Papers - All

Frank W Marlowe

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 27

Most hypotheses proposed to explain human food sharing address motives, yet most tests of these hypotheses have measured only the patterns of food transfer. To choose between these hypotheses we need to measure people's propensity to share. To do that, I played two games (the Ultimatum and Dictator Games) with Hadza hunter-gatherers. Despite their ubiquitous food sharing, the Hadza are less willing to share in these games than people in complex societies are. They were also less willing to share in smaller camps than larger camps. I evaluate the various food-sharing hypotheses in light of these results.

John A List, Michael K Price

Cited by*: 15 Downloads*: 27

We explore collusion by using the tools of experimental economics in a naturally occurring marketplace. We report that competitive price theory adequately organizes data in multilateral decentralized bargaining markets without conspiratorial opportunities. When conspiratorial opportunities are allowed and contract prices are perfectly observed, prices (quantities) are considerably above (below) competitive levels. When sellers receive imperfect price signals, outcomes are intermediate to those of competitive markets and collusive markets with full information. Finally, experienced buyers serve as a catalyst to thwart attempts by sellers to engage in anticompetitive pricing: in periods where experienced agents transact in the market, average transaction prices are below those realized in periods where only inexperienced agents execute trades.

Amanda Agan, Sonja Starr

Cited by*: 22 Downloads*: 27

"Ban-the-Box" (BTB) policies restrict employers from asking about applicants' criminal histories on job applications and are often presented as a means of reducing unemployment among black men, who disproportionately have criminal records. However, withholding information about criminal records could risk encouraging statistical discrimination: employers may make assumptions about criminality based on the applicant's race (or other observable characteristics). To investigate BTB's effects, we sent approximately 15,000 fictitious online job applications to employers in New Jersey and New York City both before and after the adoption of BTB policies. These applications varied the race and felony conviction status of the applicants. We confirm that criminal records are a major barrier to employment: employers that ask about criminal records were 63% more likely to call back an applicant if he has no record. However, our results support the concern that BTB policies encourage statistical discrimination on the basis of race: we find that the race gap in callbacks grows dramatically at the BTB-affected companies after the policy goes into effect. Before BTB, white applicants to employers with the box received 7% more callbacks than similar black applicants, but BTB increases this gap to 45%.

Frode Alfnes, Maren E Bachke, Mette Wik

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 27

Most charity organizations depend on contributions from the general public, but little research is conducted on donor preferences. Do donors have geographical, recipient, or thematic preferences? We designed a conjoint analysis experiment in which people rated development aid projects by donating money in dictator games. We find that our sample show strong age, gender, regional, and thematic preferences. Furthermore, we find significant differences between segments. The differences in donations are consistent with differences in donors' attitudes toward development aid and their beliefs about differences in poverty and vulnerability of the recipients. The method here used for development projects can easily be adapted to elicit preferences for other kinds of projects that rely on gifts from private donors.

Steffen Andersen, Erwin Bulte, Uri Gneezy, John A List

Cited by*: 16 Downloads*: 27

No abstract available

David S Brookshire, Donald L Coursey, Howard Kunreuther

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 27

No abstract available

Christopher Blattman, Julian C. Jamison, Margaret Sheridan

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 26

We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment.

Shagata Mukherjee, Michael K Price

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 26

This study takes a first step to advance our understanding of the strategic interaction between the constituent components of default in microfinance and how to mitigate them. We conduct controlled microfinance field experiments in rural India to provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between gender, group liability and moral hazard. By varying the contract structure across different microfinance games, our experiment decomposes the two moral hazard (ex-ante and ex-post) channels and find that their effect on default are counteractive rather than additive for women clients. The study facilitates heterogeneity analysis of gender on moral hazard across comparable matrilineal and patrilineal societies in two neighboring states of India. We find that matrilineal women are less risk averse and are more likely to invest in the risky project (ex-ante moral hazard) than women in patrilineal societies. Moreover, we find a reversal of gender effect on strategic default (ex-post moral hazard) across the two societies, suggesting the importance of social norms and gender roles on financial behavior. Our results indicate that policymaking in microfinance should be designed by considering the heterogeneity of diverse societies, gender roles, norms and the underlying socio-economic factors that motivate financial behavior among borrowers.

Catherine C Eckel, Philip J Grossman

Cited by*: 30 Downloads*: 26

We report the results of a field experiment conducted in conjunction with a mailed fundraising campaign of a nonprofit organization. The experiment is designed to compare the response of donors to subsidies in the form of matching amounts or rebated amounts. Matching subsidies are used by many corporations as an employee benefit; the US federal tax system encourages giving using a rebate subsidy by making donations tax deductible. The design includes a control group and two levels of subsidy of each type. Our main result is that matching subsidies result in larger total donations to charities than rebate subsidies, a result that is qualitatively similar to the lab findings. The estimated price elasticities for the matching subsidy are very similar to (and insignificantly different from) the lab experiments, while rebate subsidies lead to lower contributions in the field than in the lab. Since rebates in the field involve substantial lags and additional complications as compared with the "instant rebates" of the lab, this latter difference is not unexpected. The matching results are an important step in validating lab estimates of responsiveness to subsidies of charitable giving.

