Papers - All

Macartan Humphreys, William Masters, Martin Sandbu

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 6

Despite a widespread trend towards the adoption of increasingly participatory approaches to political decision-making in developing countries there is little or no evidence that these practices in fact return the benefits attributed to them. We present an empirical investigation into one specific worry-that participatory decision processes may be vulnerable to manipulation by elites. We report on a field experiment on the effects of leaders, drawing on a unique nationwide experiment in democratic deliberation in Sao Tome and Principe. In these deliberations, meetings were moderated by discussion leaders who were randomly assigned to run meetings around the country. The randomization procedure provides a rare opportunity to identify the impact of leaders on the outcomes of group deliberations. We find that leadership effects were extremely large, in many cases accounting for over one third of all variation in the outcomes of the national discussions. These results have important implications for the design of such deliberative practices. While the total effect of leadership cannot be assessed, it is possible to observe leadership effects and to correct for variation in outcomes of meetings.

Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, Matthew N Green

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 3

Political campaigns currently make extensive use of direct mail, particularly in state and local races, yet its effects on voter behavior are not well understood. This essay presents the results of large-scale randomized field experiments conducted in Connecticut and New Jersey during state and municipal elections of 1999. Tens of thousands of registered voters were sent from zero to nine pieces of direct mail. The target populations included party registrants with a strong history of voter participation, independents, and a random subset of registered voters. Our results indicate partisan campaign mail does little to stimulate voter turnout and may even dampen it when the mail is negative in tone.

Anya Samek, Roman Sheremeta

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 4

We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting environments: one that encourages competition (lottery contest) and one that encourages cooperation (public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in the public good game affects behavior in the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding. Contributions to the public good are not affected by participation in the contest. The direction of behavioral spillover is explained by differences in strategic uncertainty and path-dependence across games. Our design allows us to compare preferences for cooperation and competition. We find that in early periods, there is a negative correlation between decisions in competitive and in cooperative environments.

Michael S Haigh, John A List

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 12

An important class of investment decisions is characterized by unrecoverable sunk costs, resolution of uncertainty through time, and the ability to invest in the future as an alternative to investing today. The options model provides guidance in such settings, including an investment decision rule called the "bad news principle": the downside investment state influences the investment decision whereas the upside investment state is ignored. This study takes a new approach to examining predictions of the options model by using the tools of experimental economics. Our evidence, which is drawn from student and professional trader subject pools, is broadly consonant with the options model.

Jan Hansen, Carsten Schmidt, Martin Strobel

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 13

Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioural model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 1999 state elections.

Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Bettina Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 7

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In an additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate employer's surplus from the work contract is a crucial pre-requisite for a positive wage-effort relation. This demonstrates that employee's reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake.

Gustavo J Bobonis, Edward Miguel, Charu P Sharma

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 22

Iron-deficiency anemia is among the world's most widespread health problems, especially for children, but it is rarely studied by economists. This paper evaluates the impact of a health intervention delivering iron supplementation and deworming drugs to 2-6 year old children through an existing pre-school network in the slums of Delhi, India. At baseline 69 percent of sample children were anemic and 30 percent had intestinal worm infections. Sample pre-schools were randomly divided into groups and gradually phased into treatment. Weight increased significantly among assisted children, and pre-school participation rates rose sharply by 5.8 percentage points - a reduction of one-fifth in school absenteeism - in the first five months of the program. Gains are largest in low socio-economic status areas. Year two estimates are similar, but two methodological problems--sample attrition, and the non-random sorting of new child cohorts into treatment groups--complicate interpretation of the later results.

John A Fox, Jayson L Lusk

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 13

An increasing number of studies have begun conducting economic experiments in field, rather than laboratory settings. We directly compare results from laboratory and field valuation experiments. After controlling for unengaged bidders, results indicate field valuations were greater than laboratory valuations. Results are discussed in the context of recent literature on commitment costs.

Joshua D Clinton, John S Lapinski

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 6

Scholars disagree whether negative advertising demobilizes or stimulates the electorate. We use an experiment with over 10,200 eligible voters to evaluate the two leading hypotheses of negative political advertising. We extend the analysis to examine whether advertising differentially impacts the turnout of voter subpopulations depending on the advertisement's message. In the short term, we find no evidence that exposure to negative advertisements decreases turnout and little that suggests it increases turnout. Any effect appears to depend upon the message of the advertisement and the characteristics of the viewer. In the long term, we find little evidence that the information contained in the treatment groups' advertisements is sufficient to systematically alter turnout.

