign, led by the Party's newly formed Youth Caucus, reached out to 98,000 voters age 18 to 35, through 24,000 phone calls, 14,000 door knocks and 60,000 door hangers. The goal of this report is to analyze the impact of that campaign and recommend strategies for 2004.

The Youth Coordinated Campaign mobilized young voters in fourteen target sites from October 5 to November 5. The campaign utilized thirteen paid staff, 174 paid volunteers, 266 unpaid volunteers, and had a total cost of $53,317. Target sites were in fourteen of Michigan's fifteen congressional districts as well as fourteen State House and State Senate districts; selected based on an area's number of 18-35 year old voters and its number of competitive 2002 races.

The campaign used randomized treatment and control groups from the Michigan Democratic Party's voter file to evaluate each of the its mobilization tactics. These experiments measured the mobilization impact of: 1) phone calls, 2) door-to-door conversations, 3) door hangers, 4) different volunteer messages, 5) multiple tactics, 6) volunteer experience levels, 7) the date of the outreach, 8) outreach in different regions, 9) outreach on voters of different ages, and 10) outreach "spillover" onto other household voters. Additionally, the campaign conducted post-election interviews with all paid staff to further inform its evaluation.

The design of the Youth Coordinated Campaign both utilized and aimed to supplement current studies of voter mobilization. After a brief review of these studies, this report describes in greater detail the campaign design and evaluation methodology, then proceeds to its analysis and recommended strategies for 2004.

Voter Mobilization Studies

I. Observation vs. Experiment

The design of the Youth Coordinated Campaign relied heavily on the experimental work of professors Donald Green and Alan Gerber. Over the last few years Green and Gerber have fought to reintroduce experimental techniques into political science, specifically into studies of voter mobilization.[1]

The myriad of factors that influence whether a person votes or not can easily mislead evaluations based solely on observation. For example, a campaign can blanket a neighborhood with flyers, then watch turnout rise and draw a false connection between the increased turnout and the flyers – perhaps candidates were inspiring that year or good weather on Election Day boosted turnout.

To reduce this guesswork, common in newspapers and campaigns, voter mobilization studies in recent decades have used survey data to identify links between tactics and turnout.[2] Green and Gerber correctly point out that the problem with these survey studies is that they may exaggerate the impact of voter contact. If a campaign targets its most likely voters, as many

---

[1] Green, Donald and Alan Gerber, "Reclaiming the Experimental Tradition in Political Science", in Milner & Katznelson, *State of the Discipline* III, Norton, 2002.

[2] Kramer, Gerald H. "The Effects of Precinct-Level Canvassing on Voting Behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34, Winter, pp. 560-72, 1970.
Blydenburgh, John C. "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact Campaigning." *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, pp. 365-81, 15, May 1971.
Lupfer, Michael, and David E. Price. "On the Merits of Face-to-Face Campaigning." *Social Science Quarterly,* pp. 534-43, 53, December, 1972
Cain, Bruce E., and Ken McCue. "The Efficacy of Registration Drives." *Journal of Politic*s, pp. 1221-30, 47, November 1985.
Caldeira, Gregory A., Aage R. Clausen, and Samuel C. Patterson. "Partisan Mobilization and Electoral Participation." *Electoral Studies,* 9, 3, pp. 191-204, 1990.
Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. "Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass." *American Political Science Review*, 86, pp. 70-86, March 1992.
Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan, 1993.
Wielhouwer, Peter W., and Brad Lockerbie. "Party Contacting and Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 38, pp. 211-29, February 1994.

modern campaigns do, then those contacted may indeed vote more often, but not because of the contact.[3] Surveys that weigh contact numbers against turnout may therefore tend to inflate the success of a campaign tactic.

Experimental evaluation can eliminate much of this uncertainty with randomized treatment and control groups: one group receives the tactic, one does not – otherwise the groups are identical. Only a handful of voter mobilization studies used experiments before Green and Gerber.[4] These studies, however, are decades old and were often small in scale or limited in their ability to randomly assign voters to treatment and control groups (to assure the groups are initially identical), which leaves their relevancy to modern campaigns in doubt. Green and Gerber launched a fresh wave of studies in recent years that more reliably identify effective tactics for a modern campaign field strategy.

II. Personal vs. Mass Marketing Tactics

Green and Gerber's key claim: the more personal a tactic the higher its mobilization effect. In a series of experiments between 1998 and 2001 door-to-door (face-to-face) contact consistently proved the most influential and cost effective mobilization technique. Some evidence also emerged that volunteer phone banks may have a higher mobilization effect than

---

[3] Gerber, Alan S. and Donald P. Green. "The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review*. Volume 94, Number 3, September 2000.

[4] Gosnell, Harold F. *Getting-Out-The-Vote: An Experiment in the Stimulation of Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.

Gosnell, Harold F. *Machine Politics: Chicago Model.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927.

Eldersveld, Samuel J., and Richard W. Dodge. "Personal Contact or Mail Propaganda? An Experiment in Voting & Attitude Change." *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, ed. Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred M. Lee. New York: Dryden, 1954.

Eldersveld, Samuel J. "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior." *American Political Science Review*, 50 (March): pp. 154-65, 1956.

Adams, William C., and Dennis J. Smith. "Effects of Telephone Canvassing on Turnout and Preferences: A Field Experiment." *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 44 (Autumn): pp. 389-95, 1980.

professional phone banks. Zero personal contact techniques, such as direct mail and leaflets, appeared to have minimal and possibly no mobilization effect.

Summary of Green & Gerber Findings

Nonpartisan Tactic	Mobilizing Effect	Dollars / Vote[5]	*Notes*
Door-to-Door[6]	**8-10%**	**$12 - 20**	Tested on young voters
Volunteer Phone Bank[7]	**3-5%**	**$12 - 20**	Tested on young voters
Professional Phone Bank[8]	**0-2%**	**$140 - ∞**	
Multiple Calls[9]	**0-1%**	**n/a**	Tested on young voters
Leafleting[10]	**0%** (party affiliated voters)	**$40 - ∞**	**7%** effect on unaffiliated
Direct Mail[11]	**0-1%**	**$40 - ∞**	

The design of the Youth Coordinated Campaign utilized what appeared to be this body of work's most cost effective tactics: 1) door-to-door, 2) volunteer phone banks, and 3) leafleting.