Benjamin A Olken

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 26

This paper examines the accuracy of beliefs about corruption, using data from Indonesian villages. Specifically, I compare villagers' stated beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in a road-building project in their village with a more objective measure of 'missing expenditures' in the project, which I construct by comparing the project's official expenditure reports with an independent estimate of the prices and quantities of inputs used in construction. I find that villagers' beliefs do contain information about corruption in the road project, and that villagers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between corruption in the road project and other types of corruption in the village. The magnitude of their information, however, is small, in part because officials hide corruption where it is hardest for villagers to detect. This may limit the effectiveness of grass-roots monitoring of local officials. I also find evidence of systematic biases in corruption beliefs, particularly when examining the relationship between corruption and variables correlated with trust. For example, ethnically heterogeneous villages have higher perceived corruption levels but lower actual levels of missing expenditures. The findings illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions, whether in designing anti-corruption policies or in conducting empirical research on corruption.

Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael Kremer, Samuel Sinei

Cited by*: 15 Downloads*: 26

We report results from a randomized evaluation comparing three school-based HIV/AIDS interventions in Kenya: 1) training teachers in the Kenyan Government's HIV/AIDS-education curriculum; 2) encouraging students to debate the role of condoms and to write essays on how to protect themselves against HIV/AIDS; and 3) reducing the cost of education. Our primary measure of the effectiveness of these interventions is teenage childbearing, which is associated with unprotected sex. We also collected measures of knowledge, attitudes, and behavior regarding HIV/AIDS. After two years, girls in schools where teachers had been trained were more likely to be married in the event of a pregnancy. The program had little other impact on students' knowledge, attitudes, and behavior, or on the incidence of teen childbearing. The condom debates and essays increased practical knowledge and self-reported use of condoms without increasing self-reported sexual activity. Reducing the cost of education by paying for school uniforms reduced dropout rates, teen marriage, and childbearing.

Steffen Andersen, Seda Ertac, Uri Gneezy, Moshe Hoffman, John A List

Cited by*: 37 Downloads*: 26

One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger stakes than in the literature, we are able to examine stakes' effects over ranges of data that are heretofore unexplored. Our main result is that proportionally equivalent offers are less likely to be rejected with high stakes. In fact, our paper is the first to present evidence that as stakes increase, rejection rates approach zero.

Min Ding, Rajdeep Grewal, John Liechty

Cited by*: 49 Downloads*: 25

Because most conjoint studies are conducted in hypothetical situations with no consumption consequences for the participants, the extent to which the studies are able to uncover "true" consumer preference structures is questionable. Experimental economics literature, with its emphasis on incentive alignment and hypothetical bias, suggests that more realistic incentive aligned studies will result in stronger out-of-sample predictive performance of actual purchase behaviors and provide better estimates of consumer preference structures than hypothetical studies. To test this hypothesis, the authors design an experiment with conventional (hypothetical) conditions and their parallel incentive-aligned counterparts. Using Chinese dinner specials as the context, the authors conducted a field experiment in a Chinese restaurant during dinnertime. The results provide strong evidence in favor of incentive-aligned choice conjoint analysis, in that incentive-aligned choice conjoint outperforms hypothetical choice conjoint in out-of-sample predictions (59% versus 26% for incentive-aligned choice conjoint and hypothetical choice conjoint, respectively for the top two choices). As expected, subjects in the incentive-aligned choice condition exhibit preference structures that are systematically different from the preference structures of subjects in the hypothetical condition. Most notably, the subjects in the incentive-aligned choice condition are more price sensitive and exhibit different heterogeneity patterns. To determine the robustness of these results, the authors conducted a second study that used snacks as the context and only considered the choice treatments. This study confirmed the results by again providing strong evidence in favor of incentive-aligned choice analysis in out-of-sample predictions (36% versus 16% for incentive-aligned choice conjoint and hypothetical choice conjoint, respectively for the top two choices). The results provide a strong motivation for conjoint practitioners to consider conducting their studies in realistic settings using incentive structures that require participants to live with their decisions.

Puppe Clemens, Sebastian Kube, Michel Marechal

Cited by*: 18 Downloads*: 25

We study the role of reciprocity in a labor market field experiment. In a recent paper, Gneezy and List (2006) investigate the impact of gift exchange in this context and find that it has only a transient effect on long run outcomes. Extending their work to examine both positive and negative reciprocity, we find consonant evidence in the positive reciprocity condition: the gift does not work well in the long run (if at all). Yet, in the negative reciprocity treatment we observe much stronger effects: a wage reduction has a significant and lasting negative impact on efforts. Together, these results highlight the asymmetry of positive and negative reciprocity that exists in the field, and provide an indication of the relative importance of each in the long run.

