Papers - All

Jeff P Carpenter, Amrita Daniere, Lois Takahashi

Cited by*: 53 Downloads*: 25

We conduct experiments in urban slums to measure trust and cooperation and to see how behavior varies with demographic factors and associational measures of social capital. Overall, we find high contribution rates among Thai and Vietnamese participants in a voluntary contribution game, and we see that many participants are willing to signal their disapproval of free riding despite it being costly to do so. At the individual level, we find that behavior varies with many demographic factors and with many associational factors. However, these correlations often differ significantly between our two locations, indicating the role of culture, defined broadly.

Benjamin A Olken

Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 26

This paper examines the accuracy of beliefs about corruption, using data from Indonesian villages. Specifically, I compare villagers' stated beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in a road-building project in their village with a more objective measure of 'missing expenditures' in the project, which I construct by comparing the project's official expenditure reports with an independent estimate of the prices and quantities of inputs used in construction. I find that villagers' beliefs do contain information about corruption in the road project, and that villagers are sophisticated enough to distinguish between corruption in the road project and other types of corruption in the village. The magnitude of their information, however, is small, in part because officials hide corruption where it is hardest for villagers to detect. This may limit the effectiveness of grass-roots monitoring of local officials. I also find evidence of systematic biases in corruption beliefs, particularly when examining the relationship between corruption and variables correlated with trust. For example, ethnically heterogeneous villages have higher perceived corruption levels but lower actual levels of missing expenditures. The findings illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions, whether in designing anti-corruption policies or in conducting empirical research on corruption.

Melissa Bateson, Daniel Nettle, Gilbert Roberts

Cited by*: 52 Downloads*: 45

We examined the effect of an image of a pair of eyes on contributions to an honesty box used to collect money for drinks in a university coffee room. People paid nearly three times as much for their drinks when eyes were displayed rather than a control image. This finding provides the first evidence from a naturalistic setting of the importance of cues of being watched, and hence reputational concerns, on human cooperative behaviour.

Ronald G Cummings, Paul J Ferraro

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 24

Economists have paid increasing attention to the role of cultural diversity in explaining the variability of economic outcomes across societies. We develop an experimental framework that complements existing research in this area. We implement the framework with two cultures that coexist in an industrialized society: the Hispanic and Navajo cultures in the southwestern United States. We vary the ethnic mix of our experimental sessions in order to infer the effect of intercultural interactions on economic behavior and outcomes. We control for demographic differences in our subject pools and elicit beliefs directly in order to differentiate between statistical discrimination and preference-based discrimination. We present clear evidence that Hispanic and Navajo subjects behave differently and that their behavior is affected by the ethnic composition of the experimental session. Our experimental framework has the potential to shed much needed light on economic behavior and outcomes in societies of mixed ethnicity, race and religion.

Craig Gallet, John A List, Peter Orazem

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 0

The 1987 academic market was strong, whereas the 1997 market was weak. A multimarket theory of optimal search suggests that job seekers will respond to a weakening market by changing their search strategies at the extensive margin (which markets to enter) and the intensive margin (how many applications to submit per market). Employers respond to the weakening market by raising their hiring standards. High-quality applicants will obtain an increased share of academic interviews in weak markets while applicants from weaker schools will increasingly secure interviews outside of the academic market. Empirical results show that in the bust market, graduates of elite schools shifted their search strategies to include weaker academic institutions, while graduates of lower-ranked schools shifted their applications away from academia and toward the business sector. In bust conditions, academic institutions increasingly concentrate their interviews on elite school graduates, women, and U.S. residents

Michael Kremer, Sylvie Moulin, Robert Namunyu

Cited by*: 13 Downloads*: 9

Kenya's education system blends substantial centralization with elements of local control and school choice. This paper argues that the system creates incentives for local communities to build too many small schools; to spend too much on teachers relative to non-teacher inputs; and to set school fees that exceed those preferred by the median voter and prevent many children from attending school. Moreover, the system renders the incentive effects of school choice counterproductive by undermining the tendency for pupils to switch into the schools with the best headmasters. A randomized evaluation of a program operated by a non-profit organization suggests that budget-neutral reductions in the cost of attending school and increases in non-teacher inputs, financed by increases in class size, would greatly reduce dropout rates without reducing test scores. Moreover, evidence based on transfers into and out of program schools suggests that the population would prefer such a reallocation of expenditures.

