Papers - All

Xavier Gine, Dean S Karlan

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 19

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender's overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. We worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. We randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability centers of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.

Kosuke Imai

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 9

In their landmark study of a field experiment, Gerber and Green (2000) found that get-out-the-vote calls reduce turnout by five percentage points. In this article, I introduce statistical methods that can uncover discrepancies between experimental design and actual implementation. The application of this methodology shows that Gerber and Green's negative finding is caused by inadvertent deviations from their stated experimental protocol. The initial discovery led to revisions of the original data by the authors and retraction of the numerical results in their article. Analysis of their revised data, however, reveals new systematic patterns of implementation errors. Indeed, treatment assignments of the revised data appear to be even less randomized than before their corrections. To adjust for these problems, I employ a more appropriate statistical method and demonstrate that telephone canvassing increases turnout by five percentage points. This article demonstrates how statistical methods can find and correct complications of field experiments.

Jeffrey A Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt, John A List

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 3

Recently an important line of research using laboratory experiments has provided a new potential reason for why we observe gender imbalances in labor markets: men are more competitively inclined than women. Whether, and to what extent, such preferences yield differences in naturally-occurring labor market outcomes remains an open issue. We address this question by exploring job-entry decisions in a natural field experiment where we randomized nearly 7,000 interested job-seekers into different compensation regimes. By varying the role that individual competition plays in setting the wage, we are able to explore whether competition, by itself, can cause differential job entry. The data highlight the power of the compensation regime in that women disproportionately shy away from competitive work settings. Yet, there are important factors that attenuate the gender differences, including whether the job is performed in teams, whether the job task is female-oriented, and the local labor market.

Paul W Rhode, Koleman S Strumpf

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 16

Political stock markets have a long history in the United States. Organized prediction markets for Presidential elections have operated on Wall Street (1880-1944), the Iowa Electronic Market (1988-present), and TradeSports (2001-present). Proponents claim such markets efficiently aggregate information and provide forecasts superior to polls. An important counterclaim is that such markets may be subject to manipulation by interested parties. We analyze this argument by studying alleged and actual speculative attacks- large trades, uninformed by fundamentals, intended to change prices- in these three markets. We first examine the historical Wall Street markets where political operatives from the contending parties actively and openly bet on city, state and national races; the record is rife with accusations that parties tried to boost their candidates through investments and wash bets. Next we report the results of a field experiment involving a series of planned, random investments-- accounting for two percent of total market volume-- in the Iowa Electronic Market in 2000. Finally, we investigate the speculative attacks on TradeSports market in 2004 when a single trader made a series of large investments in an apparent attempt to make one candidate appear stronger. In the cases studied here, the speculative attack initially moved prices, but these changes were quickly undone and prices returned close to their previous levels. We find little evidence that political stock markets can be systematically manipulated beyond short time periods.

John A List

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 4

Previous studies of income distribution have found evidence indicating that incomes across U.S. regions have converged, supporting the prediction of the neoclassical growth model. A potential shortcoming in these studies is that only one measure of well-being is considered a measure of wealth linked to incomes or production. This paper examines whether income convergence was accompanied by air pollutant emission convergence. Results from unit root tests provide some evidence that indicators of environmental quality have converged across U.S. regions during the 1929-1994 period.

Craig Gallet, John A List

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 4

Recent research has posited that, in advanced economies, there is a positive correlation between income inequality and development. Using a new unbalanced panel dataset for 71 countries from 1961 to 1992, we present evidence that supports this conjecture. Although many factors may be contributing to this renewed positive relationship between growth and inequality, one plausible explanation rests on the shift away from a manufacturing base towards a service base in most advanced economies.

Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 13

No abstract available

Jeff P Carpenter, Erika Seki

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 10

Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally predict that while individual effort may increase as competition intensifies between workers, the incentive for workers to cooperate with each other diminishes. We report on a field experiment conducted with workers from a fishing community in Toyama Bay, Japan. Our participants are employed in three different aspects of fishing. The first group are fishermen, the second group are fish wholesalers (or traders), and the third group are staff at the local fishing coop. Although our participants have much in common (e.g., their common relationship to the local fishery and the fact that they all live in the same community), we argue that they are exposed to different amounts of competition on-the-job and that these differences explain differences in cooperation in our experiment. Specifically, fishermen and traders, who interact in more competitive environments are significantly less cooperative than the coop staff who face little competition on the job. Further, after accounting for the possibility of personality-based selection, perceptions of competition faced on-the-job and the treatment effect of job incentives explain these differences in cooperation to a large extent.

John A List, Daniel L Millimet

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 4

One particularly vexing puzzle for economists and policymakers over the past several decades concerns the empirical significance of the theoretically predicted pollution haven hypothesis. While neoclassical theory and conventional wisdom both surmise that local economies will suffer deleterious effects from stricter environmental regulations, empirical studies have largely failed to validate such claims. This study utilizes the method of matching to show that the impact of stricter regulation is heterogeneous spatially, varying systematically based on location-specific attributes. Previous studies that assume a homogenous response may therefore inadvertently mask the overall impact of more stringent regulations by pooling unaffected and affected regions.

