Papers - All

Alex Imas, Sally Sadoff, Anya Samek

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 104

There is growing interest in the use of loss contracts that offer performance incentives as upfront payments that employees can lose. Standard behavioral models predict a tradeoff in the use of loss contracts: employees will work harder under loss contracts than under gain contracts; but, anticipating loss aversion, they will prefer gain contracts to loss contracts. In a series of experiments, we test these predictions by measuring performance and preferences for payoff-equivalent gain and loss contracts. We find that people indeed work harder under loss than gain contracts, as the theory predicts. Surprisingly, rather than a preference for the gain contract, we find that people actually prefer loss contracts. In exploring mechanisms for our results, we find suggestive evidence that people do anticipate loss aversion but select into loss contracts as a commitment device to improve performance.

Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert D Metcalfe, Ivo Vlaev

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 82

Framing remains one of the pillars of behavioral economics. While framing effects have been found to be quite important in the lab, what is less clear is how well evidence drawn from naturally-occurring settings conforms to received laboratory insights. We use debt obligation to the UK government as a case study to explore the 'omission bias' present in decision making with large stakes. Using a natural field experiment that generates nearly 40,000 observations, we find that repayment rates are roughly doubled when the act is reframed as one of commission rather than omission. We estimate that this reframing of the perceived nature of the action generated over $1.3 million of new yield. We find evidence that this behavior may result from a deliberate 'omission strategy', rather than a behavioral bias, as is often assumed in the literature. Our natural field experiment highlights that behavioral economics is much more than a series of empirical exercises to quench the intellectual curiosity of academics.

Cody Cook, Rebecca Diamond, Jonathan Hall, John A List, Paul Oyer

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 60

The growth of the "gig" economy generates worker flexibility that, some have speculated, will favor women. We explore one facet of the gig economy by examining labor supply choices and earnings among more than a million rideshare drivers on Uber in the U.S. Perhaps most surprisingly, we find that there is a roughly 7% gender earnings gap among drivers. The uniqueness of our data - knowing exactly the production and compensation functions - permits us to completely unpack the underlying determinants of the gender earnings gap. We find that the entire gender gap is caused by three factors: experience on the platform (learning-by-doing), preferences over where/when to work, and preferences for driving speed. This suggests that, as the gig economy grows and brings more flexibility in employment, women's relatively high opportunity cost of non-paid-work time and gender-based preference differences can perpetuate a gender earnings gap even in the absence of discrimination.

Michael J. Seiler, Eric Walden

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 1

Great debate is being waged between whether strategic mortgage defaulters follow a herd for social reasons or mimic others' behavior for informational gain. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the latest neurological technology allowing for observation of brain activity during strategic mortgage default decision-making, we find that when defaulters learn of peer default behavior, they acknowledge the social component of the decision, but feel freer to make their own decisions. Alternatively, when observing the behavior of a maven (real estate expert), borrowers still consider the social aspect of the decision (although to a lesser extent), but ultimately follow the maven who presumably possesses a greater information set. Alarmingly, borrowers only significantly follow the herd when mavens advocate strategic default, not when they recommend against it.

Ufuk Akcigit, Fernando Alvarez, Stephane Bonhomme, George M Constantinides, Douglas W Diamond, Eugene F Fama, David W Galenson, Michael Greenstone, Lars Peter Hansen, Uhlig Harald, James J Heckman, Ali Hortacsu, Emir Kamenica, Greg Kaplan, Anil K Kashyap, Steven D Levitt, John A List, Robert E Lucas Jr., Magne Mogstad, Roger Myerson, Derek Neal, Canice Prendergast, Raghuram G Rajan, Philip J Reny, Azeem M Shaikh, Robert Shimer, Hugo F Sonnenschein, Nancy L Stokey, Richard H Thaler, Robert H Topel, Robert Vishny, Luigi Zingales

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 207

No abstract available

Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis, Bettina Rockenbach

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: None

The degree of human cooperation among strangers is a major evolutionary puzzle. A prominent explanation is that cooperation maintained because many individuals have a predisposition to punish those violating group-beneficial norms. A critical condition for cooperation to evolve in evolutionary models is that punishment increases with the severity of the violation. Here we present evidence from a field experiment with real-life interactions that, unlike in lab experiments, altruistic punishment does not increase with the severity of the violation, regardless of whether it is direct (confronting a violator) or indirect (withholding help). We also document growing concerns for counter-punishment as the severity of the violation increases, indicating that the marginal cost of direct punishment increases with the severity of violations. The evidence suggests that altruistic punishment may not provide appropriate incentives to deter large violations. Our findings thus offer a rationale for the emergence of formal institutions for prompting large-scale cooperation among strangers.

