Papers - All

David P Tracer

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 56

In order to test the proposition that performance in bargaining experiments is significantly affected by degree of monetarization, market integration, and relative westernization, a one-shot Ultimatum Game was conducted during the months of June and July 1998 in two villages in a rural region of Papua New Guinea: Anguganak (where the people speak Au) and Bogasip (where they speak Gnau). Although the villages are located in close proximity to one another and are relatively homogeneous culturally, and both subsist using a mixture of foraging and horticulture and have an elaborate system of exchange relationships, they are distinguished by their average degree of exposure to and integration in a cash-based economy, as well as their degree of education (both are greater in Anguganak). The different sections of the chapter provide: an ethnographic account of the two villages; a description of the experimental methods employed; a presentation and analysis of the results in terms of various indicators of wealth and market integration; and a discussion of the implications of the results. The level of offers made in the Ultimatum Game data combined for Anguganak and Bogasip were between those in western industrialized populations and the Machiguenga of Peru. There was some indication that variability in the level of market integration between the two village populations may have influenced the results, although they appeared to be equally influenced by local beliefs on reciprocity, generosity, and indebtedness, and an unfamiliarity with impersonal transactions.

Daniel Houser, John A List, Marco Piovesan, Anya Samek, Joachim Winter

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 56

Acts of dishonesty permeate life. Understanding their origins, and what mechanisms help to attenuate such acts is an under explored area of research. This study takes an economics approach to explore the propensity of individuals to act dishonestly across different economic environments. We begin by developing a simple model that highlights the channels through which one can increase or decrease dishonest acts. We lend empirical insights into this model by using an experiment that includes both parents and their young children as subjects. We find that the highest level of dishonesty occurs in settings where the parent acts alone and the dishonest act benefits the child rather than the parent. In this spirit, there is also an interesting effect of children on parents' behavior: in the child's presence, parents act more honestly, but there are gender differences. Parents act more dishonestly in front of sons than daughters. This finding has the potential of shedding light on the origins of the widely documented gender differences in cheating behavior observed among adults.

Juan-Camilo Cardenas

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 54

This paper discusses why running experiments in the field, outside of the university lab, can help us enrich the analysis we do of experimental data. One of the main arguments of the paper is that people participating in experiments, including students, do not come naked to the lab. They bring a great deal of rules of thumb, heuristics, values, prejudices, expectations and knowledge about the others participating, and about similar games, and use such information to make their decisions. The paper offers a short mention of relevant field experiments, and a more detailed look at field experiments conducted by the author, including a data set of CPR experiments run in 10 villages, between 2000 and 2002, with more than 1300 villagers in about 220 sessions, and replications with about 250 university students in more than 40 sessions. It offers then main lessons from bringing the lab to the field. Also there is a discussion of additional information gathered through different field instruments as well as community workshops with the participants to discuss the experimental data, the external validity of the experiments and their results, through parallels with their daily life. One of the lessons is that the greater variance in certain demographics about the experimental subjects might help explain variations in lab behavior that cannot be fully explained by the experimental institutions we study. Also, certain significant differences in behavior between villagers and students will be discussed.

Rachel Croson, Americus Reed, Jen Shang

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 54

Information is presented about a presentation at the Advances in Consumer Research North American Conference on social information and marketing environments in donation behavior. Topics in the presentation include activated identities in decision-making, contextual cues in donation behavior, and gender identity in informers and targets of social information. Field experiments on radio pledges are also described.

Paul J Ferraro

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 54

Economic analyses of asymmetric information typically start with the assumption that individuals know more about their own characteristics than outside observers. This assumption implies that individuals can accurately assess their own competence in a given domain. However, individuals can only judge their competence if they are sufficiently competent. The relationship between competence and self-awareness explains a great deal of the overconfidence observed among economic agents. More specifically, overconfidence is inversely proportional to competence. Through a series of experiments and analyses of field data, the link between incompetence and overconfidence is confirmed and its implications for economic theory are explored.

Esther Duflo, Petia Topalova

Cited by*: 14 Downloads*: 54

This paper studies the impact of reservation for women on the performance of policy makers and on voters' perceptions of this performance. Since the mid 1990's, one third of Village Council head positions in India have been randomly reserved for a woman: In these councils only women could be elected to the position of chief. Village Councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas. Using a data set which combines individual level data on satisfaction with public services with independent assessments of the quality of public facilities, we compare objective measures of the quantity and quality of public goods, and information about how villagers evaluate the performance of male and female leaders. Overall, villages reserved for women leaders have more public goods, and the measured quality of these goods is at least as high as in non-reserved villages. Moreover, villagers are less likely to pay bribes in villages reserved for women. Yet, residents of villages headed by women are less satisfied with the public goods, including goods that are beyond the jurisdiction of the Panchayat. This may help explain why women rarely win elections even though they appear to be at least as effective leaders along observable dimensions, and are less corrupt.

E. Lance Howe, James J Murphy, Drew Gerkey, Colin Thor West

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 54

Integrating information from existing research, qualitative ethnographic interviews, and participant observation, we designed a field experiment that introduces idiosyncratic environmental risk and a voluntary sharing decision into a standard public goods game. Conducted with subsistence resource users in rural villages on the Kamchatka Peninsula in Northeast Siberia, we find evidence consistent with a model of indirect reciprocity and local social norms of helping the needy. When participants are allowed to develop reputations in the experiments, as is the case in most small-scale societies, we find that sharing is increasingly directed toward individuals experiencing hardship, good reputations increase aid, and the pooling of resources through voluntary sharing becomes more effective. We also find high levels of voluntary sharing without a strong commitment device; however, this form of cooperation does not increase contributions to the public good. Our results are consistent with previous experiments and theoretical models, suggesting strategic risks tied to rewards, punishments, and reputations are important. However, unlike studies that focus solely on strategic risks, we find the effects of rewards, punishments, and reputations are altered by the presence of environmental factors. Unexpected changes in resource abundance increase interdependence and may alter the costs and benefits of cooperation, relative to defection. We suggest environmental factors that increase interdependence are critically important to consider when developing and testing theories of cooperation.

Chris Arnot, Peter C Boxall, Sean B Cash

Cited by*: 43 Downloads*: 54

The existing literature on socially responsible purchasing relies heavily on stated preference measures elicited through surveys that utilize hypothetical market choices. This paper explores consumers' revealed purchasing behavior with regard to fair trade coffee and is apparently the first to do so in an actual market setting. In a series of experiments, we investigated differences in consumer responsiveness to relative price changes in fair trade and non-fair trade brewed coffees. In order to minimize the hypothetical bias that may be present in some experimental settings, we conducted our experiments in cooperation with a vendor who allowed us to vary prices in an actual coffee shop. Using a choice model, we found that purchasers of fair trade coffee were much less price responsive than those of other coffee products. The demonstration of low sensitivity to price suggests that the market premiums identified by stated preference studies do indeed exist and are not merely artifacts of hypothetical settings.

Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Leigh Linden

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 54

This note presents the results obtained after the first year of a two-year randomized evaluation of a computer assisted learning (CAL) program in Vadodara, India. The CAL program, implemented by a NGO, took advantage of the donation of four computers to each municipal primary school in Vadodara by the state government. The program provided each child in the fourth standard with two hours of shared computer time in which students played educational games that reinforced mathematics competencies ranging from the standard 1 to the standard 3 level. We find the program to be quite effective. On average, it increased math scores by 0.37 standard deviations. The program effect is slightly higher at the bottom of the distribution but persists throughout the distribution. The program had no apparent spillover on language competencies.

Anya Samek

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 54

The gender difference in competitiveness has been cited as an important factor driving the gender gap in labor market outcomes. Using a natural field experiment with 35,000 university students, I explore the impact of compensation scheme on willingness to apply for a job. I find that competitive compensation schemes disproportionately deter women from applying, which cannot be explained by differences in risk preferences alone. I also vary whether the job is introduced as helping a non-profit, which increases application rates, suggesting a role for social preferences in application decisions. Finally, I observe a correlation between competitiveness preferences and career choice.

Sandra Polania-Reyes

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 52

Although social capital has been considered of the utmost importance for development it remains a complex and elusive concept. Different dimensions of social capital form part of the puzzle: cooperation is an individual other-regarding preference; social norms stem from beliefs about others' behavior; and the formation of such beliefs is mediated by attributes of the social network. To disentangle social capital we conduct an artefactual field experiment with 714 households at the inset of a Conditional Cash Transfer program in an urban context. To our knowledge this is the first paper that disentangles cooperation from coordination by conducting a minimum effort coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Willingness to cooperate is teased out using a public goods game. By controlling for the density of network information we capture the role of connections, which is the third element of the mixture. We also look at the relation between our experimental data and traditional survey measures of social capital. Our identification strategy allows us to assess whether exposure to the program could be helping individuals overcome strategic uncertainty and select the most efficient equilibrium in the coordination game. The regressions suggest that the program helps overcome the coordination failure through different channels. In particular, the evidence suggests there is a spillover effect of the monetary incentive as it facilitates a social norm, which itself allows individuals to overcome the coordination failure. We rule out confounding factors such as individual socio-economic characteristics, social capital accumulation, willingness to cooperate and connectivity.

Peter A Riach, Judith Rich

Cited by*: 16 Downloads*: 52

Sexual discrimination in invitation to job interview was tested by a controlled experimental method of send ing carefully-matched pairs of letters in response to newspaper adver tisements-one from a female and one from a male applicant. On 363 of the occasions, when invitations were issued, the applicants were trea ted equally, but there were 144 occasions of differential treatment. Females encountered discrimination 40 percent more frequently than ma les. Discrimination against females was statistically significant for the data in aggregate and for two of the seven occupations involved- gardener and computer analyst-programmer.