John A List, David Lucking-Reiley

Cited by*: 40 Downloads*: 5

No abstract available

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, John A List, David H Reiley

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 4

My coauthors and I reply to the comments of Daniel Levin on our paper "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment." In his comment, Levin presents new theory and proposes a new equilibrium to explain annomalies reported in our earlier sportscard auction, such as higher first-unit bids under the uniform-price institution. We evaluate his theory and equilibrium in the context of both uniform-price and Vickrey auctions and point out our concerns. Where possible, we attempt to test the predictions of his theory with our existing data.

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, John A List, David H Reiley

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 9

Auction theory has recently revealed that multi-unit uniform-price auctions, such as those used by the U.S. Treasury for debt sales, entail demand-reduction incentives that can cause inefficient allocations. Recent experimental results show that bidders do indeed strategically reduce their bids in uniform-price auctions. The present paper extends this work, both theoretically and experimentally, to consider the effects of varying numbers of bidders. We derive several theoretical predictions, including the result that demand reduction should decrease with increasing numbers of bidders, though some demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit. We then examine the bidding behavior of subjects in this environment by auctioning dozens of Cal Ripken, Jr. baseball cards using both uniform-price and Vickrey auction formats. The field data are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions of our model: most notably, demand reduction on second-unit bids becomes much smaller and harder to detect as the number of bidders increases.

John A List, David Lucking-Reiley

Cited by*: 29 Downloads*: 1

n/a

Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, John A List, David H Reiley

Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 3

Recent auction theory and experimental results document strategic demand reduction by bidders in uniform-price auctions. The present article extends this area of research to consider the effects of varying the number of bidders. Our theoretical model predicts that demand reduction should decrease with an increase in the number of bidders. Considerable demand reduction remains even in the asymptotic limit, although truthful bidding yields profits very close to those of equilibrium play. We experimentally confirm several of our predictions by examining bidding behavior of subjects in an actual marketplace, auctioning dozens of sportscards using both uniform-price and Vickrey auction formats.

Nava Ashaf, Dean S Karlan, Wesley Yin

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 9

Informal lending and savings institutions exist around the world, and often include regular door-to-door deposit collection of cash. Some banks have adopted similar services in order to expand access to banking services in areas that lack physical branches. Using a randomized control trial, we investigate determinants of participation in a deposit collection service and evaluate the impact of offering the service for micro-savers of a rural bank in the Philippines. Of 137 individuals offered the service in the treatment group, 38 agreed to sign-up, and 20 regularly used the service. Take-up is predicted by distance to the bank (a measure of transaction costs of depositing without the service) as well as being married (a suggestion that household bargaining issues are important). Those offered the service saved 188 pesos more (which equates to about a 25% increase in savings stock) and were slightly less likely to borrow from the bank.

Bharat Chandar, Ali Hortacsu, John A List, Ian Muir, Jeffrey M Wooldridge

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Field experiments conducted with the village, city, state, region, or even country as the unit of randomization are becoming commonplace in the social sciences. While convenient, subsequent data analysis may be complicated by the constraint on the number of clusters in treatment and control. Through a battery of Monte Carlo simulations, we examine best practices for estimating unit-level treatment effects in cluster-randomized field experiments, particularly in settings that generate short panel data. In most settings we consider, unit-level estimation with unit fixed effects and cluster-level estimation weighted by the number of units per cluster tend to be robust to potentially problematic features in the data while giving greater statistical power. Using insights from our analysis, we evaluate the effect of a unique field experiment: a nationwide tipping field experiment across markets on the Uber app. Beyond the import of showing how tipping affects aggregate outcomes, we provide several insights on aspects of generating and analyzing cluster-randomized experimental data when there are constraints on the number of experimental units in treatment and control.