Paul Glewwe, Nauman Ilias, Michael Kremer

Cited by*: 21 Downloads*: 25

Advocates of teacher incentive programs argue that they can strengthen weak incentives, while opponents argue they lead to teaching to the test.' We find evidence that existing teacher incentives in Kenya are indeed weak, with teachers absent 20% of the time. We then report on a randomized evaluation of a program that provided primary school teachers in rural Kenya with incentives based on students' test scores. Students in program schools had higher test scores, significantly so on at least some exams, during the time the program was in place. An examination of the channels through which this effect took place, however, provides little evidence of more teacher effort aimed at increasing long-run learning. Teacher attendance did not improve, homework assignment did not increase, and pedagogy did not change. There is, however, evidence that teachers increased effort to raise short-run test scores by conducting more test preparation sessions. While students in treatment schools scored higher than their counterparts in comparison schools during the life of the program, they did not retain these gains after the end of the program, consistent with the hypothesis that teachers focused on manipulating short-run scores. In order to discourage dropouts, students who did not test were assigned low scores. Program schools had the same dropout rate as comparison schools, but a higher percentage of students in program schools took the test.

John A List, David Lucking-Reiley

Cited by*: 161 Downloads*: 25

We test two recent theories on the subject of charitable fundraising in capital campaigns. Andreoni (1998) predicts that publicly announced seed contributions can increase the total amount of charitable giving in a capital campaign. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) predict that another technique for increasing contributions is a promise to refund donors' money in case the campaign threshold is not reached. Using a field experiment in a capital campaign for the Center for Environmental Policy Analysis at the University of Central Florida, we present evidence on both of these predictions. Data from direct mail solicitations sent to 3000 Central Floridian residents confirm the basic comparative-static predictions of both theories: total contributions increase with the amount of seed money, and with the use of a refund policy. A change in seed money from 10% to 67% of the campaign goal resulted in nearly a sixfold increase in contributions, while imposing a refund increased contributions by a more modest 20%. Seed money has a statistically significant effect on both the proportion of people choosing to donate and on the average gift size of those who donate, while refunds have a statistically significant effect only on the average gift size. These results have clear implications for practitioners in the design of fundraising campaigns.

Bruno Crepon, Julie Pernaudet

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 25

Disadvantaged youth are particularly at risk of under-investing in their health. Costs of healthcare and bias in health needs perceptions are likely to be key factors of underinvestment. Relying on a randomized experiment, we find that providing them with personalized information both on public health insurance and on their health status based on a medical diagnosis raises their curative and preventive investments. More specifically, they are more likely to consult a psychologist and to use contraception, while depression and risky sexual behaviors are key issues in this population. In order to distinguish between the two barriers, financial constraints and underestimation of health needs, we also test a program providing information on public health insurance only. This limited program improves their medical coverage in the same way as the combined program, but it does not translate into higher health investments. These findings highlight the importance of taking into account the role of subjective perceptions of health needs when considering health decisions among disadvantaged youth.

Peter Bohm

Cited by*: 17 Downloads*: 25

No abstract available

Philip Oreopoulos, Uros Petronijevic

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 25

Recent studies show that programs offering structured, one-on-one coaching and tutoring tend to have large effects on the academic outcomes of both high school and college students. These programs are often costly to implement and difficult to scale, however, calling into question whether making them available to large student populations is feasible. In contrast, interventions that rely on technology to maintain low-touch contact with students can be implemented at large scale and minimal cost but with the risk of not being as effective as one-on-one, in-person assistance. In this paper, we test whether the effects of coaching programs can be replicated at scale by using technology to reach a larger population of students. We work with a sample of over four thousand undergraduate students from a large Canadian university, randomly assigning students into one of the following three interventions: (i) a one-time online exercise designed to affirm students' values and goals; (ii) a text messaging campaign that provides students with academic advice, information, and motivation; and (iii) a personal coaching service, in which students are matched with upper-year undergraduate coaches. We find large positive effects from the coaching program, as coached students realize a 0.3 standard deviation increase in average grades and a 0.35 standard deviation increase in GPA. In contrast, we find no effects from either the online exercise or the text messaging campaign on any academic outcome, both in the general student population and across several student subgroups. A comparison of the key features of the text messaging campaign and the coaching service suggests that proactively and regularly initiating conversations with students and working to establish trust are important design features to incorporate in future interventions that use technology to reach large populations of students.

Laura Schechter

Cited by*: 20 Downloads*: 25

Play in the traditional trust experiment depends both on trust beliefs and on levels of risk aversion. We ran two experiments with a diverse set of subjects in fifteen villages of rural Paraguay, the traditional trust experiment and a new experiment measuring only risk aversion. We find that risk attitudes are highly predictive of play in the trust game. In addition, omitting risk aversion as a regressor in trust regressions signficiantly changes the coefficients of important explanatory variables such as gender and wealth. We also use data on income and bet choice to calculate players' coefficients of relative risk aversion.