Miller, Roy E., David A. Bositis, and Denise L. Baer. "Stimulating Voter Turnout in a Primary: Field Experiment with a Precinct Committeeman." *International Political Science Review*, 2, 4, pp. 445-60, 1981.

[5] Dollars / Vote reflects the tactic's program costs and does not include campaign overhead costs.

[6] Estimate from several studies including:

* Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. "Getting Out the Youth Vote: Results from Randomized Field Experiments." Unpublished report to the Pew Charitable Trusts and Yale University's Institute for Social and Policy Studies, December 29, 2001.

* Gerber & Green, September 2000.

* Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green and David W. Nickerson. "Getting Out the Youth Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments." Unpublished report to the Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE), University of Maryland, May 7, 2002.

[7] Gerber & Green, December 2001.

[8] Estimate from two studies:

* Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. "Do Phone Calls Increase Voter Turnout? A Field Experiment." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65, pp. 75-85, 2001.

* Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. "Mobilizing African Americans Using Mail and Commercial Phone Banks: A Field Experiment." Unpublished report, ISPS, Yale University, January 2 2003.

[9] Gerber & Green, December 2001.

[10] Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. "The Effect of a Nonpartisan Get-Out-The-Vote Drive: An Experimental Study of Leafleting." *The Journal of Politics* 62:3, pp. 846-857, August 2000.

[11] Gerber & Green, September 2000.

The addition of leafleting stems from the fact that young voters are disproportionately unaffiliated with the political parties, so the fact that leaflets mobilized unaffiliated voters by 7% in the Connecticut experiment made it a potential cost effective tactic.

In addition to critiques about the difficulty of randomization in the field, a central drawback of the Green and Gerber studies is their focus on nonpartisan tactics.[12] Only one study looked at the impact of partisan outreach, a direct mail study where they found little to no mobilization effect.[13] However, as the last set of comprehensive partisan experiments occurred over twenty years ago, with the problems previously cited, the Green and Gerber literature was the best authority to guide the YCC's design. The lack of data also provided the campaign an opportunity to add to the understanding of which tactics best mobilize voters in the modern campaign environment.

[12] Kosuke, Imai, "The Importance of Statistical Methods for Analyzing Data from Field Experimentation: Evaluating Voter Mobilization Strategies," Unpublished report, Department of Government, Harvard University, August 7, 2002.
[13] Gerber, Alan, Donald Green and Matthew Green, "Partisan Mail and Voter Turnout: Results from Randomized Field Experiments," Unpublished report, ISPS, Yale University, August 2001.

Campaign Design & Methodology

I. Infrastructure

A. *Staff & Site Locations*

The Youth Coordinated Campaign reported directly to the Michigan Democratic Party's Coordinated Campaign through YCC Director Amanda Stitt. The Director worked in coordination with the Youth Caucus, headed by State Representative David Woodward, to select the campaign's target sites and site captains.

The campaign selected sites based on where young voter mobilization could be most valuable to the 2002 Democratic ticket. The original twelve sites selected contained the best combination of three elements: 1) large population of 18-35 year-old Democratic or independent voters, 2) high number of contested races, and 3) strong Youth Caucus capacity (example: an active chapter of the College Democrats of Michigan or the Michigan Young Democrats).[14] Cooperation from targeted campaigns allowed the YCC to add extra sites in Jackson and Milan / Pittsfield, while a lack of cooperation forced one site change from Richmond / New Baltimore to Saint Claire Shores.

Each site captain was responsible for the design and the implementation of a one month (October 5 to November 5) campaign plan that utilized the YCC's three tactics: 1) door-to-door contact, 2) volunteer phone banks, and 3) door hangers – leaflets hung on a voter's door. If an area had a high number of competitive races the YCC Director had the ability to name a regional organizer to oversee multiple site captains.

[14] See Youth Coordinated Campaign Target Chart for a site-by-site summary of selection criteria; Democratic Identifications exist in relation to age, therefore proportion was more important than quantity for "Dem Ids," p. 12.

Youth Coordinated Campaign Organizational Chart



Youth Coordinated Campaign Target Chart

Major Cities & Municipalities	18-35 '00 Turnout	18-35 '98 Turnout	18-35 '02 Eligible	18-35 '02 Registered	18-35 Dem Id	House District	Senate District	Cong. District	Top State Turnout	Active CD / YD
Alpena	5122	1560	13817	11910	594	**106**	**36**	**1**		
Ann Arbor & Ypsilanti	14665	5483	44903	27812	2285	**53**	**18**	**15**	**1st in '00**	X
Canton & Van Buren Townships	11672	4400	24529	16378	1437	**21**	**7**	**11**	**5th in '00**	X
Detroit (Wayne State University)	6417	160	30408	13577	2037	**6**	**1 & 4**	**13 & 14**		X
East Lansing	10352	4062	35720	21417	1539	**69**	**23**	**8**		X
Grand Rapids	11238	5148	28765	16182	1399	**75**	**29**	**3**	**11th in '00**	
Kalamazoo	9264	3088	29522	19253	1360	**60**	**20**	**6**		X
Richmond & New Baltimore	10939	4667	16473	16383	1079	**32**	**11**	**10**		
Royal Oak & Madison Heights	13346	1619	24715	19267	1836	**26**	**13**	**9 & 12**	**2nd in '00**	
Saginaw County	9099	4631	16276	14103	933	**94**	**32**	**4 & 5**		X
Springfield & Battle Creek	7626	1779	18375	15154	896	**62**	**19**	**7**		
Woodhaven & Flat Rock	9096	2988	17892	14656	1226	**23**	**7**	**15**		
Totals	**99049**	**32542**	**242675**	**166370**	**10268**	**12**	**12**	**13**	**4**	**6**

* Voting history numbers represent US Census and MI Qualified Voter File figures for State House Districts

B. ***Budget***

The total cost of the Youth Coordinated Campaign was $53,317. The Michigan Democratic Party's Coordinated Campaign provided $40,000 of these funds and the Youth Caucus raised the rest. The campaign's ability to remain below its proposed budget of $62,000 was a function of two factors: 1) the Director's ability to generate in-kind contributions from target campaigns, and 2) the average site captain's recruitment of 60% unpaid volunteers.[15]

Target campaigns and the MDP Coordinated Campaign provided in-kind office space, telecommunications and office supplies. The central non-staff costs were: door hangers, precinct maps and voter file contact lists. Phone bank and event costs were in-kind donations from local campaign coalitions.