Fuhai Hong, Tanjim Hossain, John A List, Migiwa Tanaka

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 98

A well-recognized problem in the multitasking literature is that workers might substantially reduce their effort on tasks that produce unobservable outputs as they seek the salient rewards to observable outputs. Since the theory related to multitasking is decades ahead of the empirical evidence, the economic costs of standard incentive schemes under multitasking contexts remain largely unknown. This study provides empirical insights quantifying such effects using a field experiment in Chinese factories. Using more than 2200 data points across 126 workers, we find sharp evidence that workers do trade off the incented output (quantity) at the expense of the non-incented one (quality) as a result of a piece rate bonus scheme. Consistent with our theoretical model, treatment effects are much stronger for workers whose base salary structure is a flat wage compared to those under a piece rate base salary. While the incentives result in a large increase in quantity and a sharp decrease in quality for workers under a flat base salary, they result only in a small increase in quantity without affecting quality for workers under a piece rate base salary.

Sally Sadoff, Anya Samek, Charles Sprenger

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 40

We conduct a natural field experiment with over 200 customers at a grocery store to investigate dynamic inconsistency and the demand for commitment in food choice. Subjects are invited to allocate and re-allocate food items received as part of a grocery delivery program. We observe substantial dynamic inconsistency, as well as a demand for commitment among a non-negligible number of subjects. Interestingly, individuals who demand commitment are more likely to be dynamically consistent in their prior behavior. This work provides direct evidence of dynamic inconsistency in consumption choices in the field and points towards potential extensions to models of temptation.

David J Cooper

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 13

This paper studies experiments set in a corporate environment where a manager attempts to overcome a history of coordination failure by employees using either financial incentives or communication. I compare the choices of subject managers drawn from a standard undergraduate population with subject managers drawn from the executive MBA (EMBA) program at Case?s Weatherhead School of Management. The EMBA subjects are a group of experienced, successful managers; all of the EMBA subjects have at least ten years of work experience, including at least five years in a supervisory role, and have average annual earnings in excess of $120,000. The EMBA subject managers are able to overcome a history of coordination failure significantly faster than the undergraduate subject managers. This superior performance is driven neither by differences in the financial incentives offered to the employees nor by use of an inherently different communications strategy. Instead, EMBA subject managers are significantly more likely to use the same "good" communication strategy as is identified for undergraduate subject managers through systematic coding of managers messages to employees.

Ginger Z Jin, Andrew Kato

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 27

Economists accept consumer frauds as an equilibrium outcome of information costs. This paper empirically investigates what information is costly, what contribute to the information costs, and what institutions are more effective in reducing the information costs. We focus on one of the most complained about markets - Internet auctions. In a field experiment, we obtain actual baseball cards from both online and retail markets whose quality are then professionally graded and compared to the prices paid by online buyers for goods with similar claims. The experiment allows us to obtain a key variable - true quality - on top of price and seller ratings used in the existing literature. Our findings indicate that some naive buyers in the online ungraded market are misled by non-credible claims of quality. They pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often. In comparison, claim-driven frauds do not exist in retail or graded markets where buyers can observe card quality either through careful quality examination before purchase or a third-party grading service. Online seller reputation is found to be effective for identifying good-faith sellers. But conditional on completed auctions, reputable sellers do not provide better quality. More disturbingly, the price increase from making non-credible claims more than compensates for the lower likelihood of sale for sellers with low reputations. We attribute the naivete to misleading signals in the online ungraded market and two loopholes in the eBay rating system, namely universal rating and costless switching of anonymous identities. These loopholes reduce the precision and accessibility of seller information, and therefore add difficulties for naive buyers to become sophisticated. We also point out that naive buyers could impose several negative externalities on the other good-faith players in the market.

Benjamin A Olken

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 26

This paper examines the accuracy of beliefs about corruption, using data from Indonesian villages. Specifically, I compare villagers' stated beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in a road-building project in their village with a more objective measure of 'missing expenditures' in the project, which I construct by comparing the project's official expenditure reports with an independent estimate of the prices and quantities of inputs used in construction. I find that villagers' beliefs do contain information about corruption in the road project, and that villagers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between corruption in the road project and other types of corruption in the village. The magnitude of their information, however, is small, in part because officials hide corruption where it is hardest for villagers to detect. This may limit the effectiveness of grass-roots monitoring of local officials. I also find evidence of systematic biases in corruption beliefs, particularly when examining the relationship between corruption and variables correlated with trust. For example, ethnically heterogeneous villages have higher perceived corruption levels but lower actual levels of missing expenditures. The findings illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions, whether in designing anti-corruption policies or in conducting empirical research on corruption.