Charles Bellemare, Sabine Kroger

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 5

This paper analyzes data for a random sample drawn from the Dutch population who reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest and reward investments by means of an economic experiment. We have three main results. First, we find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries men, the young and elderly, and low educated individuals invest relatively less, but reward significantly more investments. Second, higher expected levels of investments have a positive and significant effect on the level of investments themselves, corroborating the presence of social norms. Third, we compare our results with a laboratory experiment conducted with a student sample. We find that the student sample provides a lower bound of the population level of social capital.

Jeffrey A Flory, Uri Gneezy, Kenneth Leonard, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 88

Research on competitiveness at the individual level has emphasized sex as a physiological determinant, focusing on the gap in preference for competitive environments between young men and women. This study presents evidence that women's preferences over competition change with age such that the gender gap, while large for young adults, disappears in older populations due to the fact that older women are much more competitive. Our finding that tastes for competition appear just as strong among older women as they are among men suggests a simple gender-based view of competitiveness is misleading; age seems just as important as sex. These findings are consistent with one of the most commonly cited views on the deeper origins of gender differences: that they stem at least in part from human evolution.

Donald P Green

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 1

This essay summarizes the results of a large-scale randomized experiment conducted during the 2000 election campaign by the NAACP National Voter Fund, which sought to mobilize African-American voters. Focusing solely on the direct mail and phone banking components of the NAACP-NVF campaign, this study examines the voting behavior of 980,208 participants residing in single-voter households, 1.7 percent of whom were randomly assigned to a control group. The experiment permits us to estimate (1) the extent to which the National Voter Fund's phone calls and direct mail increased voter turnout and (2) the approximate cost per vote. Within this sample, the NVF's two pieces of GOTV mail, three live phone calls, and two recorded phone calls had modest effects, generating approximately 7,100 additional votes at $158 per vote. The upper bound of a 90 percent confidence interval puts these figures at 16,214 additional votes at $69 per vote.

Bruno S Frey, Stephan Meier

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 29

People behave pro-socially in a wide variety of situations that standard economic theory is unable to explain. Social comparison is one explanation for such pro-social behavior: people contribute if others contribute or cooperate as well. This paper tests social comparison in a field experiment at the University of Zurich. Each semester every single student has to decide whether he or she wants to contribute to two Social Funds. We provided 2500 randomly selected students with information about the average behavior of the student population. Some received the information that a high percentage of the student population contributed, while others received the information that a relatively low percentage contributed. The results show that people behave pro-socially, conditional on others. The more others cooperate, the more one is inclined to do so as well. The type of person is important. We are able to fix the "types" by looking at revealed past behavior. Some persons seem to care more about the pro-social behavior of others, while other "types" are not affected by the average behavior of the reference group.

Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis, Bettina Rockenbach

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: None

Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means of understanding the evolution of cooperation.

Alpert Bernard

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 4

The article analyzes the validity and reliability of using the results of behavioral experiments in stimulating businessmen in real life situation. 301 samples of various fields namely business and non-business managers, students and military personnels were taken for the experiment. The businesss situation taken was that a manager had abruptly discharged his subordinate on the context of performance. The subjects were required to make a letter of advocacy and also were asked to write their opinion on the firing done by the manager. The letter of advocacy was the subject's effort, in writing, to support the point of view assigned to him. One point of view had the subject approving the manager's method of firing the subordinate and the other point of view had him disapproving. If change in opinion for both groups of advocates had occurred toward one point of view and not toward the other, then the change could have been reasonably attributed to bias in the topic. Military personnel showed the least significant opinion changes in advocating either of the two points of view. On the other extreme, business managers showed rather highly significant changes irrespective of point of view advocated.

