Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, David W Nickerson
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 10

No abstract available
Steven Blader, Claudine Gartenberg, Andrea Prat
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 19

This paper investigates how the success of a management practice depends on the nature of the long-term relationship between the firm and its employees. A large US transportation company is in the process of fitting its trucks with an electronic on-board recorder (EOBR), which provide drivers with information on their driving performance. In this setting, a natural question is whether the optimal managerial practice consists of: (1) Letting each driver know his or her individual performance only; or (2) Also providing drivers with information about their ranking with respect to other drivers. The company is also in the first phase of a multi-year initiative to remake its internal operations. This first phase corresponds to an overhaul of the relational contract with its employees, focusing exclusively on changing values toward a greater emphasis on teamwork and empowerment. The main result of our randomized experiment is that (2) leads to better performance than (1) in a particular site if and only if the site has not yet received the values intervention, and worse performance if it has. The result is consistent with the presence of a conflict between competition-based managerial practices and a cooperation-based relational contract. More broadly, it highlights the role of intangible relational factors in determining the optimal set of managerial practices.
Daniel Houser, John A List, Anya Samek
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 32

Young children have long been known to act selfishly and gradually appear to become more generous across middle childhood. While this apparent change has been well documented, the underlying mechanisms supporting this remain unclear. The current study examined the role of early theory of mind and executive functioning in facilitating sharing in a large sample (N = 98) of preschoolers. Results reveal a curious relation between early false-belief understanding and sharing behavior. Contrary to many commonsense notions and predominant theories, competence in this ability is actually related to less sharing. Thus, the relation between developing theory of mind and sharing may not be as straightforward as it seems in preschool age children. It is precisely the children who can engage in theory of mind that decide to share less with others.
John A List, Jason F Shogren
Cited by*: 9 Downloads*: 8

n/a
Sujoy Chakravarty, Carine Sebi, E Somanathan, Emmanuel Theophilus
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 7

The public goods problem (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a long history in the Social Sciences.Our experimental design uses a standard Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) game with a moderately large group of ten and face-to-face communication. The subjects, who are villagers in the Gori-Ganga Basin of the Central Himalayas, are not re-matched every period.Our results are somewhat different from laboratory experiments using a similar design such as Isaac and Walker (1988a, 1988b). A noteworthy general observation is that even with a relatively low Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR = 0.2) and a large group we find a steady contribution rate around 55 percent, which diminishes slightly at the end of the session to around 45 percent. We also delve into the demographic characteristics of our subject pool and find that individual contribution to the common pool is determined by gender, age, caste, literacy and history of cooperation in the experiment. However, face-to-face communication is not seen to increase average individual contribution to the common pool.
Eszter Czibor, David Jimenez-Gomez, John A List
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

What was once broadly viewed as an impossibility - learning from experimental data in economics - has now become commonplace. Governmental bodies, think tanks, and corporations around the world employ teams of experimental researchers to answer their most pressing questions. For their part, in the past two decades academics have begun to more actively partner with organizations to generate data via field experimentation. While this revolution in evidence-based approaches has served to deepen the economic science, recently a credibility crisis has caused even the most ardent experimental proponents to pause. This study takes a step back from the burgeoning experimental literature and introduces 12 actions that might help to alleviate this credibility crisis and raise experimental economics to an even higher level. In this way, we view our "12 action wish list" as discussion points to enrich the field.
Bharat Chandar, Uri Gneezy, John A List, Ian Muir
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Even though social preferences affect nearly every facet of life, there exist many open questions on the economics of social preferences in markets. We leverage a unique opportunity to generate a large data set to inform the who's, what's, where's, and when's of social preferences through the lens of a nationwide tipping field experiment on the Uber platform. Our field experiment generates data from more than 40 million trips, allowing an exploration of social preferences in the ride sharing market using bid data. Combining experimental and natural variation in the data, we are able to establish tipping facts as well as provide insights into the underlying motives for tipping. Interestingly, even though tips are made privately, and without external social benefits or pressure, more than 15% of trips are tipped. Yet, nearly 60% of people never tip, and only 1% of people always tip. Overall, the demand-side explains much more of the observed tipping variation than the supply-side.
Omar Isaac Asensio, Magali A Delmas
Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: None