Thomas S Dee

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 7

Wisconsin's influential Learnfare initiative is a conditional cash penalty program that sanctions a family's welfare grant when covered teens fail to meet school attendance targets. In the presence of reference-dependent preferences, Learnfare provides uniquely powerful financial incentives for student performance. However, a 10-county random-assignment evaluation suggested that Learnfare had no sustained effects on school enrollment and attendance. This study evaluates the data from this randomized field experiment. In Milwaukee County, the Learnfare procedures were poorly implemented and the random-assignment process failed to produce balanced baseline traits. However, in the nine remaining counties, Learnfare increased school enrollment by 3.7 percent (effect size = 0.08) and attendance by 4.5 percent (effect size = 0.10). The hypothesis of a common treatment effect sustained throughout the six-semester study period could not be rejected. These effects were larger among subgroups at risk for dropping out of school (e.g., baseline dropouts, those over age for grade). For example, these heterogeneous treatment effects imply that Learnfare closed the enrollment gap between baseline dropouts and school attendees by 41 percent. These results suggest that well-designed financial incentives can be an effective mechanism for improving the school persistence of at-risk students at scale.

Omar Al-Ubaydli, John A List

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 89

A commonly held view is that laboratory experiments provide researchers with more "control" than natural field experiments, and that this advantage is to be balanced against the disadvantage that laboratory experiments are less generalizable. This paper presents a simple model that explores circumstances under which natural field experiments provide researchers with more control than laboratory experiments afford. This stems from the covertness of natural field experiments: laboratory experiments provide researchers with a high degree of control in the environment which participants agree to be experimental subjects. When participants systematically opt out of laboratory experiments, the researcher's ability to manipulate certain variables is limited. In contrast, natural field experiments bypass the participation decision altogether and allow for a potentially more diverse participant pool within the market of interest. We show one particular case where such selection is invaluable: when treatment effects interact with participant characteristics.

Dean S Karlan, Jonathan Zinman

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 17

Expanding access to commercial credit is a key ingredient of financial development strategies. There is less consensus on whether expanding access to consumer credit helps borrowers, particularly when loans are extended at high interest rates. Popular skepticism about "unproductive," "usurious" lending is fueled by research highlighting behavioral biases that may induce overborrowing. We estimate the impacts of expanding access to consumer credit at a 200% annual percentage rate (APR) using a field experiment and follow-up data collection. The randomly assigned marginal loans produced significant net benefits for borrowers across a wide range of outcomes. There is also some evidence that the loans were profitable.

Juan-Camilo Cardenas

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 40

No abstract available

Daniel Houser, John A List, Marco Piovesan, Anya Samek, Joachim Winter

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 88

Acts of dishonesty permeate life. Understanding their origins, and what mechanisms help to attenuate such acts is an underexplored area of research. This study takes an economics approach to explore the propensity of individuals to act dishonestly across different contexts. We conduct an experiment that includes both parents and their young children as subjects, exploring the roles of moral cost and scrutiny on dishonest behavior. We find that the highest level of dishonesty occurs in settings where the parent acts alone and the dishonest act benefits the child. In this spirit, there is also an interesting, quite different, effect of children on parents' behavior: parents act more honestly under the scrutiny of daughters than under the scrutiny of sons. This finding sheds new light on the origins of the widely documented gender differences in cheating behavior observed among adults, where a typical result is that females are more honest than males.

Anya Samek

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 4

We experimentally investigate the difference in competitiveness of 3-5 year-old boys and girls in the U.S. 123 children from a preschool are randomly matched into girl-girl, boy-boy, and boy-girl pairs of similar age and participate in a gender-neutral, competitive classroom activity using candy as an incentive. Children participate in a piece rate incentive scheme and a tournament incentive scheme in rounds 1 and 2, and select their preferred incentive scheme for round 3. We find that girls and boys choose to compete at equal rates - with 80% of children choosing to compete overall. We also find that girls' output in the task is significantly lower than that of boys under the tournament scheme, but not different in round 3 for the girls and boys who self-select into the tournament. All children display a remarkable rate of confidence - 84% of children believe they won under the tournament scheme. The gender of the match does not play a significant role.