Papers - Artefactual

Craig E Landry, Andreas Lange, John A List, Michael K Price, Nicholas G Rupp

Cited by*: 18 Downloads*: 17

This study develops theory and conducts an experiment to provide an understanding of why people initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate these influences. Using an experimental design that links donations across distinct treatments separated in time, we present several insights. For example, we find that previous donors are more likely to give, and contribute more, than donors asked to contribute for the first time. Yet, how these previous donors were acquired is critical: agents who are initially attracted by signals of charitable quality transmitted via an economic mechanism are much more likely to continue giving than agents who were initially attracted by non-mechanism factors.

Hisaki Kono

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 12

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers' repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others' investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

Mariah D Ehmke, John A List, Jayson L Lusk

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 14

A concern with the contingent valuation method (CVM) is the finding that hypothetical and real statements of value often differ. We test whether hypothetical bias, broadly defined, is independent of location by comparing real and hypothetical votes on a dichotomous choice referendum in China, France, Indiana, Kansas, and Niger. We find significant differences in hypothetical bias across locations and reject the hypothesis that hypothetical bias is independent of location. As opposed to the typical finding reported in the literature, subjects in Niger significantly understated their willingness-to-pay in the hypothetical referendum.

Ori Heffetz , John A List

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 14

A hallmark result within behavioral economics is that individuals' choices are affected by current endowments. A recent theory due to Koszegi and Rabin (2006) explains such endowment effect with a model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences. Departing from past work, we conduct complementary experiments to disentangle expectations - verified probabilistic beliefs held by subjects - from other features of endowment - such as "assignment" to a good - hence allowing us to compare the effect of expectations with that of other variations. While mere assignment can affect choices, we do not find a large role in the effect for Koszegi-Rabin expectations.

Anya Samek

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 4

We experimentally investigate the difference in competitiveness of 3-5 year-old boys and girls in the U.S. 123 children from a preschool are randomly matched into girl-girl, boy-boy, and boy-girl pairs of similar age and participate in a gender-neutral, competitive classroom activity using candy as an incentive. Children participate in a piece rate incentive scheme and a tournament incentive scheme in rounds 1 and 2, and select their preferred incentive scheme for round 3. We find that girls and boys choose to compete at equal rates - with 80% of children choosing to compete overall. We also find that girls' output in the task is significantly lower than that of boys under the tournament scheme, but not different in round 3 for the girls and boys who self-select into the tournament. All children display a remarkable rate of confidence - 84% of children believe they won under the tournament scheme. The gender of the match does not play a significant role.

Avner Ben-Ner, John A List, Louis Putterman, Anya Samek

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 43

An active area of research within the social sciences concerns the underlying motivation for sharing scarce resources and engaging in other pro-social actions. We develop a theoretical framework that sheds light on the developmental origins of social preferences by providing mechanisms through which parents transmit preferences for generosity to their children. Then, we conduct a field experiment with nearly 150 3-5 year old children and their parents, measuring (1) whether child and parent generosity is correlated, (2) whether children are influenced by their parents when making sharing decisions and (3) whether parents model generosity to children. We observe no correlation of independently measured parent and child sharing decisions at this young age. Yet, we find that apart from those choosing an equal allocation of resources between themselves and another child, children adjust their behaviors to narrow the gap with their parent's or other adult's choice. We find that fathers, and parents of initially generous children, increase their sharing when informed that their child will be shown their choice.

Avner Ben-Ner, John A List, Louis Putterman, Anya Samek

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

An active area of research within the social sciences concerns the underlying motivation for sharing resources and engaging in other pro-social actions. In this paper we ask: do parents model social preference behavior to children, and do children emulate this behavior? We develop a theoretical framework to examine this question, and conduct an experiment with 147 3 to 5 year old children and their parents, using dictator games to measure generosity. We find (1) evidence of parental teaching/modeling in the case of fathers and in that of parents of relatively generous children, and (2) an emulation effect such that children who initially share less than half of their endowment subsequently share more the more they see a parent or other adult share. We find little correlation between baseline sharing of children and the parents, with the possible exception of the oldest children.