John A List, Warren McHone , Daniel L Millimet

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 8

Whether lax environmental regulations are an important attraction for mobile capital remains one of the most controversial issues in the area of regulatory federalism. While the extant literature does a nice job of estimating the effects of environmental regulation on the spatial allocation of new plant births, one neglected area of research is the effect that environmental regulation has on plant relocation decisions. This paper uses an annual (1980-90) county level panel data set to examine the relationship between air quality regulatory stringency and the destination choice of relocating plants. We estimate empirical models using both parametric and semi-nonparametric specifications. Empirical results from both models suggest that air quality regulations alter significantly the destination choices of relocating plants.

John A List, Warren McHone , Daniel L Millimet

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 19

Whether environmental regulations alter capital flows remains a hotly debated issue. This paper uses county-level data to examine the location decisions of domestic and foreign firms in a single empirical model and tests for asymmetries by firm origin in the degree to which capital flows are influenced by environmental standards. We find that while domestic firms are influenced by environmental regulations, foreign firms are not. Since the benefits of foreign investment are well-documented-foreign plants typically provide more jobs and increase local wages by more than domestic plants-this result suggests a double-dividend is available: foreign plants provide an economic stimulus and are not unduly influenced by environmental protections.

Martijn Egas, Arno Riedl

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 5

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the standard student population. We find that the economics of altruistic punishment lead to the demise of cooperation when punishment is relatively expensive and/or has low impact. Our results indicate that the 'decision to punish' comes from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, earnings are lowest when punishment promotes cooperation, suggesting that the scope for altruistic punishment as a means to maintain cooperation is limited."

Bradley J Ruffle, Richard Sosis

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 8

Time-consuming and costly religious rituals pose a puzzle for economists committed to rational choice theories of human behavior. We propose that either through selection or a causal relationship, the performance of religious rituals is associated with higher levels of cooperation. To test this hypothesis we design field experiments to measure the in-group cooperative behavior of members of religious and secular Israeli kibbutzim, communal societies for which mutual cooperation is a matter of survival. Our results show that religious males (the primary practitioners of collective religious ritual in Orthodox Judaism) are more cooperative than religious females, secular males and secular females. Moreover, the frequency with which religious males engage in collective religious rituals predicts well their degree of cooperative behavior.

Rachel Croson, Jen Shang

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 67

This paper examines the impact of social comparisons on fundraising and charitable contributions. We present results from a field experiment involving contribution to a public radio station. Some callers are told of the contributions decisions of others, and other callers are given no such information. We find that providing ambitions (high) social comparison information can significantly increase contributions.

John A List

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 77

This special issue highlights an empirical approach that has increasingly grown in prominence in the last decade--field experiments. While field experiments can be used quite generally in economics to test theories' predictions, to measure key parameters, and to provide insights into the generalizability of empirical results, this special issue focuses on using field experiments to explore questions within the economics of charity. The issue contains six distinct field experimental studies that investigate various aspects associated with the economics of charitable giving. The issue also includes a fitting tribute to one of the earliest experimenters to depart from traditional lab methods, Peter Bohm, who curiously has not received deep credit or broad acclaim. Hopefully this issue will begin to rectify this oversight.

Michael E Levine, Charles R Plott

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 32

No abstract available

Grant D Devine, Bruce W Marion

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 29

Comparative price information for major Ottawa supermarkets was collected over a twenty-eight-week period and published in daily newspapers during a five-week test period. In response to the information, the dispersion of prices across store and chains narrowed, the average level of prices of the market dropped, and consumer satisfaction increased relative to the control market. Consumers transferred patronage to the lower priced stores. Consumers indicated a willingness to pay US$ .34 per week on average for the price comparison information. Estimated consumer benefits far exceeded the cost of the program.

Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, Jaime Zender

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 8

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results the discriminatory auction provides the lowest average revenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bidder demands are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply. Despite a lack of a priori differences across bidders, the discriminatory auction results in significantly more symmetric allocations.

Mariah D Ehmke, John A List, Jayson L Lusk

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 14

A concern with the contingent valuation method (CVM) is the finding that hypothetical and real statements of value often differ. We test whether hypothetical bias, broadly defined, is independent of location by comparing real and hypothetical votes on a dichotomous choice referendum in China, France, Indiana, Kansas, and Niger. We find significant differences in hypothetical bias across locations and reject the hypothesis that hypothetical bias is independent of location. As opposed to the typical finding reported in the literature, subjects in Niger significantly understated their willingness-to-pay in the hypothetical referendum.

Maria De Paola, Rosanna Nistico, Vincenzo Scoppa

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 4

We evaluate the effectiveness of monetary incentives in enhancing student performance using a randomized experiment involving undergraduate students enrolled at a southern Italian University. Students were assigned to three different groups: a high-reward group, a low-reward group, and a control group. Rewards were given to the 30 best-performing students in each group. Financial rewards increase student performance. High-ability students react strongly whereas the effect is null for low-ability students. Large and small rewards produce very similar effects. These effects also persist in subsequent years, when the financial incentives are no longer in place. No types of crowding-out effects of the monetary incentives are found.