The majority of volunteers were under 30 years old – college students in campus sites and high school students in non-campus sites. Other sources of volunteers were Youth Caucus members, community organizations, local party activists and young workers. Due to the delayed cash flow of the YCC the majority of paid volunteers participated only during the last weekend of the campaign.

Outside of the MDP Coordinated Campaign, funding for the YCC came from the Youth Caucus, individual donors, local parties (district and county), and target campaigns. The Young Democrats of American and College Democrats of America provided supplies, such as t-shirts and literature on their national Youth to the Booth campaign, but did not donate funds.

[15] Of 450 total volunteers, 276 were unpaid and 174 were paid.

Campaign Budget

July 15 to November 15, 2002

Expenses:

Costs in MDP Coordinated Campaign Budget		
Salaries		$36,070
State Youth Organizer (4 mths @ $2,000 per month)	$8,000	
Site Captains and volunteers / canvassers	$28,070	
Health Care		$1,597
State Youth Organizer health insurance (4 months)	$1,597	
Travel		$2,600
State Youth Organizer (4 mths @ 500 miles per week)	$2,600	
Subtotal		**$40,267**
Costs in Youth Coordinated Campaign Budget		
Printing/Publications		$7,612
Door Hangers (100,000 printed by EGT Group, Inc.)	$7,612	
Rent & Utilities		$0
In-kind contribution of MDP and target campaigns	$0	
Phone, Fax & Internet		$0
In-kind contribution of MDP and target campaigns	$0	
Supplies: Copying, Printing & Office Supplies		$0
In-kind contribution of MDP and target campaigns	$0	
Target site costs		
Voter Mobilization		$5,438
Walk lists and phone bank lists (ApT & PPC)	$1,395	
Phone bank use costs (in-kind: campaigns)	$0	
Campus voter registration flyers (in-kind: campaigns)	$0	
Campus absentee voting info. flyer (in-kind: MDP)	$0	
Extra funds for canvassers and volunteers	$4,043	
Events, forums, and debates (optional by site)	$0	
Subtotal		**$13,050**
TOTAL		**$53,317**

Revenues:

Youth Coordinated Campaign		$13,050
Elected Officials and County/District Parties	$5,000	
Individual Donors	$5,000	
Youth Caucus	$3,050	
MDP Coordinated Campaign		$40,267
TOTAL		**$53,317**

II. Evaluation Methodology

A. *Experiments*

To measure the impact of its outreach the Youth Coordinated Campaign used the Michigan Democratic Party's voter file to create contact lists and non-contact lists within each targeted State House District. After the removal of all Republicans and voters older than 35, the campaign placed individuals randomly into the contact or non-contact group for each tactic.[16]

1. *Door-to-Door: October 5 to November 1*

Within the target district the campaign divided voters up by seven digit zip codes and randomly assigned 2/3 of voters in that area to the contact group and 1/3 to the non-contact group. The division by seven digit zip codes allowed walk lists to cover large portions of nine-digit zip codes that canvassers could more easily walk.[17]

2. *Phone: October 5 to November 1*

Phone lists randomly placed 80% of a district's voters in contact groups and 20% in non-contact groups. The high percentage in contact groups is due to the phone's ability to reach more voters than door-to-door in an equal amount of time. Within call lists voters were randomly assigned to receive an "information" message (when and where to vote) or an "issues" message (why to vote) – indicated by a 1 or a 2 next to the voter's name.[18]

[16] Many thanks to David Nickerson, PhD candidate at Yale University and student of Green and Gerber, for assistance with the randomization, assignment and interpretation process.
[17] See Appendix A for a sample walk list and Appendix E the door-to-door script.
[18] See Appendix B for a sample phone call list and Appendix D for the two different phone scripts.

3. *Door hangers: November 2 to November 5*

As with door-to-door, the campaign divided target districts into seven digit zip codes, with 60% randomly assigned to the contact group and 40% to the non-contact group. The lower percentage in the contact group is due to the smaller timeframe of the door hanger campaign. Door hangers contained a message with both issues and information, tailored by precinct, with a list of Democratic candidates down to State House Representative.[19]

The campaign also collected information on the date and time of the outreach as well as the participating volunteer's experience level. The goal of this data was to inform future campaigns about the impact of a tactic one month vs. one week away from Election Day, as well as of any relationship between a volunteer's experience and the tactic's success.

B. *Staff Feedback*

After the campaign site captains had the opportunity to comment on their experiences with the different types of voter outreach. Feedback ranged from how easy or difficult a tactic was to administer to the success or failure of different volunteer recruitment strategies. As only a portion of sites were able to integrate all evaluation techniques into their work, staff interviews also identified the administrative challenges of outreach measurement. Finally, the discussions explored the variety of activities beyond direct voter contact, from candidate events to voter registration, that made-up YCC.

[19] See Appendix C for a sample door hanger walk list and Appendix F for a sample door hanger.

Analysis

I. Mobilization vs. Implementation

Two elements determine a campaign tactic's effectiveness: 1) mobilization effect, and 2) ease of implementation. If a tactic has a strong mobilization effect but is difficult to administer than only a small number of voters may receive the outreach. Likewise, if a tactic is easy to implement but has a weak mobilizing effect, then it may reach many voters yet only move a small number to vote.