Michael J. Seiler, Eric Walden

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 0

In this study, we use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to understand how homeowners process non-financial information when considering strategic mortgage default. We find that borrowers initially attempt to inhibit their knee-jerk reaction to retaliate against a lender who has engaged in egregious lending practices when compared to a financially conservative lender. Moreover, when defaults are rare, borrowers are less likely to default because violating the social norm results in feelings of disgust. Finally, when a lender refuses a loan modification, the borrower is found to seek retribution. Interestingly, granting even a modest loan modification removes the desire of homeowners to seek retribution towards their lender no matter what their impression of the lender may be. The results carry a number of policy implications.

Juan-Camilo Cardenas, John K Stranlund, Cleve E Willis

Cited by*: 98 Downloads*: 40

Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior.

Yan Chen, Peter Cramton, John A List, Axel Ockenfels

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

We review past research and discuss future directions on how the vibrant research areas of market design and behavioral economics have influenced and will continue to impact the science and practice of management in both the private and public sectors. Using examples from various auction markets, reputation and feedback systems in online markets, matching markets in education, and labor markets, we demonstrate that combining market design theory, behavioral insights, and experimental methods can lead to fruitful implementation of superior market designs in practice.

David P Tracer

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 56

In order to test the proposition that performance in bargaining experiments is significantly affected by degree of monetarization, market integration, and relative westernization, a one-shot Ultimatum Game was conducted during the months of June and July 1998 in two villages in a rural region of Papua New Guinea: Anguganak (where the people speak Au) and Bogasip (where they speak Gnau). Although the villages are located in close proximity to one another and are relatively homogeneous culturally, and both subsist using a mixture of foraging and horticulture and have an elaborate system of exchange relationships, they are distinguished by their average degree of exposure to and integration in a cash-based economy, as well as their degree of education (both are greater in Anguganak). The different sections of the chapter provide: an ethnographic account of the two villages; a description of the experimental methods employed; a presentation and analysis of the results in terms of various indicators of wealth and market integration; and a discussion of the implications of the results. The level of offers made in the Ultimatum Game data combined for Anguganak and Bogasip were between those in western industrialized populations and the Machiguenga of Peru. There was some indication that variability in the level of market integration between the two village populations may have influenced the results, although they appeared to be equally influenced by local beliefs on reciprocity, generosity, and indebtedness, and an unfamiliarity with impersonal transactions.

Rene Bekkers

Cited by*: 20 Downloads*: 112

A field study of altruistic behaviour is presented using a modification of the dictator game in a large random sample survey in the Netherlands (n=1,964). In line with laboratory experiments, only 5.7% donated money. In line with other survey research on giving, generosity increased with age, education, income, trust, and prosocial value orientation.

Juan-Camilo Cardenas

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 50

En esta ponencia queremos explorar, a partir de nuestros resultados de investigacion, posibles puentes de complementariedad y sinergia entre la economia experimental y los m_todos participativos de investigacion, para poder estudiar problemas rurales, en particular aquellos asociados al uso de recursos naturales por parte de las comunidades. Desde el 1er semestre del 2001 hasta la fecha hemos realizado una serie de talleres y experimentos economicos en varias comunidades del pas. En esta ponencia vamos a hacer referencia a los tres estudios de caso que se realizaron en el proyecto "Regulacion de Recursos Comunitarios: Ejercicios economicos en el campo" que se llevaron a cabo en el Neusa y la Vega en Cundinamarca, y el Parque Sanquianga en Nario. El proposito de estos estudios de caso era estudiar los problemas del uso comunitario de recursos como la pesca, la piangua y o el agua en una microcuenca. En cada comunidad se realizaron 26 sesiones de experimentos economicos con participacion de 130 campesinos en cada comunidad; igualmente se llevaron a cabo talleres y ejercicios desde el Diagnostico Rural Participativo (DRP) para discutir con los mismos participantes tanto los resultados de los experimentos como la problem_tica asociada al uso de estos recursos naturales. Dicha informacion fue sistematizada con el fin de contrastar los tres casos, y las posibles consistencias entre dos aproximaciones (economia experimental y herramientas participativas) que hasta el momento no han sido utilizadas de manera conjunta ni para las mismas situaciones. Como se presentar_, la economia experimental ofrece potencialidades interesantes para estudiar la validez de los modelos economicos de comportamiento de las personas frente a, por ejemplo, los dilemas del uso de recursos colectivos; igualmente puede ofrecer informacion muy detallada y verificable acerca de las decisiones micro de las personas; por su parte las metodolog?as participativas permiten explicar procesos y situaciones que un agente externo dif?cilmente puede comprender acerca de las causalidades e interacciones de factores que afectan la problem_tica de una comunidad. A traves de estos instrumentos podemos mostrar como estas dos metodologias pueden de una manera eficaz responder a preguntas centrales acerca del uso comunitario de recursos.