Little is known about the effect of message framing on conservation behavior over time. In a randomized controlled trial with residential households, we use advanced metering and information technologies to test how different messages about household energy use impact the dynamics of conservation behavior down to the appliance level. Our results, based on 374 million panel observations of kilowatt-hour (kWh) electricity consumption for 118 households over 9 months, show that differences in behavioral responses due to message framing become more significant over time. We find that a health-based frame, in which households consider the human health effects of their marginal electricity use, induced persistent energy savings behavior of 8-10% over 100 days; whereas a more traditional cost savings frame, drove sharp attenuation of treatment effects after 2 weeks with no significant savings versus control after 7 weeks. We discuss the implications for the design of effective information campaigns to engage households in conservation behavior.
Martijn Egas, Arno Riedl
Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 5

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the standard student population. We find that the economics of altruistic punishment lead to the demise of cooperation when punishment is relatively expensive and/or has low impact. Our results indicate that the 'decision to punish' comes from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, earnings are lowest when punishment promotes cooperation, suggesting that the scope for altruistic punishment as a means to maintain cooperation is limited."
Rafael Jimenez-Duran
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Social media platforms ban users and remove posts to moderate their content. This "speech policing" remains controversial because little is known about its consequences and the costs and benefits for different individuals. I conduct two field experiments on Twitter to examine the effect of moderating hate speech on user behavior and welfare. Randomly reporting posts for violating the rules against hateful conduct increases the likelihood that Twitter removes them. Reporting does not affect the activity on the platform of the posts' authors or their likelihood of reposting hate, but it does increase the activity of those attacked by the posts. These results are consistent with a model in which content moderation is a quality decision for platforms that increases user engagement and hence advertising revenue. The second experiment shows that changing users' perceived content removal does not change their willingness to pause using social media, a measure of consumer surplus. My results imply that content moderation does not necessarily moderate users, but it marginally increases advertising revenue. It can be consistent with both profit- and welfare-maximization if out-of-platform externalities are small
Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green
Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 30

No abstract available
Alexander W Cappelen, John A List, Anya Samek, Bertil Tungodden
Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 44

We present results from the first study to examine the causal impact of early childhood education on social preferences of children. We compare children who, at 3-4 years old, were randomized into either a full-time preschool, a parenting program with incentives, or to a control group. We returned to the same children when they reach 7-8 years old a conducted a series of incentivized experiments to elicit there social preferences. We find that early childhood education has a strong causal impact on social preferences several years after the intervention: attending preschool makes children more egalitarian in their fairness view and the parenting program enhances the importance children place on efficiency relative to fairness. Our findings highlight the importance of taking a broad perspective when designing and evaluating early childhood education programs, and provide evidence how differences in institutional exposure may contribute to explaining heterogeneity in social preferences in society.
Edwin Leuven, Hessel Oosterbeek, Bas van der Klaauw
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 62

In a randomized field experiment where first year university students could earn financial rewards for passing all first year requirements within one year we find small and non-significant average effects of financial incentives on the pass rate and the numbers of collected credit points. There is however evidence that high ability students collect significantly more credit points when assigned to (larger) reward groups. Low ability students collect less credit points when assigned to larger reward groups. After three years these effects have increased, suggesting dynamic spillovers. The small average effect in the population is therefore the sum of a positive effect for high ability students and a (partly) off-setting negative effect for low ability students. A negative effect of financial incentives for less able individuals is in line with research from psychology and recent economic laboratory experiments which shows that external rewards may be detrimental for intrinsic motivation.
Jeffrey A Livingston
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 10

Problems that arise in online markets due to asymmetric information are exacerbated by the fact that transactions in these markets are completely anonymous. The online auction mechanism provided by eBay is an example of such a market. To combat the anonymity problem, eBay allows sellers to become "ID Verified" by paying a small fee to have their identity confirmed by a credit information company. Doing so may reassure potential bidders that the seller is legitimate since their identity is known, and there is more assurance that the seller could be tracked down and punished should a problem arise. Identifying the effect of ID verification is difficult using naturally occurring data, however, because the service tends to be used only by sellers who have a well-established reputation. It is thus difficult to determine whether an improved outcome is due to the seller's reputation or due to ID verification. This study alleviates this concern by conducting a field experiment where items are sold with different IDs that have different characteristics, and finds little evidence that bidders place any value on ID verification.
Eric Cardella, Michael J. Seiler
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 1