The difference in turnout between each tactic's contact and non-contact groups best measures the mobilization effect of the outreach. Both the contact rate (how often an attempt to administer the tactic was successful) and level of total outreach measure a tactic's ease of implementation.

Youth Coordinated Campaign Tactics Assessment

Tactic	Total Outreach	Total in Experiment	Contact Rate	Mobilizing Effect	*Notes*
Door-to-Door	**14,000**	**2,000**	**10%**	**10%**	Contact = conversation with target voter
Volunteer Call	**24,000**	**8,700**	**60%**	**2.5%**	Contact = message or conversation with voter
Door Hanger	**60,000**	**8,800**	**90%**	**1%**	Contact = door hanger left at accessible address

A. *Door-to-Door*

1. *Mobilization*

Of the three tactics, door-to-door conversations clearly have the strongest mobilization effect. The 10% increase after door-to-door contact fits within the

8-10% range Green and Gerber found in their nonpartisan studies of all age voters.[20] The low contact rate makes the estimation less exact than the numbers for the other tactics, but the unique power of a face-to-face conversation is clear.[21]

2. *Implementation*

With Republicans, unregistered voters and those above 35 not on walk lists, volunteers often had large distances between target households. Site captains cited this as a major reason for low outreach numbers. Additionally, most door-to-door outreach occurred on weekends, often between noon and 5PM, when many young people may not have been home. This fact and the transitory nature of 18-35 year olds, which decreases address accuracy, likely contributed to the low contact rate.[22]

B. *Volunteer Call*

1. *Mobilization*

The mobilization effect of 2.5% nearly reaches the 3-5% window documented in the Green and Gerber studies.[23] This effect does not distinguish between a conversation and a message, although if the impact of a message is very low than the effect of a conversation may be as high as 7%. The high contact rate makes the overall estimation of 2.5% very reliable.[24]

[20] Green & Gerber, September 2000 and Green & Gerber, December 2001.
[21] The door-to-door estimate has a 50% confidence interval and matches closely with Green and Gerber data.
[22] From 1999 to 2000 on third of 20-29 year olds moved once a year, twice the rate of other ages: Nickerson, David, "Hunting the Elusive Young Voter," Manuscript presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA, August 29 to September 1, 2002.
[23] Green & Gerber, September 2000 and Green & Gerber, December 2001.
[24] The phone estimate has an over 90% confidence interval and matches closely with Green and Gerber data.

2. *Implementation*

The high contact rate is likely due to two factors: 1) well-managed voter lists, and 2) successful call times. The existence of a Qualified Voter File in Michigan, as well as good management by Practical Political Consulting and Applied Political Technologies, provided volunteers with a highly accurate call lists. Additionally, calling on weekday nights, usually between 6 and 9PM seems to have been a good time to reach 18-35 year olds.

C. *Door Hanger*

1. *Mobilization*

The surprising fact here is that a simple door hanger had any impact at all. While 1% is slightly higher than the 0.6% Green and Gerber found for direct mail, it reaffirms the principle: the less personal the tactic the lower the impact.[25] A high contact rate makes this estimation also very reliable.[26]

2. *Implementation*

The entire door hanger campaign occurred during the campaign's last weekend. The very high outreach number is likely due the fact that over 50% of the campaign's total volunteer pool worked only on this last weekend. This was the only weekend the campaign had funds to pay canvassers, and the final campaign weekend generally draws more volunteers than earlier weekends.

[25] Green & Gerber, September 2000.
[26] The door hanger estimate has a over 80% confidence interval and matches closely with Green and Gerber data.

II. Additional Mobilization Tactics

The Youth Coordinated Campaign also measured a variety of ways to boost the effectiveness of each tactic. These additional tactics relate to the time, place and manner of the campaign's outreach.

Youth Coordinated Campaign Extra Tactics

Tactic	Extra Mobilizing Effect	*Notes*
Message: where & when to vote	**+1.5%**	Compared against a pure issues message; tested in phone outreach
Age: tactics on different ages	**0%**	Age groups: 18-24, 25-30, 31-35
Volunteer: high experience level	**+6%**	No difference in low vs. medium experience; tested in phone outreach
Overlap: call + door hanger	**0%**	The door hanger reminder to vote after a call provided no extra effect
Date: last week of the election	**+5%**	Also found a +3% effect in the forth week out; tested in phone outreach
Other: non-contact activities	**----**	Observation indicates non-measured factors likely increased 18-35 turnout

A. *Message*

The phone script with polling place information boosted turnout to a higher degree than the script with only an issues message. This may be due to the value of polling place information to a younger voter. Additionally, site captains reported that voters were more receptive to a call with specific information for them instead of simply a campaign pitch. While only the phone experiments tested these messages, the door hangers also contained precinct specific polling information that may have boosted their effectiveness.

B. *Age*

Within those 18-35 years old tactics appear to have an equal impact on regardless of age. The comparison divided the cohort into three groups: 18-24, 25-30 and 31-35 year olds. This result coincides with nonpartisan studies that have not found differences in the mobilization effect of the tactics across age groups.[27] The ability to implement the outreach, however, may be more difficult with younger voters whose address and phone information change with greater frequency.[28]

C. *Volunteer Experience*

Callers that self identified as having high experience levels were consistently more effective than those with less experience.[29] However, no clear difference appears to exist between those with no experience and those with low or medium experience.[30]

Effect of Experience on Phone Mobilization



[27] Green & Gerber, September 2000 and Green & Gerber, December 2001.
[28] Nickerson, August 2002.
[29] Thanks to David Nickerson for assistance with the volunteer experience and tactic date charts.
[30] The estimation bars represent 90% confidence intervals.

The high experience callers may have been more effective in their calls simply because they were more comfortable and accustomed to the process. Equally interesting is the lack of difference between those with "zero" experience and those with "medium" experience. While paid staff (most of the high experience callers) were most effective, a new volunteer was just as valuable as someone who had worked on a campaign or two.