James Cox, John A List, Michael K Price, Vjollca Sadiraj, Anya Samek

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 123

The literature exploring other regarding behavior sheds important light on interesting social phenomena, yet less attention has been given to how the received results speak to foundational assumptions within economics. Our study synthesizes the empirical evidence, showing that recent work challenges convex preference theory but is largely consistent with rational choice theory. Guided by this understanding, we design a new, more demanding test of a central tenet of economics - the contraction axiom - within a sharing framework. Making use of more than 325 dictators participating in a series of allocation games, we show that sharing choices violate the contraction axiom. We advance a new theory that augments standard models with moral reference points to explain our experimental data. Our theory also organizes the broader sharing patterns in the received literature.

John A List, Azeem M Shaikh, Yang Xu

Cited by*: 33 Downloads*: 278

Empiricism in the sciences allows us to test theories, formulate optimal policies, and learn how the world works. In this manner, it is critical that our empirical work provides accurate conclusions about underlying data patterns. False positives represent an especially important problem, as vast public and private resources can be misguided if we base decisions on false discovery. This study explores one especially pernicious influence on false positives-multiple hypothesis testing (MHT). While MHT potentially affects all types of empirical work, we consider three common scenarios where MHT influences inference within experimental economics: jointly identifying treatment effects for a set of outcomes, estimating heterogenous treatment effects through subgroup analysis, and conducting hypothesis testing for multiple treatment conditions. Building upon the work of Romano and Wolf (2010), we present a correction procedure that incorporates the three scenarios, and illustrate the improvement in power by comparing our results with those obtained by the classic studies due to Bonferroni (1935) and Holm (1979). Importantly, under weak assumptions, our testing procedure asymptotically controls the familywise error rate - the probability of one false rejection - and is asymptotically balanced. We showcase our approach by revisiting the data reported in Karlan and List (2007), to deepen our understanding of why people give to charitable causes.

Catherine Kling , John A List, Jinhua Zhao

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 5

Recent evidence from laboratory experiments suggests that important disparities exist between willingness to pay (WTP) and compensation demanded for the same good. Because a fundamental postulate in neoclassical theory is that with small income effects and many available substitutes, the willingness to accept (WTA) and WTP measures of value for a commodity should be roughly equivalent, this finding has vast implications in both a positive and normative sense. This study advances, and experimentally tests, a new explanation of the WTP/WTA disparity-a dynamic theory based on the presence of commitment costs. Although to date neoclassical models have not explained the observed data patterns well, we find that the commitment cost theory combined with a simple behavioral anomaly is able to lend insights into the causes and severity of the WTA/WTP disparity. Furthermore, we find that market experience attenuates the behavioral anomaly, consistent with the notion that no value disparity exists for agents with sufficient market experience.