John A List, Charles F Mason

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 20

Are individuals expected utility maximizers? This question represents much more than academic curiosity. In a normative sense, at stake are the fundamental underpinnings of the bulk of the last half-century's models of choice under uncertainty. From a positive perspective, the ubiquitous use of benefit-cost analysis across government agencies renders the expected utility maximization paradigm literally the only game in town. In this study, we advance the literature by exploring CEO's preferences over small probability, high loss lotteries. Using undergraduate students as our experimental control group, we find that both our CEO and student subject pools exhibit frequent and large departures from expected utility theory. In addition, as the extreme payoffs become more likely CEOs exhibit greater aversion to risk. Our results suggest that use of the expected utility paradigm in decision making substantially underestimates society's willingness to pay to reduce risk in small probability, high loss events.

Fuhai Hong, Tanjim Hossain, John A List, Migiwa Tanaka

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 29

Using a natural field experiment with factory workers where we introduce a quantity-based performance-pay scheme in addition to their base salary, we quantify the impact of one-dimensional monetary incentives on both incentivized (quantity) and non-incentivized (quality) dimensions of output. While the management typically observes only quantity, we also observe quality by hiring quality-inspectors unbeknownst to the workers. While some workers receive a flat-rate base salary, others receive a piece-rate base salary. We find sharp evidence that workers under a flat-rate base salary trade off quality for quantity. Interestingly, this quantity-quality trade-off is statistically insignificant for workers under a piece-rate base salary. This variation in the treatment effect is consistent with a simple theoretical model that predicts that when agents are already incented at the margin, the quantity-quality trade-off resulting from additional incentives will be less prominent.

Richard C Bishop, Kevin J Boyle, Richard T Carson, David Chapman, Matthew DeBell, Colleen Donovan, W. Michael Hanemann, Barbara Kanninen, Matthew Konopka, Raymond J Kopp, Jon A Krosnick, John A List, Norman Meade, Robert Paterson, Stanley Presser, Nora Scherer, V. Kerry Smith, Roger Tourangeau, Michael Welsh, Jeffrey M Wooldridge

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 78

No abstract available

James Andreoni, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 8

No abstract available

John A List, William S Neilson, Michael K Price

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 101

Recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision-making. This line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision-making environment potentially miss critical features. This study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally. Our experimental laboratory is large open air markets, where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller's collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations. This permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition. Empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions, and show that deviations from Nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership.

Sultan Orazbayev

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 2

Academic journal editors reject a significant portion of first submissions without sending them out for peer review. This decision, desk rejection, is made to reduce the workload on associate editors and referees, to give the submitting author a head start on revision or pursuit of an alternative venue, as well as to achieve quicker turnaround time for the journal. Desk rejection is a judgement based on the manuscript's perceived quality, impact and fit with the journal's scope. Could extraneous factors which are unrelated to the content of the manuscript, affect the editorial decision? This paper examines whether the sequential order in which manuscripts are submitted to a large academic journal affects the editorial decision. Becoming the first submission on the editor's list of manuscripts to review increases the probability of a desk rejection by up to 7% without any effect on the likelihood of a rejection after peer review.

John A List, Anya Samek, Michael K Price

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 2

No abstract available

Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John A List, Ty Turley, Maarten Voors

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 35

The experimental literature has shown the tendency for experimental trading markets to converge to neoclassical predictions. Yet, the extent to which theory explains the equilibrating forces in markets remains under-researched, especially in the developing world. We set up a laboratory in 94 villages in rural Sierra Leone to mimic a real market. We implement several treatments, varying trading partners and the anonymity of trading. We find that when trading with co-villagers average efficiency is somewhat lower than predicted by theory (and observed in different contexts), and markets do not fully converge to theoretical predictions across rounds of trading. When participants trade with strangers efficiency is reduced more. Anonymizing trade within the village does not affect efficiency. This points to the importance of behavioral norms for trade. Intra-village social relationships or hierarchies, instead, appear less important as determinants of trading outcomes. This is confirmed by analysis of the trader-level data, showing that individual earnings in the experiment do not vary with one's status or position in local networks.