D. *Overlap: Phone & Door Hanger*

The addition of a door hanger to a household that received a YCC call appears to have no extra effect. Perhaps one election reminder was enough or maybe the fact that both had polling place information, in the case of the information script, diminished the impact of the door hanger. The campaign did not attempt multiple calls, which the nonpartisan literature found has no extra effect, and had too low a contact rate with door-to-door outreach to examine additional overlapped tactics.[31]

E. *Date*

Phone outreach the week before the election seems more effective than outreach two, three or four weeks beforehand. This appears to be a straightforward case of voters paying more attention to election activities as the day to vote draws near. Another interesting finding was that outreach four weeks before the election was as effective, maybe slightly more effective, than outreach two or three weeks beforehand. This slight increase could be due to a limited number of campaigns doing direct voter contact four weeks out – less noise competition. A low contact rate makes the forth week result less reliable than the estimation for the first week, but it is clear that some value does exist in an early start.



F. *Other Factors*

In 1998 voters 18-35 years old were 9% of the electorate in Michigan and in 2002 they represented 17%. The Youth Coordinated Campaign can only claim a small portion of the credit for this rise, maybe a few thousand votes, with all of its voter contact strategies, events and other activities. A fierce gubernatorial race that elected the state's first female Governor, a young candidate that reached out to young voters, likely played a large role in the increase. The impact of candidate outreach should never be underestimated. The Youth Coordinated Campaign, however, did play an important role and the site-by-site breakdown of its efforts shows the districts where it likely had the greatest impact.

[31] Green & Gerber, December 2001.

Youth Coordinated Campaign Site Summary Chart

Major Cities & Municipalities	YCC Site Captain	18-35 '00 Turnout	18-35 '98 Turnout	18-35 '02 Turnout	Phones Called	Doors Knocked	Hangers Dropped	Free Vols	Paid Vols	House District	Senate District	Cong. District
Alpena	Joel Bauer	5122	1560	3095	*1000*	*150*	*350*	35	0	**106**	**36**	**1**
Ann Arbor & Ypsilanti	Rachel Fisher	14665	5483	8138	*n/a*	*2150*	*9885*	65	25	**53**	**18**	**15**
Canton & Van Buren Twps	Michelle Mirzoian	11672	4400	6966	*4000*	*1150*	*4000*	15	7	**21**	**7**	**11**
Detroit	Jeff Nzoma	6417	160	3964	*500*	*250*	*4450*	27	15	**6**	**1 & 4**	**13 & 14**
East Lansing	Andrew Goetz	10352	4062	7417	*1000*	*3000*	*4500*	20	10	**69**	**23**	**8**
Grand Rapids	Paige Barnum	8834	3729	5164	*2160*	*n/a*	*4500*	20	33	**76**	**29**	**3**
Jackson	Aaron Flynn	7153	2695	4223	*1720*	*2262*	*3535*	22	8	**64**	**19**	**7**
Kalamazoo	Lori Richards	9264	3088	5341	*560*	*1160*	*3400*	10	15	**60**	**20**	**6**
Milan & Pittsfield Twp.	Michelle Mirzoian	9917	2222	5052	*3700*	*850*	*3500*	10	0	**55**	**17**	**15**
Royal Oak & Madison Heights	John Hensler	13346	1619	8157	*3500*	*850*	*4550*	10	15	**26**	**13**	**9**
Saginaw County	Jamie Hardy	9099	4631	5442	*2160*	*783*	*5000*	10	27	**94**	**32**	**4 & 5**
Springfield & Battle Creek	Kara Presley	7626	1779	3763	*n/a*	*n/a*	*1050*	5	8	**62**	**19**	**7**
St. Clair Shores & Harrison Twp.	Amanda D'Angelo	9332	4053	5345	*150*	*250*	*6000*	5	6	**24**	**9 & 11**	**10 & 12**
Woodhaven & Flat Rock	Michelle Mirzoian	9096	2988	5041	*3300*	*1000*	*5020*	12	5	**23**	**7**	**15**
Totals	**12**	**131895**	**42469**	**77108**	**23750**	**13855**	**59740**	**266**	**174**	**14**	**14**	**14**

* Voter turnout numbers are from the MI Qualified Voter File figures for State House Districts

** If a site overlaps multiple State House Districts the chart lists the central district

III. Cost Effectiveness

A. *Spillover Votes*

The best way to compare campaign tactics is cost effectiveness. The "dollars per vote" standard combines the influence of a tactic with how easy it is to administer. This estimation uses the total number of votes each tactic generates, which includes the "spillover" effect or the mobilization effect on all members of the contacted household. For example, more than one member of a household could listen to a message on an answering machine or one person's decision to vote could influence another to vote.

Youth Coordinated Campaign Total Household Impact

Tactic	Mobilization + Spillover Effect	*Notes*
Door-to-Door	**19%**	Every 100 households contacted generated 19 new votes.
Volunteer Call	**4%**	Every 100 households called generated 4 new votes.
Door Hanger	**2%**	Every 100 door hangers placed generated 2 new votes

B. *Dollars per Vote*

The standard dollars per vote calculation only includes the campaign program costs.[32] This allows campaigns with vastly different overhead costs to weigh the value of a new tactic or program of tactics. For example, the Youth Coordinated Campaign received much of its overhead costs as in-kind contributions, to neglect this fact and calculate based on overhead cost could lead to a deceptively low dollars per vote estimate.

[32] Green & Gerber, September 2000.