Alpert Bernard

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 4

The article analyzes the validity and reliability of using the results of behavioral experiments in stimulating businessmen in real life situation. 301 samples of various fields namely business and non-business managers, students and military personnels were taken for the experiment. The businesss situation taken was that a manager had abruptly discharged his subordinate on the context of performance. The subjects were required to make a letter of advocacy and also were asked to write their opinion on the firing done by the manager. The letter of advocacy was the subject's effort, in writing, to support the point of view assigned to him. One point of view had the subject approving the manager's method of firing the subordinate and the other point of view had him disapproving. If change in opinion for both groups of advocates had occurred toward one point of view and not toward the other, then the change could have been reasonably attributed to bias in the topic. Military personnel showed the least significant opinion changes in advocating either of the two points of view. On the other extreme, business managers showed rather highly significant changes irrespective of point of view advocated.

John A List

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

While empirical economics has made important strides over the past half century, there is a recent attack that threatens the foundations of the empirical approach in economics: external validity. Certain dogmatic arguments are not new, yet in some circles the generalizability question is beyond dispute, rendering empirical work as a passive enterprise based on frivolity. Such arguments serve to caution even the staunchest empirical advocates from even starting an empirical inquiry in a novel setting. In its simplest form, questions of external validity revolve around whether the results of the received study can be generalized to different people, situations, stimuli, and time periods. This study clarifies and places the external validity crisis into perspective by taking a unique glimpse into the grandest of trials: The External Validity Trial. A key outcome of the proceedings is an Author Onus Probandi, which outlines four key areas that every study should report to address external validity. Such an evaluative approach properly rewards empirical advances and justly recognizes inherent empirical limitations.

Juan-Camilo Cardenas

Cited by*: 21 Downloads*: 33

Many forest ecosystems provide multiple goods and services to both local users (e.g. firewood, water) and to other external beneficiaries (biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration). This calls for alternative approaches in the governance of these local ecosystems. Even if local users solve the commons dilemma they face regarding the optimal provision of the direct benefit, there might still be a need for introducing mechanisms that also address the externality that involves those outside of the group. This paper addresses the analysis of different types of mechanisms, endogenously emerged from groups vs. externally imposed to them, when facing the typical tragedy of the commons. During 2000_2002 we conducted a series of economic experiments in several rural communities in Colombia. The sub-set reported here of 53 sessions with 265 actual users of local ecosystems, were focused specifically on the effect of external and self-governing rules for inducing cooperative behavior within groups. A group extraction or 'commons' game was used to explore how rules, formal and informal, emerge and how individual behavior responds to regulatory mechanisms aimed at solving the dilemma. Three treatments were compared to a baseline design: Two external regulations (high and low penalties, and only 20% of the players monitored), and a self-governed system where individuals were allowed to have in each round a few minutes of non-binding face-to-face communication. Surprisingly, both external regulations generated very similar results regardless of the level of the penalty, and they induced behaviors very similar to those achieved by the self-governed treatment. The experimental results suggest that individuals do not seem to follow entirely the conventional economic prediction of a minimizer of expected costs of regulations against the benefits from over extracting the resource, and that humans can develop norms based on non-enforceable rules of cooperation. Instead, other elements related to social norms and subjective valuation of the benefits and costs of the regulations might be in play.

Majid Ahmadi, Nathan Durst, Jeff Lachman, Mason List, Noah List, John A List, Atom Vayalinkal

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Recent models and empirical work on network formation emphasize the importance of propinquity in producing strong interpersonal connections. Yet, one might wonder how deep such insights run, as thus far empirical results rely on survey and lab-based evidence. In this study, we examine propinquity in a high-stakes setting of talent allocation: the Major League Baseball (MLB) Draft. We examine draft picks from 2000-2019 across every MLB club of the nearly 30,000 players drafted (from a player pool of more than a million potential draftees). Our findings can be summarized in three parts. First, propinquity is alive and well in our setting, and spans even the latter years of our sample, when higher-level statistical exercises have become the norm rather than the exception. Second, the measured effect size is important, as MLB clubs pay a real cost in terms of inferior talent acquired due to propinquity bias: for example, their draft picks appear in 25 fewer games relative to teams that do not exhibit propinquity bias. Finally, the effect is found to be the most pronounced in later rounds of the draft (after round 15), where the Scouting Director has the greatest latitude.