Marco Castillo, John A List, Ragan Petrie, Anya Samek

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

We use field experiments with nearly 900 children to investigate how skills developed at ages 3-5 drive later-life outcomes. We find that skills map onto three distinct factors - cognitive skills, executive functions, and economic preferences. Returning to the children up to 7 years later, we find that executive functions, but not cognitive skills, predict the likelihood of receiving disciplinary referrals. Economic preferences have an independent effect: children who displayed impatience at ages 3-5 were more likely to receive disciplinary referrals. Random assignment to a parenting program reduced disciplinary referrals. This effect was not mediated by skills or preferences.

Michael Chirico, Robert Inman, Charles Loeffler, John MacDonald, Holger Sieg

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 67

Property taxes play a central role in the financing of municipal government services. Yet, municipal governments commonly confront problems with property tax collection even when the tax base is known. There is surprisingly little evidence on what authorities can do to increase property tax compliance. This paper analyzes seven different property tax notification strategies through a randomized controlled experiment conducted with the City of Philadelphia. All seven notification strategies increase property tax compliance over the usual approach of simply sending a bill. The most effective notifications are the those that threaten to take out a lien on the property or to foreclose by sheriff's sale for continued failure to pay taxes. The results suggest that economic motives to pay property taxes are more effective than those that appeal to social norms.

Frank W Marlowe

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 16

No abstract available

David H Herberich, John A List

Cited by*: 9 Downloads*: 42

The article reports on a study that provides understanding of how risk preferences and other factors influence a farmer's decision to participate in a carbon offset market. It states incorporating background risk in a laboratory setting and drawing subjects from both a standard student population and a nonstandard farmer population helped to understand the decision making process. The study suggests that farmers are slightly more risk averse than students.

Loukas Balafoutas, Nikos Nikiforakis, Bettina Rockenbach

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: None

Many interactions in modern human societies are among strangers. Explaining cooperation in such interactions is challenging. The two most prominent explanations critically depend on individuals' willingness to punish defectors: In models of direct punishment, individuals punish antisocial behavior at a personal cost, whereas in models of indirect reciprocity, they punish indirectly by withholding rewards. We investigate these competing explanations in a field experiment with real-life interactions among strangers. We find clear evidence of both direct and indirect punishment. Direct punishment is not rewarded by strangers and, in line with models of indirect reciprocity, is crowded out by indirect punishment opportunities. The existence of direct and indirect punishment in daily life indicates the importance of both means of understanding the evolution of cooperation.

Luca Fumarco

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 28

In this study, I show that with the appropriate experimental strategy, a correspondence test can be adapted to investigate disability discrimination in the rental housing market. I focus on discrimination against blind tenants assisted by guide dogs in Italy and obtain very robust results. The utilization of three fictitious household tenants (that is, a married couple, a married couple with a blind wife who owns a guide dog, and a married couple where the wife is normal sighted and owns a pet dog) allows me to investigate whether discrimination is due to the blindness or to guide dog alone. I find that apartment owners discriminate blind tenants because of the presence of the guide dog alone. According to the Italian law, this is indirect discrimination, which in the US corresponds to the refusal to provide reasonable accommodation.

Annika List, John A List, Anya Samek

Cited by*: None Downloads*: None

Social scientists for years have documented the pervasiveness of discrimination in product and labor markets. While the literature has recently attempted to measure the nature of such discrimination, much less work has been done exploring the origins of discrimination. We make a modest step in this direction by reporting data from a field experiment attempting to measure discrimination amongst 3-5 years olds. Using a design that isolated discriminatory behaviors in economic games, we find that both White and Hispanic children send more resources to Black children than White children, whereas black children send equal amounts. This provides a first glimpse that suggests preferences amongst the young do not show similar patterns as preferences of adults.