The estimate for the YCC program cost uses a conservative $15 per volunteer hour for each tactic. As the campaign had over 60% of its volunteers work for free, two estimates exist for each tactic: 1) campaign that pays 100% of its volunteers, and 2) YCC estimate with only 40% paid volunteers. The first estimate is a worst-case scenario where a campaign can find no volunteers to work for free.[33]

Dollars per Vote at $15 per Volunteer Hour

Tactic	Household Mobilization Effect	Contacts per vote	Contacts per hour	Dollars per Vote (100% paid)	Dollars per Vote (40% paid)
Door-to Door	19%	5	*3*	$25	**$10**
Volunteer Call	4%	25	*20*	$19	**$8**
Door Hanger	2%	50	*13*	$58	**$23**

The most interesting fact here is that door-to-door outreach was slightly less cost effective for the campaign than volunteer phone calls. This is the result of the low "contacts per hour" the campaign made because it only targeted 18-35 year old households, which were often quite spread out. If volunteers hit houses of all ages their door-to-door contacts would likely jump to around 7 per hour.[34] This brings door-to-door dollars per vote (with 100% paid) down to $11 – well below the $19 for volunteer calls.

The nonpartisan estimates of Green and Gerber assume a campaign pays all its volunteers. The phone and door-to-door estimates here fit in the $12-20 range of those

[33] The dollars per vote calculation multiplies the number of votes generated in 1 hour by $15. Contacts per vote (determined by the mobilization effect) divided by contacts per hour = the number of votes generated in 1 hour.

studies, while the door hanger estimate of $58 is higher than their estimate of $20-40.[35] Again, however, the door hanger contact rate of 13 per hour is lower because of the campaign's targeting of only 18-35 year old households. If door hanger volunteers targeted households of all ages their contacts per hour would likely rise to around 20 per hour, which brings the dollar per vote estimate down to $38.[36]

Dollars per Vote for All Age Contacts at $15 per Volunteer Hour

Tactic	Household Mobilization Effect	Contacts per vote	Contacts per hour	Dollars per Vote (100% paid)	Dollars per Vote (40% paid)
Door-to Door	19%	5	*7*	$11	$4.50
Volunteer Call	4%	25	*20*	$19	$8
Door Hanger	2%	50	*20*	$38	$15

For the Youth Coordinated Campaign door-to-door and volunteer phone outreach were highly cost effective. However, these tactics were not equally cost effective for every target site. As the Site Summary Chart indicates, the extra distance between homes in rural sites like Alpena made door-to-door outreach difficult to implement.[37] A high number of locked apartment buildings in sites like Detroit and Pittsfield also impeded door-to-door outreach.

[34] Green and Gerber, December 2001.
[35] Green & Gerber, September 2000 and Green and Gerber, December 2001.
[36] Increased contact rates based on nonpartisan estimates: Green, Gerber & Nickerson, May 2002.
[37] See Youth Coordinated Campaign Site Summary Chart for site-by-site outreach totals, p. 23.

In dense college towns like East Lansing, Ann Arbor and Kalamazoo door-to-door outreach was easier to implement, while accurate phone lists were more difficult to obtain. High transience and unlisted dormitory numbers make phone bank outreach less cost effective in these areas. As each site attempted to deploy all three tactics, some site captains had to implement strategies ill suited for their area.

Many sites compensated for these difficulties with extra volunteer recruitment. The average site captain recruited over 30 volunteers. Campus sites had a much larger percentage of unpaid volunteers, while paid volunteers usually exceeded unpaid at non-campus sites. An area's total number of volunteers related directly to its levels of outreach in all three tactics.[38]

With a budget of under $55,000 it appears that the campaign was able to design, implement and evaluate a highly cost effective mobilization strategy. While experimental dollars per vote comparisons are not yet available for television and radio outreach, the Youth Coordinated Campaign clearly demonstrates that personalized field tactics can be both low cost and high impact.

[38] The Ann Arbor / Ypsilanti site had the highest number of volunteers and also won the College Democrats of America's "Chapter of the Year" award for its efforts at the University of Michigan in 2002.

Recommendations

I. Apply Voter Mobilization Literature to Campaigns

The key finding of this evaluation matches the conclusion of nonpartisan literature on voter mobilization: *the more personal the tactic, the higher the impact and the lower the cost.* This principle appears to hold firmly with 18-35 year old Democratic and independent voters in Michigan. The fact that results in this study are so similar to those extensively studied in nonpartisan outreach, adds weight to the argument that the established body of mobilization literature can also apply to political campaigns.

II. Tactics for 2004

A. *Door-to-Door Primary Tactic*

The impact of one face-to-face conversation appears to be at least ten times as powerful as a reminder to vote left silently on the door, and four to five times stronger than a phone call. The main challenge of door-to-door outreach is to increase its contact rate. More pay for canvassers and outreach on weekdays from 6 to 9PM will help improve contact rates.

B. *Include Older Voters in Door-to-Door*

With 18-35 year old homes as exclusive targets, large distances existed between households on volunteer walk lists. These gaps lowered door-to-door contact rates further than normal and made the tactic less cost effective. If in 2004 the campaign still targeted areas with young populations, but allowed volunteers to also visit older Democratic and independent homes in between the 18-35 households, cost effectiveness would more than

double. This strategy would also facilitate better coordination with local campaigns, which use Democratic base numbers, not age, to identify target precincts.[39]

C. *Calls Primary Tactic in Rural & Apartment Precincts*

Volunteer phone calls appeared nearly as cost effective with 18-35 year olds as door-to-door outreach because of its ease of implementation. The more difficult the door-to-door campaigns were to implement the more cost effective volunteer phone outreach became. Areas with large distances between households or a high number of locked apartment buildings consistently had difficulty with door-to-door outreach. The accuracy of the MDP voter file allows for high phone contact rates, which compensates for the smaller mobilization effect of a phone conversation or message.

D. *Limit Calls on College Campuses*

The high density of 18-35 year old households on college campuses makes door-to-door outreach much more cost effective than phone outreach. Additionally, accurate phone lists of young voters in dormitories are difficult to obtain. Targeted outreach in general is difficult on campuses because of student mobility and the fact that many keep their voter registration addresses in their hometowns. The most effective mobilization strategy seems to be a combination of registration drives and door-to-door outreach in areas of campus with the highest Democratic base numbers.

[39] Some site captains expressed concern that this strategy might detract from the unique focus on youth the YCC had in 2002. However, as long as the Youth Caucus still targets areas with the highest number of active 18-35 year-old voters, then the focus on youth will remain, but not to the detriment of other Democratic voters in the area.

