David Court, Benjamin Gillen, Jordi McKenzie, Charles R Plott
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Successful field tests were conducted on two new Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs). The mechanisms collected information held as intuitions about opening weekend box office revenues for movies in Australia. Participants were film school students. One mechanism is similar to parimutuel betting that produces a probability distribution over box office amounts. Except for "art house films", the predicted distribution is indistinguishable from the actual revenues. The second mechanism is based on guesses of the guesses of others and applied when incentives for accuracy could not be used. It tested well against data and contains information not encompassed by the first mechanism.
Laura Derksen, Adamson Muula, Joep van Oosterhout
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The HIV epidemic in southern Africa has important consequences for economic development. The epidemic could be stopped by a universal test and treat policy, as antiretroviral drugs block the spread of the virus. However, demand for HIV testing and treatment are surprisingly low. This paper develops a model in which the decision to seek an HIV test is a signal of infection, and those who seek a test are subject to statistical discrimination from potential sexual partners. We evaluate an information experiment designed to test the theory, and find evidence that this form of discrimination is a significant barrier to HIV testing. In particular, we provide information at the community level on the public benefit of antiretroviral therapy: because the drugs prevent HIV transmission, a person who is tested and treated for HIV is a relatively safe sexual partner. This information reduces discrimination and increases HIV testing, with the strongest effects in communities where the new information becomes common knowledge. The results demonstrate that discrimination towards HIV positive individuals can be due to rational behavior by a misinformed public, and that providing new information can be an effective way to mitigate its effects.
Jana Gallus
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This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia, which faces declining editor retention rates, particularly among newcomers. Randomization assures that award receipt is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals that awards have a sizeable effect on newcomer retention, which persists over the four quarters following the initial intervention. This is noteworthy for indicating that awards for volunteers can be effective even if they have no impact on the volunteers' future career opportunities. The awards are purely symbolic, and the status increment they produce is limited to the recipients' pseudonymous online identities in a community they have just recently joined. The results can be explained by enhanced self-identification with the community, but they are also in line with recent findings on the role of status and reputation, recognition, and evaluation potential in online communities.
Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Andrea Prat
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This paper investigates how the success of a management practice depends on the nature of the long-term relationship between the firm and its employees. A large US transportation company is in the process of fitting its trucks with an electronic on-board recorder (EOBR), which provide drivers with information on their driving performance. In this setting, a natural question is whether the optimal managerial practice consists of: (1) Letting each driver know his or her individual performance only; or (2) Also providing drivers with information about their ranking with respect to other drivers. The company is also in the first phase of a multi-year initiative to remake its internal operations. This first phase corresponds to an overhaul of the relational contract with its employees, focusing exclusively on changing values toward a greater emphasis on teamwork and empowerment. The main result of our randomized experiment is that (2) leads to better performance than (1) in a particular site if and only if the site has not yet received the values intervention, and worse performance if it has. The result is consistent with the presence of a conflict between competition-based managerial practices and a cooperation-based relational contract. More broadly, it highlights the role of intangible relational factors in determining the optimal set of managerial practices.
Brit Grosskopf, Graeme Pearce
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We present a natural field experiment designed to measure other{regarding preferences in the market for taxis. We employed testers of varying ethnicity to take a number of predetermined taxi journeys. In each case we endowed them with only 80% of the expected fare. Testers revealed the amount they could afford to pay to the driver mid-journey and asked for a portion of the journey for free. In a 2x2 between{subjects design we vary the length of the journey and whether drivers havereputational concerns or not. We find that the majority of drivers give at least part of the journey for free and over 25% complete the journey. Giving is found to be proportional to the length of the journey, and the drivers' reputational concerns do not explain their behaviour. Evidence of strong out{group negativity against black testers by both white and South Asian drivers is also reported. In order to link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory we estimate the parameters of a number of utility functions. The data and the structural analysis lend support to the quantitative predictions of experiments that measure other{regarding preferences, and shed further light on how discrimination can manifest itself within our preferences.
