Papers - Natural

Erwin Bulte, Simon Levin , John A List, Steven Pacala

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 2

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Amanda Chuan, Anya Samek

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 4

We conducted a field experiment with a charitable group to investigate whether giving the donor an option to write a personal message to the recipient influences giving behavior. Over 1,500 households were approached in a door-to-door campaign and randomized to either a control or a treatment in which donors could include a card for the recipient. We predict that treatment should increase contributions through making the gift more meaningful, but may also decrease contribution rate by increasing the social or other cost of donating. We find evidence in favor of the cost effect, and no evidence of increased giving.

Glenn W Harrison, John A List

Cited by*: 644 Downloads*: 105

Experimental economists are leaving the reservation. They are recruiting subjects in the field rather than in the classroom, using field goods rather than induced valuations, and using field context rather than abstract terminology in instructions. We argue that there is something methodologically fundamental behind this trend. Field experiments differ from laboratory experiments in many ways. Although it is tempting to view field experiments as simply less controlled variants of laboratory experiments, we argue that to do so would be to seriously mischaracterize them. What passes for "control" in laboratory experiments might in fact be precisely the opposite if it is artificial to the subject or context of the task. We propose six factors that can be used to determine the field context of an experiment: the nature of the subject pool, the nature of the information that the subjects bring to the task, the nature of the commodity, the nature of the task or trading rules applied, the nature of the stakes, and the environment that subjects operate in.

John A List

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Once believed to be an impossibility, field experiments in economics now occupy a central place in the empiricist's quiver. In the past few decades alone field experiments have taken on much greater import in academe, across organizations, as well as for policymakers. But is this emergence simply a fad that will soon return field experiments to obscurity? I argue in this article that there is something fundamental about the emergence of field experiments, as controlling the assignment mechanism in the field provides unparalleled power to both understand the "effects of causes" and the "causes of effects." This knowledge generation then begins to uncover the generalizability and scalability of knowledge. Quite the opposite of a withering tool that will be gone tomorrow, I urge economists to "double down" on this comparative advantage and in doing so I provide four methodological paths which I hope will cement the promise and growth of field experiments in the social sciences.

Rachel Croson, Jen Shang

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 36

We study the effect of social information on the voluntary provision of public goods. Competing theories predict that others[1] contributions might be either substitutes or complements to one's own. We demonstrate a positive social information effect on individual contributions, supporting theories of complementarities. We find the most influential level of social information is drawn from the 90th to 95th percentile of previous contributions. We furthermore find the effect to be significant for new members but not for renewing members. In the most effective condition, social information increases contributions by 12% ($13). These increased contributions do not crowd out future contributions.

Omar Al-Ubaydli, John A List

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 88

This is a review of the literature of field experimental studies of markets. The main results covered by the review are as follows: (1) Generally speaking, markets organize the efficient exchange of commodities; (2) There are some behavioral anomalies that impede efficient exchange; (3) Many behavioral anomalies disappear when traders are experienced.

Omar Al-Ubaydli, John A List

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

This is a review of the literature of field experimental studies of markets. The main results covered by the review are as follows: (1) Generally speaking, markets organize the efficient exchange of commodities; (2) There are some behavioral anomalies that impede efficient exchange; (3) Many behavioral anomalies disappear when traders are experienced.

John A List, Robert D Metcalfe

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 14

Field experiments represent a relatively new area in economics to understand the causal links from one variable to another. They have been used by academics to help answer interesting and policy-relevant questions in the developed world relating to educational attainment, tax avoidance, consumer finance, negative externalities, charitable giving, and labour market contracts. In this paper we bring together the key ideas behind the different variants of field experiments, how field experiments have been used to test theory, their limitations, and the new areas currently being opened up by field experiments.

Peter A Riach, Judith Rich

Cited by*: 136 Downloads*: 37

Controlled experiments, using matched pairs of bogus transactors, to test for discrimination in the marketplace have been conducted for over 30 years, and have extended across 10 countries. Significant, persistent and pervasive levels of discrimination have been found against non-whites and women in labour, housing and product markets. Rates of employment discrimination against non-whites, in excess of 25% have been measured in Australia, Europe and North America. A small number of experiments have also investigated employment discrimination against the disabled in Britain and the Netherlands, and against older applicants in the United States.

Jana Gallus

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 28

This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia, which faces declining editor retention rates, particularly among newcomers. Randomization assures that award receipt is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals that awards have a sizeable effect on newcomer retention, which persists over the four quarters following the initial intervention. This is noteworthy for indicating that awards for volunteers can be effective even if they have no impact on the volunteers' future career opportunities. The awards are purely symbolic, and the status increment they produce is limited to the recipients' pseudonymous online identities in a community they have just recently joined. The results can be explained by enhanced self-identification with the community, but they are also in line with recent findings on the role of status and reputation, recognition, and evaluation potential in online communities.

Michal Krawczyk

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

This study makes use of an unusual opportunity to manipulate framing of a simple decision under uncertainty: whether or not to answer an exam question when unsure which answer is correct and a missing response is scored higher than an incorrect one. Two treatments were compared in a natural field experiment: one in which the decision was framed in terms of losses, and the other - in terms of gains. Some alternative theories of decision making under risk, notably prospect theory, propose that individuals display reflection effect, i.e. tend to be more risk-seeking in losses than gains. No such evidence was found: subjects were generally risk-averse and this disposition was not affected by treatment.