E. *Door Hangers Only Alongside Door-to-Door*

While door hangers on their own were not cost effective, they did have a slight mobilization effect. Therefore, there is value in a reminder to vote left behind when a voter is not available for a door-to-door conversation. A similar reminder, such as a leaflet, might also add value after a conversation as well. Door hangers and leaflets appear to be most effective as supplemental tactics.

F. *Include Polling Place Information*

The information on where and when to vote increased the mobilization effect of phone calls.[40] The impact of this information is unlikely unique to phone outreach and should add value to literature and door-to-door outreach. Site captains' stressed that voters were more open to conversations that began with a reminder of where and when to vote instead of a campaign issues pitch.

III. Administration

A. *Paid Site Captains Are Worth The Cost*

Those who self identified with the highest level of experience on outreach sheets were most often the site captains themselves. The 6% boost in effectiveness this experience gave their personal outreach efforts is well worth the cost of their employment – outside of their ability to recruit and coordinate other volunteers. Sites that could have included just as many unpaid or paid volunteers, but not these experienced individuals, would have made a much smaller impact.

B. *Zero to Moderate Experience Equally Effective*

Beyond paid staff, volunteer experience appeared to matter little. Callers with no experience were equally effective as those with low or even moderate experience levels. Recruitment strategies should therefore not aim at overused campaign volunteer lists, but should use high schools, unions, colleges, community organizations and even personal friendships to build *new* pools of volunteers.

C. *Start Early & Peak in the Final Week*

The relatively equal impact of outreach two, three and four weeks before the election, indicates direct voter contact should begin well before a campaign's final week. However, the additional 5% effect of outreach in the final week shows extra resources devoted at the end of the campaign are likely worth the cost. An early start and a strong final week appear to be parts of a model campaign timeframe.

D. *Synchronize Lists With Local Campaign*

In most sites the Youth Coordinated Campaign was an outside addition to the targeted campaign, which often used different voter outreach lists and strategies. This led at times to tension and even competition for volunteer. Early synchronization with local campaigns, where staff members use the Youth Coordinated Campaign to cover targeted precincts with young voters, could help minimize these conflicts.

---

[40] Redistricting in Michigan may have increased the effectiveness of polling place information in 2002. However, experiments without the influence of redistricting have also found a mobilization increase of approximately 2% with an "information message," see Green, Gerber and Nickerson, May 2002.

IV. Additional Research

A. *Door-to-Door & Phone Overlap*

Door-to-door contact rates were too low for an evaluation of the additional impact generated by a combination of face-to-face and phone outreach. Also, multiple door-to-door visits and calls may have some extra effect, although the nonpartisan literature argues against it.[41] Experiments should weight these different combinations before campaigns limit their outreach to only the most effective tactic.

B. *Message*

Additional experiments on the variety of messages that best reach young voters would be valuable. This evaluation only used phone outreach to measure the impact of polling place information, a result that campaigns should test on direct mail and door-to-door outreach. Also, the impact of humor, candor and different issues on young voters needs more exploration.

C. *Messenger*

The outreach measured in the Youth Coordinated Campaign only involved contact between the average volunteer and voters. Candidate outreach or outreach from a celebrated community member might have a stronger impact. Evaluations that measured the importance of the messenger could help a campaign better deploy limited resources strategically.

[41] Green & Gerber, December 2001.

D. *Radio and TV Outreach*

Experimental dollars per vote estimations of radio and television outreach do not yet exist. As the vast majority of campaign funds go to television advertisements, cost effective comparisons with between field tactics and mass media outreach would be very useful. Several site captains felt radio outreach may be a disproportionately cost effective method to reach young voters.

Appendices

Appendix A: Sample Door-to-Door Experiment Sheet

Name _____ Age _____ Experience 0 1 2 3 Date _____ Start Time_____ Stop Time_____

city	precinct	list	address	Family Name	Persons		Gob Away	Not Home	Moved	Can't
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	101000 OAK AVE	SMITH	JOHN					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12998 ELM RD	JONES	BOB					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	9220 REESE RD	OAK	JUSTIN / MEGAN					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10240 REESE RD	O'RIELLY	DAVID					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10260 REESE RD	FREDRICK	TOM / MARK					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10494 REESE RD	LUCKY	SUMER / REID					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	9459 TOTTEN LN	THOMAS	BRAM					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12980 GERA RD # 1	COLD	ETHAL					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12980 GERA RD # 3	SIMMONS	MAIA					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12887 CIMARRON DR	FISHER	AMANDA					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12800 IROQUOIS DR	MCPHAIL	DAVID					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12215 DIXIE HWY	DOBSON	KATHY					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	13685 DIXIE HWY	MARY	MONA					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10075 WENN RD	STITT	MJ					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10105 WENN RD	CHECK	JODY					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10111 WENN RD	ELVERHOY	TIM / MARTHA					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10128 BURT RD	DOUGLAS	ROB / SARAH					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	10630 BURT RD	KING	DONALD					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	11137 BURT RD	ROBERTSON	SHELIA / BILL					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12196 BURT RD	SPIELBERG	TIM					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12196 BURT RD	KANG	DAVID					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12275 BURT RD	CROFT	ESTER					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12375 BURT RD	STEVENS	TROY					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12460 BURT RD	GROVES	BRAD / HEIDI / MATT					
BIRCH RUN	730300001	1	12490 BURT RD	HUGHBERT	ANNE					

Appendix B: Sample Phone Experiment Sheet

Name _____ Age _____ Experience 0 1 2 3 Date _____ Start Time_____ Stop Time_____

Home Codes: C = Contacted a person listed (Please Circle Person); O = Contacted A Registered Voter Not Listed; M = Left Message on machine.

Not Home Codes: B = Busy (Please again); N = No answer; G = The person has moved; D = Dead / Line not valid.