Bruno Crepon, Julie Pernaudet
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Disadvantaged youth are particularly at risk of under-investing in their health. Costs of healthcare and bias in health needs perceptions are likely to be key factors of underinvestment. Relying on a randomized experiment, we find that providing them with personalized information both on public health insurance and on their health status based on a medical diagnosis raises their curative and preventive investments. More specifically, they are more likely to consult a psychologist and to use contraception, while depression and risky sexual behaviors are key issues in this population. In order to distinguish between the two barriers, financial constraints and underestimation of health needs, we also test a program providing information on public health insurance only. This limited program improves their medical coverage in the same way as the combined program, but it does not translate into higher health investments. These findings highlight the importance of taking into account the role of subjective perceptions of health needs when considering health decisions among disadvantaged youth.
Lester Lusher
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Procrastination, an issue linked to poor performance and decreased well-being, is a pervasive problem in education. This paper examines the role of commitment and motivation by evaluating a program called CollegeBetter.com which acts as a commitment device and monetary incentive to help college students battle problems of present bias. The zero-sum mechanism is based off a parimutuel betting market, where students join a pool by placing a monetary wager on themselves to achieve the pool's "commitment challenge." Students who successfully commit to the challenge 1) recover their wagers and 2) split losing wagers proportionally. Through a series of lab and field experiments, I find that students interested in the mechanism were low-achieving, overconfident, self-identified procrastinators, while traditional measures of time-preferences were weak predictors of selection. Across all pools, students randomly selected to participate were more likely to achieve the commitment challenge than students who applied for a spot but were randomly excluded. Consistent with loss aversion, having the student risk their own money is a principal contributor to the effectiveness of the mechanism.
Fadi Hassan, Paolo Lucchino
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More than 1.3 billion people worldwide have no access to electricity and this has first-order effects on several development dimensions. In this paper we focus on the link between access to light and education. We randomly distribute solar lamps to 7th grade pupils in rural Kenya and monitor their educational outcomes throughout the year at quarterly frequency. We find that access to lights through solar lamps is a relevant and effective input to education. Our identification strategy accounts for spillovers by exploiting the variation in treatment at the pupil level and in treatment intensity across classes. We find a positive and significant intention-to-treat effect as well as a positive and significant spillover effect on control students. In a class with the average treatment intensity of our sample (43%), treated students experience an increase in math grades of 0.88 standard deviations. Moreover, we find a positive marginal effect of treatment intensity on control students: raising the share of treated students in a class by 10% increases grades of control students by 0.22 standard deviations. We exploit household geolocation to disentangle within-class and geographical spillovers. We show that geographical spillovers do not have a significant impact and within-school interaction is the main source of spillovers. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism through which lamps affect students is by increasing co-studying at school especially after sunset.
Andris Saulitis
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This paper examines the extent to which a noncompliant debtor can be induced to pay back the debt by sending a randomly assigned message via mobile phone and e-mail, ranging from a simple reminder to personalized messages and a social norm. In cooperation with a debt-collector enterprise in Latvia, the field experiment was carried out on 24,781 unique cases of consumer debts with unpaid liabilities, ranging from one to 40,060.26 euros. Overall, sending a message to a debtor increases compliance in comparison of not sending a message at all. However, messages, which include debtor's name, agent's name or social norm, do not increase compliance in comparison to a simple reminder message. I also looked at the interaction effect between the content of the message and the debt amount, which has been hardly examined in previous experiments on compliance. Messages with a debtor's name significantly increase compliance in comparison to a simple reminder among the debts smaller than 170 euros. However, such a message is counter-effective for debts larger than 1,340 euros, the same trend is true for a message with the social norm. Hence, a different policy needs to be applied to the debtors who are extensively overindebted in comparison to those with comparatively small debt amounts.