When selling a home, an important decision facing the homeowner is choosing an optimal listing price. This decision will depend in large part on how the chosen list price impacts the post negotiation final sale price of the home. In this study, we design an experiment that enables us to identify how different types of common list price strategies affect housing negotiations. Specifically, we examine how rounded, just below, and precise list prices impact the negotiation behavior of the buyer and seller and, ultimately, the final sale price of the home. Our results indicate that the initial list price strategy does play an important role in the negotiation process. Most notably, a high precise price generates the highest final sale price, smallest percentage discount off the list price, and the largest fraction of the surplus to the seller, while just below pricing leads to the lowest final price, largest percentage discount, and smallest fraction of the surplus to the seller. This pattern seems to be largely driven by sellers making persistently higher and more precise counter-offers throughout the negotiation process when the initial list price is high precise. Interestingly, these effects generally attenuate with negotiating experience. Importantly, our experimental results are generally consistent, both in direction and magnitude, with the limited transactions-based empirical studies relating to real estate listing prices.
Michael J. Seiler
Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 0

Inequity Aversion has long been applied in a game theoretic setting to explain that individuals are willing to sacrifice personal wealth in order to financially penalize players they perceive to be acting selfishly or unfairly. I apply inequity aversion to strategic mortgage default decisions and find that individual homeowners (as well as a second sample of professional mortgage lenders) have a differential stated willingness to walk away from their mortgage based on the perceived characteristics of their lender. Importantly, these significant differences can be removed even with extremely modest loan modifications. Finally, I document that regular homeowners and even professional lenders do a poor job differentiating between the owner of their loan and the servicer of their loan. This is particularly troubling given the extreme misconception of their bank's true character. As a result, much of their willingness to penalize is misplaced resulting in an unnecessary number of strategic mortgage defaults.
Steven D Levitt, John A List, Sally Sadoff
Cited by*: 8 Downloads*: 46

We test the effect of performance-based incentives on educational achievement in a low-performing school district using a randomized field experiment. High school freshmen were provided monthly financial incentives for meeting an achievement standard based on multiple measures of performance including attendance, behavior, grades and standardized test scores. Within the design, we compare the effectiveness of varying the recipient of the reward (students or parents) and the incentive structure (fixed rate or lottery). While the overall effects of the incentives are modest, the program has a large and significant impact among students on the threshold of meeting the achievement standard. These students continue to outperform their control group peers a year after the financial incentives end. However, the program effects fade in longer term follow up, highlighting the importance of longer term tracking of incentive programs.
Eli Beracha, Michael J. Seiler
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 0

In this study, we examine whether homebuyers favor homes associated with just below pricing strategies or those with rounded prices (e.g., $199,900 vs. $200,000). The inclination for just below pricing allows sellers that use just below pricing to set a higher asking price without driving away potential buyers. Rounded priced homes, on the other hand, sell significantly faster and at a smaller discount from list price compared with just below priced homes. We find that the just below pricing strategy yields the highest transaction price relative to the true underlying home value. This suggests sellers exploit buyers' preference for just below priced homes with a higher initial listing price that outweighs the lower discount and shorter time on market associated with similar round priced homes, making just below pricing the more effective pricing strategy.
Alessandra Cassar, Lucas Crowley, Bruce Wydick
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 13

An important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending. This research presents evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia, in which subjects participate in trust games and a microfinance game. We present moderately strong evidence that personal trust between group members and peer homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or mere acquaintanceship between members. We also find some evidence of reciprocity in groups: those who have been helped by other members are more likely to contribute themselves.
Erwin Bulte, Aart de Zeeuw, Shelby Gerking, John A List
Cited by*: 19 Downloads*: 37

Standard applications of utility theory assume that utility depends solely on outcomes and not on causes. This study uses a field experiment conducted in the Netherlands to determine if alternative causes of an environmental problem affect willingness to pay to ameliorate it. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that people are willing to pay significantly more to correct problems caused by humans than by nature (the "outrage effect"), but find no support for the hypothesis that "moral responsibility" matters. We also find support for the hypothesis that stated willingness to pay values obtained via "cheap talk" and "consequential" treatments are lower than without inclusion of these protocols.