Fuhai Hong, Tanjim Hossain, John A List

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 35

Exploiting findings that losses loom larger than gains, studies have shown that framing manipulations can increase productivity of workers. Using a natural field experiment that exogenously manipulates wage bonuses within contests in a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility, we show that how loss aversion affects worker behavior critically depends on the incentive scheme as well as the framing manipulation. Four sets of two identical teams competed against each other to win a bonus given to the team, within a set, with the higher average hourly productivity over the week. In each set, the bonus was framed as a reward or gain for one team and as a punishment or loss for the other. Average weekly productivity was slightly higher under the loss treatment, but this increase was statistically insignificant. However, the team under the loss treatment was at least 35% more likely to win the contest. As teams' payoffs are based on relative productivity under a contest, framing effect is much stronger in terms of relative productivity. Finally, workers seemingly responded to the bonus by increasing the quality of production as well as quantity-defect rate fell as productivity increased.

Maria De Paola, Francesca Gioia, Vincenzo Scoppa

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

We investigate whether and how social ties affect performance in teams by implementing a field experiment in which a sample of undergraduate students are randomly assigned either to teams composed by friends or to teams composed by individuals not linked by friendship relationships. Students undertake an intermediate exam divided into two parts: one graded on the basis of individual performance and the other graded on the basis of team performance. We find that students assigned to socially connected teams perform significantly better than control students in both the team part and the individual part of the exam, suggesting that social ties are relevant both for solving free-riding problems and for inducing knowledge spillovers among teammates. The positive effect of friendship persists over time: treated students obtain better grades also after the conclusion of the experiment.

Marco Haan, Peter Kooreman

Cited by*: 16 Downloads*: 11

A wealth of experimental literature studies the effect of repetition and group size on the extent of free riding in the provision of public goods. In this paper, we use data from honor systems for candy bars in 166 firms to test whether such effects can be found outside the laboratory. We find that free riding increases with repetition, and weak evidence that free riding decreases with group size.

John A List

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 3

This study examines data drawn from the game show Friend or Foe?, which is similar to the classic prisoner's dilemma tale: partnerships are endogenously determined, players work together to earn money, after which, they play a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game over large stakes: varying from $200 to (potentially) more than $22,000. If one were to conduct such an experiment in the laboratory, the cost to gather the data would be well over $350,000. The data reveal several interesting insights; perhaps most provocatively, they suggest that even though the game is played in front of an audience of millions of viewers, there is some evidence consistent with a model of discrimination. The observed patterns of social discrimination are unanticipated, however. For example, there is evidence consistent with the notion that certain populations have a general "distaste" for older participants.

Greg Allenby, Russell Belk, Catherine Eckel, Robert Fisher, Ernan Haruvy, John A List, Yu Ma, Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, Yu Wang, Sherry Xin Li

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

We offer a unified conceptual, behavioral, and econometric framework for optimal fundraising that deals with both synergies and discrepancies between approaches from economics, consumer behavior, and sociology. The purpose is to offer a framework that can bridge differences and open a dialogue between disciplines in order to facilitate optimal fundraising design. The literature is extensive, and our purpose is to offer a brief background and perspective on each of the approaches, provide an integrated framework leading to new insights, and discuss areas of future research.

Michal Krawczyk, Magdalena Smyk

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Bibliometric studies show that male academics are more productive than their female counterparts and that the gap cannot be explained in terms of difference in abilities. In this project we wish to verify the hypothesis that this tendency is related to the greater support that men receive from their colleagues ("old boys network"). Towards this end we had e-mails sent by a male or female student asking academics for a minor favour. In Study 1 we asked authors of nearly 300 papers in experimental economics to share the raw data used in their study. We observed no difference in response rate or compliance rate between male and female senders. In Study 2 we sent 2775 e-mails to academics affiliated with prestigious schools from ten different fields, asking to either send us a copy of their recent article of meet the sender supposedly interested in pursuing a PhD program. Once again we manipulated gender of the senders but this time we also varied their physical attractiveness. We found a small but significant difference in the Article Treatment: attractive females' requests were honoured less often. No such tendency was found in the Meeting Treatment and no general gender effect was observed. Overall, we find very little support for the claim that early-stage male researchers enjoy greater support than their female colleagues.

Steffen Andersen, Seda Ertac, Uri Gneezy, John A List, Sandra Maximiano

Cited by*: 35 Downloads*: 2

Recent literature presents evidence that men are more competitively inclined than women. Since top-level careers usually require competitiveness, competitiveness differences provide an explanation for gender gaps in wages and differences in occupational choice. A natural question is whether women are born less competitive or whether they become so through the process of socialization. To pinpoint when in the socialization process the difference arises, we compare the competitiveness of children in matrilineal and patriarchal societies. We find that while there is no difference at any age in the matrilineal society, girls become less competitive around puberty in the patriarchal society.

Anya Samek

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 54

The gender difference in competitiveness has been cited as an important factor driving the gender gap in labor market outcomes. Using a natural field experiment with 35,000 university students, I explore the impact of compensation scheme on willingness to apply for a job. I find that competitive compensation schemes disproportionately deter women from applying, which cannot be explained by differences in risk preferences alone. I also vary whether the job is introduced as helping a non-profit, which increases application rates, suggesting a role for social preferences in application decisions. Finally, I observe a correlation between competitiveness preferences and career choice.

Peggy Dwyer , James Gilkeson , John A List

Cited by*: 46 Downloads*: 15

Using data from a national survey of nearly 2000 mutual fund investors, we investigate whether investor gender is related to risk taking as revealed in mutual fund investment decisions. Consonant with the received literature, we find that women exhibit less risk-taking than men in their most recent, largest, and riskiest mutual fund investment decisions. More importantly, we find that the impact of gender on risk taking is significantly weakened when investor knowledge of financial markets and investments is controlled in the regression equation. This result suggests that the greater level of risk aversion among women that is frequently documented in the literature can be substantially, but not completely, explained by knowledge disparities.