Jasper Knockaert, Stefanie Peer, Erik T Verhoef
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If left unidentified and uncorrected, self-selection biases may greatly compromise the external validity of the outcomes of field experiments. We show that self-selection biases in terms of observed und unobserved characteristics can be well identified and corrected by means of a complementary stated preference (SP) experiment conducted among the participants and non-participants of a field experiment. In the SP experiment, respondents are confronted with hypothetical choice situations that closely resemble the choice situations present in the field experiment. The SP experiment does not only allow us to compare participants and non-participants with respect to their behavior and implied preferences in the hypothetical choice situations, but also renders it possible to infer how non-participants would have behaved if they had decided to participate, using an innovative modeling approach to elicit the corresponding preference structures. We apply this approach in the context of a large-scale field experiment in which train commuters received monetary rewards for traveling outside peak hours. We find strong self-selection biases, especially with respect to the marginal utility of income, which is significantly higher among participants of the field experiment.
Eliana Carranza, Robyn Meeks
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Overloaded electrical systems are a major source of unreliable power (outages) in developing countries. Using a randomized saturation design, we estimate the impact of energy efficient lightbulbs on household electricity consumption and local electricity reliability. Receiving compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs) significantly reduced household electricity consumption. Estimates not controlling for spillovers in take-up underestimate the impacts of the CFLs, as control households near the treated are likely to take-up CFLs themselves. Greater saturation of CFLs within a transformer leads to aggregate reliability impacts of two fewer days per month without electricity due to unplanned outages relative to pure controls. Increased electricity reliability permits households to consume more electricity services, suggesting that CFL treatment results in technological externalities. The spillovers in take-up and technological externalities that we document may provide an additional explanation for the gap between empirical and engineering estimates of the impacts of energy efficient technologies.
Guodong Gao, Tianshu Sun, Ginger Zhe Jin
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While much research has examined the role of technology in moderating online user connections, how IT motivates offline interactions among users is much less understood. Using a randomized field experiment involving 80,000 participants, we study how mobile messaging can leverage recipients' social ties to encourage blood donation. There are three main findings: first, both behavior intervention (in the form of reminder message) and economic reward (in the form of individual or group reward) increase donations, but only the messages with group reward are effective in motivating more donors to donate with their friend(s); second, group reward tends to attract different types of donors, especially those who are traditionally less active in online social setting; and third, across all treatments, message recipients donate a greater amount of blood if their friends are present. Structural estimation further suggests that rewarding group donors is four times more cost-effective than rewarding individual donors. Based on the structural estimates, we perform policy simulations on the optimal design of mobile messaging. The method of combining structural model and randomized field experiment opens new frontiers for research on leveraging IT to mobilize a user's social network for social good.
Elizabeth Lyons
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Remote and short-term work arrangements are increasingly common despite the limited incentives they provide for acquiring firm-specific knowledge. This paper examines the importance and cost-effectiveness of firm-specific training for remote contract workers using evidence from a field experiment conducted in an East African insurance firm that offers two-month employment contracts for its salespeople. Findings show that firm-specific training significantly increases firm revenue, but that this effect is concentrated among higher ability workers. Training has no impact on worker retention, and offering workers financial or competitive input-based incentives has no impact on these findings, or on observed worker investment in firm-specific training. These results demonstrate that high ability temporary workers may be willing to invest in firm-specific human capital without additional incentives, and that firm performance is significantly improved as a result. Implications for temporary work contracts are discussed.