Favorable: X = Person seemed in favor of candidate / party; O = Person seemed opposed to candidate / party = ? = Not sure how person feels.

phone	last	hhnames	pollplace	polladd	pollcity	script	Home	Not Home	Favorable
7346998607	SMITH	JOHN	FIRE STATION #1	130 FOURTH ST.	BELLEVILLE	2			
7346976420	JONES	BOB	CITY HALL	6 MAIN ST.	BELLEVILLE	2			
7343312533	OAK	JUSTIN / MEGAN				2			
7346998363	O'RIELLY	DAVID	BHS AUDITORIUM	501 W. COLUMBIA AVE.	BELLEVILLE	2			
7344959808	FREDRICK	TOM / MARK	DODSON SCHOOL	205 BECK N	CANTON	2			
7349816309	LUCKY	SUMER / REID				2			
7346994539	THOMAS	BRAM	FIRE HALL	25 SECOND ST.	BELLEVILLE	1			
7346996855	COLD	ETHAL				2			
7344559535	SIMMONS	MAIA				1			
7343972133	FISHER	AMANDA	FIELD SCHOOL	1000 SOUTH HAGGERTY	CANTON	1			
7344953101	MCPHAIL	DAVID	AGAPE CHRISTIAN	45081 GEDDES	CANTON	1			
7343978563	DOBSON	KATHY				1			
7343976019	MARY	MONA	TRI-CITY CHRISTIAN	3855 SHELDON S	CANTON	1			
7348443969	STITT	MJ				1			
7346977527	CHECK	JODY				2			
2483986136	ELVERHOY	TIM / MARTHA	ST. JOHN NEUMANN	44800 WARREN	CANTON	1			
7343971669	DOUGLAS	ROB / SARAH	FIELD ELEMENTARY SCH	1000 S. HAGGERTY	CANTON	2			
7346972153	KING	DONALD				1			
7348446144	ROBERTSON	SHELIA / BILL	CANTON HIGH SCHOOL	8415 N. CANTON CENTER	CANTON	1			
7343974492	SPIELBERG	TIM				1			
7349813599	FISHER	BRIAN	SUMMIT OF THE PARK	46000 SUMMIT PARKWAY	CANTON	1			
7343540236	WHITEHOUSE	JOHN				2			
7349819146	EILER	ZACH	MILLER SCHOOL	43721 HANFORD	CANTON	1			
7346972174	GODEK	MAIA				1			

Appendix C: Sample Door Hanger Walk List

Date _____ Start Time_____ Stop Time_____

This contains mostly: Big Apartments ____ Small Apartments ____ Detached Houses ____

Left	Missed	address	city	precinct	state	zip9
		3337 WILL CARLETON RD	FLAT ROCK	821000003	MI	481348907
		3521 WILL CARLETON RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481349754
		3521 WILL CARLETON RD	FLAT ROCK	821000003	MI	481349754
		3537 WILL CARLETON RD	FLAT ROCK	821000003	MI	481349754
		3553 WILL CARLETON RD	FLAT ROCK	821000003	MI	481349754
		3585 WILL CARLETON RD	FLAT ROCK	821000003	MI	481349754
		3703 WILL CARLETON RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481349754
		28751 BRANDES RD	FLAT ROCK	821000003	MI	481349742
		26565 BELL RD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649330
		27451 BELL RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649633
		27664 BELL RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481640027
		27796 BELL RD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648607
		28664 MARGARET LN	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648610
		28708 MARGARET LN	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648610
		28724 MARGARET LN	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481648610
		28831 MARGARET LN	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648610
		27093 BRYAN BLVD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649046
		27097 BRYAN BLVD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649046
		27141 BRYAN BLVD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649046
		37558 DALE DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649047
		27140 JOHN DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649048
		37551 LESLIE DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649112
		26705 WHISPERING WILLOWS DR	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649197
		26710 POPLAR DR	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649199
		26715 POPLAR DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649198
		34400 ASH RD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649151
		35306 ASH RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649635
		35510 ASH RD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648612
		35611 ASH RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649634
		37633 ASH RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649339
		38145 ASH RD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649342
		27796 BELL RD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648607
		28664 MARGARET LN	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648610
		28708 MARGARET LN	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648610
		28724 MARGARET LN	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481648610
		28831 MARGARET LN	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481648610
		27093 BRYAN BLVD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649046
		27097 BRYAN BLVD	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649046
		27141 BRYAN BLVD	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649046
		37558 DALE DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649047
		27140 JOHN DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649048
		37551 LESLIE DR	NEW BOSTON	821000003	MI	481649112
		26705 WHISPERING WILLOWS DR	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649197
		26710 POPLAR DR	Huron Twp	821000003	MI	481649199

Appendix D: Phone Sample Scripts

Phone Script 1: Issues

· Hi my name is _____ [first name].

· I'm calling from the Youth Coordinated Campaign to ask for your support for _____ [target campaign] as well as Jennifer Granholm and the rest of the Democratic ticket.

· This is the most important election in decades for Michigan with _____ [issue] and _____ [issue] being debated.

· Young voters can make all the difference in these close elections.

· Can we count on your support on November 5th?

· Thanks for your time and for more information you can visit _____ [target campaign(s) website]

Phone Script 2: Information

· Hi my name is _____ [first name].

· I'm calling from the Youth Coordinated Campaign to ask for your support for _____ [target campaign] as well as Jennifer Granholm and the rest of the Democratic ticket;

· (IF LISTED) And to remind you that your (new) polling location is _____

· Young voters can make all the difference in these close elections.

· Can we count on your support on November 5th?

· Thanks for your time and for more information you can visit _____ [target campaign(s) website]

Appendix E: Door-to-Door Sample Script

Door-to-Door Script:

· Hi my name is _____ [first name].

· I'm with the Youth Coordinated Campaign and just wanted to give you some information about _____ [target campaign] as well as Jennifer Granholm and the rest of the Democratic ticket.

· This is the most important election in decades for Michigan with _____ [issue] and _____ [issue] being debated.

· Young voters can make the difference in these elections.

· Can we count on your support on November 5th?

· Thanks for your time.

Appendix F: Sample Door Hanger