Steven D Levitt, John A List

Cited by*: 58 Downloads*: 52

This study presents an overview of modern field experiments and their usage in economics. Our discussion focuses on three distinct periods of field experimentation that have influenced the economics literature. The first might well be thought of as the dawn of "field" experimentation: the work of Neyman and Fisher, who laid the experimental foundation in the 1920s and 1930s by conceptualizing randomization as an instrument to achieve identification via experimentation with agricultural plots. The second, the large-scale social experiments conducted by government agencies in the mid-twentieth century, moved the exploration from plots of land to groups of individuals. More recently, the nature and range of field experiments has expanded, with a diverse set of controlled experiments being completed outside of the typical laboratory environment. With this growth, the number and types of questions that can be explored using field experiments has grown tremendously. After discussing these three distinct phases, we speculate on the future of field experimental methods, a future that we envision including a strong collaborative effort with outside parties, most importantly private entities.

Bradley J Ruffle, Richard Sosis

Cited by*: 35 Downloads*: 51

The in-group-out-group bias is among the most widely documented and analyzed phenomenon in the social sciences. We conduct field experiments to test whether the bias extends to the cooperative behavior of one of the most successful modern collectives, the Israeli kibbutz. Despite their promise as universal cooperators, kibbutz members are more cooperative toward anonymous kibbutz members than they are toward anonymous city residents. In fact, when paired with city residents, kibbutz members' observed levels of cooperation are identical to those of city residents. Moreover, self-selection rather than kibbutz socialization largely accounts for the extent to which kibbutz members are cooperative.

Julian Conrads, Tommaso Reggiani, Rainer M Rilke

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 51

Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one treatment, people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e. the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment, this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations.

Paul Glewwe, Michael Kremer, Sylvie Moulin

Cited by*: 8 Downloads*: 51

Although there is intense debate about the effect of increased expenditure on education in developed countries, there is widespread consensus that provision of textbooks can substantially increase test scores in developing countries. This paper evaluates a program through which a Dutch non-profit organization provided textbooks to 25 rural Kenyan primary schools that were chosen randomly from a group of 100 candidate schools. After one school year, average test scores did not differ substantially between program and comparison schools. However, for those students in the top quintile of the distribution of initial academic achievement, the program raised test scores by at least 0.2 standard deviations.

Adriaan R Soetevent

Cited by*: 63 Downloads*: 51

The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either 'closed' collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendants' contributions can be identified by their direct neighbors, and attendants can observe the total amount given by the people who preceded them. Initially, contributions to the services' second offerings increase by 10% when baskets are used, whereas no effect is found for first offerings. The positive effect of using baskets peters out over the experimental period. Additional data on the coins collected show that in both offerings, people switch to giving larger coins when baskets are used.

Steffen Andersen, Alec Brandon, Uri Gneezy, John A List

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 51

Perhaps the most powerful form of framing arises through reference dependence, wherein choices are made recognizing the starting point or a goal. In labor economics, for example, a form of reference dependence, income targeting, has been argued to represent a serious challenge to traditional economic models. We design a field experiment linked tightly to three popular economic models of labor supply-two behavioral variants and one simple neoclassical model--to deepen our understanding of the positive implications of our major theories. Consistent with neoclassical theory and reference--dependent preferences with endogenous reference points, workers (vendors in open air markets) supply more hours when presented with an expected transitory increase in hourly wages. In contrast with the prediction of behavioral models, however, when vendors earn an unexpected windfall early in the day, their labor supply does not respond. A key feature of our market in terms of parsing the theories is that vendors do not post prices rather they haggle with customers. In this way, our data also speak to the possibility of reference-dependent preferences over other dimensions. Our investigation again yields results that are in line with neoclassical theory, as bargaining patterns are unaffected by the unexpected windfall.

John A List, Robert D Metcalfe, Michael K Price, Florian Rundhammer

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 51

The literature has shown the power of social norms to promote residential energy conservation, particularly among high usage users. This study uses a natural field experiment with nearly 200,000 US households to explore whether a financial rewards program can complement such approaches. We observe strong impacts of financial rewards, particularly amongst low-usage and low-variance households, customers who typically are less responsive to normative messaging. Our data thus suggest important policy complementarities between behavioral and financial incentives: whereas non-pecuniary interventions disproportionally affect intense users, financial incentives are able to affect substantially low-user, "sticky households."

Joshua D Angrist, Eric Bettinger, Erik Bloom, Elizabeth King, Michael Kremer

Cited by*: 124 Downloads*: 50

Colombia's PACES program provided over 125,000 pupils from poor neighborhoods with vouchers that covered approximately half the cost of private secondary school. Since many vouchers were allocated by lottery, we use differences in outcomes between lottery winners and losers to assess program effects. Three years into the program, lottery winners were 15 percentage points more likely to have attended private school, had completed .1 more years of schooling, and were about 10 percentage points more likely to have finished 8 th grade, primarily because they were less likely to repeat grades. The program did not significantly affect dropout rates. Lottery winners scored .2 standard deviations higher on standardized tests. There is some evidence that winners worked less than losers and were less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers. On average, lottery winners increased their educational expenditure by about 70% of the value of the voucher. Since winners also worked less, they devoted more total resources to education. Compared to an equivalent expansion of the public education system, the voucher program increased annual government educational expenditure by about $24 per winner. But the costs to the government and to participants were probably much less than the increase in winners' earnings due to greater educational attainment.