Gad Allon, Jan A. Van Mieghem, Dennis J. Zhang
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This paper studies how service providers can design social interaction among participants and quantify the causal impact of that interaction on service quality. We focus on education and analyze whether encouraging social interaction among students improves learning outcomes in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), which are a new service delivery channel with universal access at reduced, if not zero, cost. We analyze three randomized experiments in a MOOC with more than 30; 317 students from 183 countries. Two experiments study large-group interaction by encouraging a random subset of students to visit the course discussion board. The majority of students treated in these experiments had higher social engagement, higher quiz completion rates, and higher course grades. Using these treatments as instrumental variables, we estimate that one additional board visit causally increases the probability that a student finishes the quiz in the subsequent week by up to 4:3%. The third experiment studies small-group interaction by encouraging a random subset of students to conduct one-on-one synchronous discussions. Students who followed through and actually conducted pairwise discussions increased their quiz completion rates and quiz scores by 10% in the subsequent week. Combining results from these three experiments, we provide recommendations for designing social interaction mechanisms to improve service quality.
Carina Cavalcanti, Andreas Leibbrandt
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This paper investigates the role of dry promotions for community participation in eight Brazilian fishing villages. We randomly promoted some fishermen to assistants before the start of an environmental program, increasing their responsibilities but not providing any monetary compensation. Thereafter, we study whether they engage more in conservation behavior during this program. The data shows that promoted fishermen provide substantially more effort, which suggests that such promotions my be a cost-effective tool to stimulate cooperation and community participation.
Andreas Leibbrandt, Redzo Mujcic
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Some of the greatest human achievements are difficult to imagine without pro-sociality. This paper employs a natural field experiment to investigate indirect reciprocity in natural social interactions. We find strong evidence of indirect reciprocity in one-shot interactions among drivers. Subjects for whom other drivers stopped were more than twice as likely to extend a similar act to a third party. This result is robust to a number of factors including age, gender, social status, presence of onlookers, and the opportunity cost of time. We provide novel evidence for the power of indirect reciprocity to promote prosocial behavior in the field.
Jeffrey A Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt, John A List
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Workplace misbehaviors are often governed by explicit monitoring and strict punishment. Such enforcement activities can serve to lessen worker productivity and harm worker morale. We take a different approach to curbing worker misbehavior-bonuses. Examining more than 6500 donor phone calls across more than 80 workers, we use a natural field experiment to investigate how different wage contracts influence workers' propensity to break workplace rules in harmful ways. Our findings show that even though standard relative performance pay contracts, relative to a fixed wage scheme, increase productivity, they have a dark side: they cause considerable cheating and sabotage of co-workers. Yet, even in such environments, by including an unexpected bonus, the employer can substantially curb worker misbehavior. In this manner, our findings reveal how employers can effectively leverage bonuses to eliminate undesired behaviors induced by performance pay contracts.
John A List, Anya Samek, Dana L Suskind
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Behavioral economics and field experiments within the social sciences have advanced well beyond academic curiosum. Governments around the globe as well as the most powerful firms in modern economies employ staffs of behavioralists and experimentalists to advance and test best practices. In this study, we combine behavioral economics with field experiments to reimagine a new model of early childhood education. Our approach has three distinct features. First, by focusing public policy dollars on prevention rather than remediation, we call for much earlier educational programs than currently conceived. Second, our approach has parents at the center of the education production function rather than at its periphery. Third, we advocate attacking the macro education problem using a public health methodology, rather than focusing on piecemeal advances.
John A List, Robert D Metcalfe, Michael K Price, Florian Rundhammer
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The literature has shown the power of social norms to promote residential energy conservation, particularly among high usage users. This study uses a natural field experiment with nearly 200,000 US households to explore whether a financial rewards program can complement such approaches. We observe strong impacts of financial rewards, particularly amongst low-usage and low-variance households, customers who typically are less responsive to normative messaging. Our data thus suggest important policy complementarities between behavioral and financial incentives: whereas non-pecuniary interventions disproportionally affect intense users, financial incentives are able to affect substantially low-user, "sticky households."
John A List, William S Neilson, Michael K Price
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Recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision-making. This line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision-making environment potentially miss critical features. This study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally. Our experimental laboratory is large open air markets, where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller's collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations. This permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition. Empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions, and show that deviations from Nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership.