Papers - All

Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John A List, Ty Turley, Maarten Voors

Cited by*: 27 Downloads*: 78

We use a sample of subsistence farmers in Sierra Leone as respondents to compare behavior in a context-free experiment (a standard public goods game) and behavior in the field (a real development intervention). There is no meaningful correlation in behavior across contexts. This casts doubt on the prospect of using lab experiments as "predictors" of behavior in real life.

John A List

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 77

This special issue highlights an empirical approach that has increasingly grown in prominence in the last decade--field experiments. While field experiments can be used quite generally in economics to test theories' predictions, to measure key parameters, and to provide insights into the generalizability of empirical results, this special issue focuses on using field experiments to explore questions within the economics of charity. The issue contains six distinct field experimental studies that investigate various aspects associated with the economics of charitable giving. The issue also includes a fitting tribute to one of the earliest experimenters to depart from traditional lab methods, Peter Bohm, who curiously has not received deep credit or broad acclaim. Hopefully this issue will begin to rectify this oversight.

Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis

Cited by*: 22 Downloads*: 77

Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to punish norm violators in a natural field experiment conducted in the main subway station in Athens, Greece. The large number of passengers ensures that strategic motives for punishing are minimized. We study violations of two distinct efficiency enhancing social norms. In line with laboratory evidence, we find that individuals punish norm violators. However, these individuals are a minority. Men are more likely than women to punish violators, while the decision to punish is unaffected by the violator's height and gender. Interestingly, we find that violations of the better known of the two norms are substantially less likely to trigger punishment. We present additional evidence from two surveys providing insights into the determinants of norm enforcement.

Eszter Czibor, Sander Onderstal, Randolph Sloof, Mirjam van Praag

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 76

We conduct a framed field experiment in a Dutch university to compare student effort provision and exam performance under the two most prevalent evaluation practices: absolute (criterion-referenced) and relative (norm-referenced) grading. Based on the empirical stylized fact of gender differences in competitiveness we hypothesize that the rank-order tournament created by relative grading will increase male, but not female, performance. Contrary to our expectations, we find no impact of competitive grading on preparation behavior or exam scores among either gender. Our result may be attributed to the low value students in our sample attach to academic excellence.

David H Herberich, Steven D Levitt, John A List

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 74

No abstract available

Andreas Leibbrandt, John A List

Cited by*: 7 Downloads*: 74

One explanation advanced for the persistent gender pay differences in labor markets is that women avoid salary negotiations. By using a natural field experiment that randomizes nearly 2,500 job-seekers into jobs that vary important details of the labor contract, we are able to observe both the nature of sorting and the extent of salary negotiations. We observe interesting data patterns. For example, we find that when there is no explicit statement that wages are negotiable, men are more likely to negotiate than women. However, when we explicitly mention the possibility that wages are negotiable, this difference disappears, and even tends to reverse. In terms of sorting, we find that men in contrast to women prefer job environments where the 'rules of wage determination' are ambiguous. This leads to the gender gap being much more pronounced in jobs that leave negotiation of wage ambiguous.

Jeff P Carpenter, Glenn W Harrison, John A List

Cited by*: 16 Downloads*: 73

No abstract available

Maria Bigoni, Margherita Fort, Mattia Nardotto, Tommaso Reggiani

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 72

We assess the effect of two antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes based on grading rules on students' effort, using experimental data. We randomly assigned students to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between paired up students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a baseline treatment in which students can neither compete nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation, whereas cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline treatment. Nonetheless, we find a strong gender effect since this result holds only for men while women do not react to this type of non-monetary incentives.

Stefano DellaVigna, John A List, Ulrike Malmendier, Gautam Rao

Cited by*: 19 Downloads*: 71

Do men and women have different social preferences? Previous findings are contradictory. We provide a potential explanation using evidence from a field experiment. In a door-to-door solicitation, men and women are equally generous, but women become less generous when it becomes easy to avoid the solicitor. Our structural estimates of the social preference parameters suggest an explanation: women are more likely to be on the margin of giving, partly because of a less dispersed distribution of altruism. We find similar results for the willingness to complete an unpaid survey: women are more likely to be on the margin of participation.

Richard O Biel, David N Laband

Cited by*: 17 Downloads*: 71

There is considerable professional disagreement among economists about whether economists are less cooperative than non-economists. It has been argued that once an individual has been schooled in the self-interest model of individual human behavior (s)he exhibits more selfish behavior than other, ostensibly similar individuals who have not been taught to fully appreciate Homo economicus. Heretofore, the empirical debate has centered around classroom experiments designed to compare the "honesty" of undergraduate economics majors versus non economics majors. However, methodological problems have plagued these studies, leaving both sides at an impasse. We offer unique and compelling real-world evidence that suggests economists are no less cooperative than non-economists. Indeed, after comparing the incidence of "cheating" on their Association dues, we find that professional economists are significantly more honest/cooperative than professional political scientists, and especially, professional sociologists.

Gad Allon, Jan A. Van Mieghem, Dennis J. Zhang

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 71

This paper studies how service providers can design social interaction among participants and quantify the causal impact of that interaction on service quality. We focus on education and analyze whether encouraging social interaction among students improves learning outcomes in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), which are a new service delivery channel with universal access at reduced, if not zero, cost. We analyze three randomized experiments in a MOOC with more than 30; 317 students from 183 countries. Two experiments study large-group interaction by encouraging a random subset of students to visit the course discussion board. The majority of students treated in these experiments had higher social engagement, higher quiz completion rates, and higher course grades. Using these treatments as instrumental variables, we estimate that one additional board visit causally increases the probability that a student finishes the quiz in the subsequent week by up to 4:3%. The third experiment studies small-group interaction by encouraging a random subset of students to conduct one-on-one synchronous discussions. Students who followed through and actually conducted pairwise discussions increased their quiz completion rates and quiz scores by 10% in the subsequent week. Combining results from these three experiments, we provide recommendations for designing social interaction mechanisms to improve service quality.

Raymond C Battalio, Leonard Green, John H Kagel

Cited by*: 22 Downloads*: 70

No abstract available

John A List

Cited by*: 46 Downloads*: 69

In this introduction to the symposium, I first offer an overview of the spectrum of experimental methods in economics, from laboratory experiments to the field experiments that are the subject of this symposium. I then offer some thoughts about the potential gains from doing economic research using field experiments and my own mental checklist of 14 steps to improve the chances of carrying out an economics field experiment successfully.

Jeffrey A Flory, Uri Gneezy, Kenneth Leonard, John A List

Cited by*: 7 Downloads*: 68

Gender differences in competitive behavior have received much attention, demonstrating a systematic gap between males' and females' tendencies to compete. Theories predict a biological factor linked to an evolutionary response to the different paths to reproductive success for men and women. Since strategies for reproductive success change over the female life-cycle, the gender gap is predicted to be largest for young adults but after menopause women should be as competitive as men. Using data drawn from two very different societies, we find strong support for this theoretical prediction: competitiveness in women is tightly linked to their biological roles in childrearing.

John A List, Anya Samek, Terri Zhu

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 67

We use a field experiment to investigate the effect of incentives on food purchase decisions at a grocery store. We recruit over 200 participants and track their purchases for a period of 6 months, permitting us a glimpse of more than 3,500 individual shopping trips. We randomize participants to one of several treatments, in which we incentivize fresh fruit and vegetable purchases, provide tips for fruit and vegetable preparation, or both. We report several key insights. First, our informational content treatment has little effect. Second, we find an important price effect: modest pecuniary incentives more than double the proportion of dollars spent on produce in the grocery store. Third, we find an interesting pattern of consumption after the experiment ends: even when incentives are removed, the treatment group has higher fruit and vegetable purchases compared to the control group. These long-term results are in stark contrast to either a standard price model or a behavioral model of 'crowd out.' Rather, our results are consonant with a habit formation model. This opens up the distinct possibility that short term incentives can be used as a key instrument to combat obesity.

Rachel Croson, Jen Shang

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 67

This paper examines the impact of social comparisons on fundraising and charitable contributions. We present results from a field experiment involving contribution to a public radio station. Some callers are told of the contributions decisions of others, and other callers are given no such information. We find that providing ambitions (high) social comparison information can significantly increase contributions.

Michael Chirico, Robert Inman, Charles Loeffler, John MacDonald, Holger Sieg

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 67

Property taxes play a central role in the financing of municipal government services. Yet, municipal governments commonly confront problems with property tax collection even when the tax base is known. There is surprisingly little evidence on what authorities can do to increase property tax compliance. This paper analyzes seven different property tax notification strategies through a randomized controlled experiment conducted with the City of Philadelphia. All seven notification strategies increase property tax compliance over the usual approach of simply sending a bill. The most effective notifications are the those that threaten to take out a lien on the property or to foreclose by sheriff's sale for continued failure to pay taxes. The results suggest that economic motives to pay property taxes are more effective than those that appeal to social norms.

Stefano DellaVigna, John A List, Ulrike Malmendier, Gautam Rao

Cited by*: 13 Downloads*: 66

We design a model-based field experiment to estimate the nature and magnitude of workers' social preferences towards their employers. We hire 446 workers for a one-time task. Within worker, we vary (i) piece rates; (ii) whether the work has payoffs only for the worker, or also for the employer; and (iii) the return to the employer. We then introduce a surprise increase or decrease in pay ('gifts') from the employer. We find that workers have substantial baseline social preferences towards their employers, even in the absence of repeated-game incentives. Consistent with models of warm glow or social norms, but not of pure altruism, workers exert substantially more effort when their work is consequential to their employer, but are insensitive to the precise return to the employer. Turning to reciprocity, we find little evidence of a response to unexpected positive (or negative) gifts from the employer. Our structural estimates of the social preferences suggest that, if anything, positive reciprocity in response to monetary 'gifts' may be larger than negative reciprocity. We revisit the results of previous field experiments on gift exchange using our model and derive a one-parameter expression for the implied reciprocity in these experiments.

Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, Colin F Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Joseph Henrich, Richard McElreath

Cited by*: 75 Downloads*: 66

al behavior better explained statistically by individuals' attributes such as their sex, age, or relative wealth, or by the attributes of the group to which the individuals belong? Are there cultures that approximate the canonical account of self-regarding behavior? Existing research cannot answer such questions because virtually all subjects have been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the range of all social and cultural environments. To address the above questions, we and our collaborators undertook a large cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public good, and dictator games. Twelve experienced field researchers, working in 12 countries on five continents, recruited subjects from 15 small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. Our sample consists of three foraging societies, six that practice slash-and-burn horticulture

Sera Linardi, Nita Rudra

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 66

Can globalization change our willingness to redistribute to the poor? We propose the hypothesis that in developing countries, the 'glitter' of foreign direct investment (FDI) reduces public support for redistribution by creating perceptions of better employment opportunities for the poor. Initial evidence is derived from World Value Survey responses from developing economies. Delving deeper, a framed field experiment in India reveals foreign ownership of low-skilled firms reduces redistribution to the poor. We further find that rich conservatives drive this reduction. This analysis provides the first experimental evidence of the causal impact of globalization on redistribution, mediated by ideology and income.