Papers - All

Amanda Chuan, John A List, Anya Samek, Shreemayi Samujjwala

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Parental investments shape children's educational specializations. Using a longitudinal study, we find that parents invest more in daughters than sons at ages 3-5. We find that early parental investment can explain persistently higher English scores for girls than boys 4-6 years later. However, there is no gender gap in Math. Parental investments at ages 3-5 appear to contribute to girls' advantage in English but have little impact on Math. Our results suggest that parental investments at early ages contributes to girls' comparative advantage in English.

Alan S Gerber, Donald P Green, Matthew N Green

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 3

Political campaigns currently make extensive use of direct mail, particularly in state and local races, yet its effects on voter behavior are not well understood. This essay presents the results of large-scale randomized field experiments conducted in Connecticut and New Jersey during state and municipal elections of 1999. Tens of thousands of registered voters were sent from zero to nine pieces of direct mail. The target populations included party registrants with a strong history of voter participation, independents, and a random subset of registered voters. Our results indicate partisan campaign mail does little to stimulate voter turnout and may even dampen it when the mail is negative in tone.

Eric Bettinger, Robert Slonim

Cited by*: 33 Downloads*: 65

Recent policy initiatives offer cash payments to children (and often their families) to induce better health and educational choices. These policies implicitly assume that children are especially impatient (i.e., have high discount rates); however, little is known about the nature of children's patience, how it varies across children, and whether children can even make rational intertemporal choices. This paper examines the inter-temporal choices of five to sixteen year old children in an artefactual field experiment. We examine their choices between varying levels of compensation received in two or four months in the future and in zero or two months in the future. We find that children's choices are consistent with hyperbolic discounting, boys are less patient than girls, older children are more patient and that mathematical achievement test scores, private schooling and parent's patience are not correlated with children's patience. We also find that although more than 25 percent of children do not make rational inter-temporal choices within a single two-period time frame, we cannot find variables that explain this behavior other than age and standardized mathematical achievement test scores.

Lars Hultkrantz, Gunnar Lindberg, Jan-Eric Nilsson, Fridtjof Thomas

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 58

Around one million people are killed world wide every year in road-traffic accidents. The risks and consequences of accidents increase progressively with speed, which ultimately is determined by the individual driver. The behaviour of the motorist thus affects both her own and other peoples safety. Internalisation of external costs of road transport has hitherto been focused on distance-based taxes or insurance premiums. While these means, as they are designed today, may affect driven distance, they have no influence on driving behaviour. This paper argues that by linking on-board positioning systems to insurance premiums it is possible to reward careful driving and get drivers to self select into different risk categories depending on their compliance to speed limits. We report two economic field experiments that have tested ways to induce car-owners to have technical platforms installed in their vehicle in order to affect the extent of speeding. It is demonstrated that a bonus to remunerate those that have the device installed, tantamount to a lower insurance premium, increases drivers?propensity to accept the technical devices. In a second experiment the size of the bonus is made dependent on the actual frequency of speeding. We find that this is a second way to discipline users to drive at legal speeds.

Michael Kremer, Dan Levy

Cited by*: 16 Downloads*: 9

This paper examines a natural experiment in which students at a large state university were randomly assigned roommates through a lottery system. We find that on average, males assigned to roommates who reported drinking in the year prior to entering college had one quarter-point lower GPA than those assigned to non-drinking roommates. The 10th percentile of their college GPA is half a point lower than among males assigned non-drinking roommates. For males who themselves drank frequently prior to college, assignment to a roommate who drank frequently prior to college reduces GPA by two-thirds of a point. Since students who drink frequently are particularly influenced by frequent-drinking roommates, substance-free housing programs could potentially lower average GPA by segregating drinkers. The effect of initial assignment to a drinking roommate persists and possibly even grows over time. In contrast, students' college GPA is not influenced by roommates' high school grades, admission test scores, or family background. Females' GPAs are not affected by roommates' drinking prior to college. Overall, these findings are more consistent with models in which peers change preferences than models in which they change endowments.

Stefano Carattini, Kenneth Gillingham, Xiangyu Meng, Erez Yoeli

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Observability has been demonstrated to influence the adoption of pro-social behavior in a variety of contexts. This study implements a natural field experiment to examine the influence of observability in the context of a novel pro-social behavior: peer-to-peer solar. Peer-to-peer solar offers an opportunity to households who cannot have solar on their homes to access solar energy from their neighbors. However, unlike solar installations, peer-to-peer solar is an invisible form of pro-environmental behavior. We implemented a set of randomized campaigns using Facebook ads in the Massachusetts cities of Cambridge and Somerville, in partnership with a peer-to-peer company, to study social media users' interest in peer-to-peer solar through clicks on the ads. In the campaigns, treated customers were informed that they could share "green reports" online, providing information to others about their greenness. We find that interest in peer-to-peer solar increases by up to 30% when "green reports," which would make otherwise invisible behavior visible, are mentioned in the ads.

John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 13

No abstract available

Tanjim Hossain, John Morgan

Cited by*: 47 Downloads*: 65

Many firms divide the price a consumer pays for a good into two pieces---the price for the item itself and the price for shipping and handling. With fully rational customers, the exact division between the two prices is irrelevant---only the total price matters. We test this hypothesis by selling matched pairs of CDs and Xbox games in a series of field experiments on eBay. In theory, the ending auction price should vary inversely with the shipping charge to leave the total price paid constant. Contrary to the theory, we find that charging a high shipping cost and starting the auction at a low opening price leads to higher numbers of bidders and higher revenues when the shipping charge is not excessive. We show that these results can be accounted for by boundedly rational bidding behavior such as loss-aversion with separate mental accounts for different attributes of the price or disregard for shipping costs.

Stefano Carattini, Robert Dur, John A. List

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Many policies that are generally considered socially desirable by the scientific community, based on modeling and causal empirical analyses, are not very widespread. The main driver is often lack of public support at baseline ("ex ante"). Yet, there is evidence that when voters hold biased beliefs ex ante about a given policy, experiencing the policy firsthand may lead them to correct their beliefs and increase public support. If it was widely documented that opposition to sound policies in part dissipates when voters experience a given policy, then more policy-makers may be inclined to experiment with policies that scientists recommend but that are unpopular ex ante. Systematically combining policy evaluation with causal analysis of public support would allow scholars to create a body of knowledge on the conditions under which policies become more (or less) popular after implementation and what are the drivers of changes in beliefs and public support.

Fadi Hassan, Paolo Lucchino

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 30

More than 1.3 billion people worldwide have no access to electricity and this has first-order effects on several development dimensions. In this paper we focus on the link between access to light and education. We randomly distribute solar lamps to 7th grade pupils in rural Kenya and monitor their educational outcomes throughout the year at quarterly frequency. We find that access to lights through solar lamps is a relevant and effective input to education. Our identification strategy accounts for spillovers by exploiting the variation in treatment at the pupil level and in treatment intensity across classes. We find a positive and significant intention-to-treat effect as well as a positive and significant spillover effect on control students. In a class with the average treatment intensity of our sample (43%), treated students experience an increase in math grades of 0.88 standard deviations. Moreover, we find a positive marginal effect of treatment intensity on control students: raising the share of treated students in a class by 10% increases grades of control students by 0.22 standard deviations. We exploit household geolocation to disentangle within-class and geographical spillovers. We show that geographical spillovers do not have a significant impact and within-school interaction is the main source of spillovers. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that the mechanism through which lamps affect students is by increasing co-studying at school especially after sunset.

Steffen Andersen, Glenn W Harrison, Morten I Lau, Elisabet E Rutstrom

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 16

Economists recognize that preferences can differ across individuals. We examine the strengths and weaknesses of lab and field experiments to detect differences in preferences that are associated with standard, observable characteristics of the individual. We consider preferences over risk and time, two fundamental concepts of economics. Our results provide striking evidence that there are good reasons to conduct field experiments. The lab fails to detect preference heterogeneity that is present in the field, obviously due to the demographic homogeneity of the lab. There are also differences in treatment effects measured in the lab and the field that can be traced to interactions between treatment and demographic effects. These can only be detected and controlled for properly in the field data. Thus one cannot simply claim, without additional empirical argument or assumption, that treatment effects estimated in the lab are reliable.

Dermot Hayes , John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 13 Downloads*: 4

This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference learning-bids reflect a person's desire to learn how an unfamiliar good fits into their preference set. Subjects bid in four consecutive experimental auctions for three goods that vary in familiarity, candy bars, mangos, and irradiated meat. Our results suggest that preference learning is the main source of the high premia, and that novelty of the experimental experience does not in itself artificially inflate valuations.

Peter Bohm, Hans Lind

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 11

Preference reversal, or choice/reservation-price inconsistency, has been documented experimentally for certain types of lotteries. We argue that the relevance of these findings for real-world markets is uncertain because the type of objects used cannot exist on a market and because the extent to which the subjects had any real interest in the objects is unknown. Using real-world lotteries, we have tested choice/price consistency on subjects who prefer lotteries to cash. Preference reversal was observed, but the frequency was much lower than in earlier experiments. There were no differences between subjects who qualify as ""lottery interested"" and those who did not.

John A List

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 0

n/a

John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 24 Downloads*: 1

Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.

Matthew Cypher, S McKay Price, Spenser Robinson, Michael J. Seiler

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 5

Using a sample of CCIM designees and candidates in an experimental setting, this study examines the impact of broker signaling in commercial real estate transactions. It also explores the effect of certainty of closure in commercial real estate transactions. Findings suggest brokers are able to influence transaction pricing. Moreover, detailed analysis reveals that when a signal is above a reference point implied by previous transactions, the strength of the signal matters; privately communicated signals from reliable sources have significantly greater impact than signals which are made widely available. Additionally, we find an approximately 10% premium in transactions with lower certainty of closure than one with high certainty. The latter result varies by transactional participant type; owner/developers require a larger premium than institutional sellers.

David Laibson , John A List

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 114

There are many great ways to incorporate behavioral economics in a first-year undergraduate economics class-i.e., the course that is typically called "Principles of Economics." Our preferred approach integrates behavioral economics throughout the course (e.g., see Acemoglu, Laibson, and List 2015). With the integrated approach, behavioral content plays a role in many of the chapters of the principles of economics curriculum, including chapters on optimization, equilibrium, game theory, intertemporal choice, probability and risk, social preferences, household finance, the labor market, financial intermediation, monetary policy, economic fluctuations, and financial crises. We prefer the integrated approach because it enables the behavioral insights to show up where they are conceptually most relevant. By illustration, it is best to combine a discussion of downward nominal wage rigidity (i.e., the idea that workers strongly resist nominal wage declines) with the overall discussion of the labor market. Whether or not an instructor integrates behavioral economics throughout the principles of economics course, it makes sense to pull central materials together and dedicate a lecture (or more) to a focused discussion of behavioral economics. This note describes our approach to such a lecture, emphasizing six key principles of behavioral economics. Our choice of content for a behavioral lecture is motivated by three factors. First, we include ideas that are conceptually important. Second, we include material that is practically important and personally relevant to our students-we have found that such content resonates long after the course ends. Third, we include content that relates to what has been (or will be) taught in the rest of the course, and therefore serves as a complement. We want students to see that behavioral economics is an integrated part of economics, not a freak show that is isolated from "the standard ingredients" in the rest of the economics course. This paper summarizes our approach to such a focused behavioral lecture. In Section I, we define behavioral economics and place it in historical context. In Section II, we introduce six modular principles that can be used to teach behavioral economics. We provide PowerPoint notes on our home pages, which instructors should feel free to edit and use.

Christopher Cotton, Brent R Hickman, John A List, Joseph Price, Sutanuka Roy

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

We conduct a field experiment across three diverse school districts to structurally identify student motivation and study productivity parameters in a model of adolescent human capital development. By observing study time, homework task completion, and test results, we can identify individual and demographic variations in motivation and study time effectiveness. Struggling students typically do not lack motivation but rather struggle to convert study time into completed assignments and proficiency improvements. The study also attending a higher-performing school is associated with both higher productivity and higher motivation relative to peers with similar observables in lower-performing schools. Counterfactual analyses estimates that school quality differences account for a substantial share of the racial differences in test scores, and considers the impact of alternative policies aimed at reducing racial performance gaps.

Michael H Birnbaum

Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 15

No abstract available

Rama Katkar, David Lucking-Reiley

Cited by*: 7 Downloads*: 13

Sellers in eBay auctions have the opportunity to choose both a public minimum bid amount and a secret reserve price. We ask, empirically, whether the seller is made better or worse off by setting a secret reserve above a low minimum bid, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as the minimum bid level. In a field experiment, we auction 50 matched pairs of Pokemon cards on eBay, half with secret reserves and half with equivalently high public minimum bids. We find that secret reserve prices make us worse off as sellers, by reducing the probability of the auction resulting in a sale, deterring serious bidders from entering the auction, and lowering the expected transaction price of the auction. We also present evidence that some sellers choose to use secret reserve prices for reasons other than increasing their expected auction prices.