Papers - All
Richard C Bishop,
Kevin J Boyle,
Richard T Carson,
David Chapman,
Matthew DeBell,
Colleen Donovan,
W. Michael Hanemann,
Barbara Kanninen,
Matthew Konopka,
Raymond J Kopp,
Jon A Krosnick,
John A List,
Norman Meade,
Robert Paterson,
Stanley Presser,
Nora Scherer,
V. Kerry Smith,
Roger Tourangeau,
Michael Welsh,
Jeffrey M Wooldridge
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 78 
No abstract available
Uri Gneezy,
John A List
Cited by*: 262 Downloads*: 31
Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led scholars to question the underpinnings of neoclassical economics. We use insights gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research -- gift exchange -- in an attempt to maximize worker effort in two quite distinct tasks: data entry for a university library and door-to-door fundraising for a research center. In support of the received literature, our field evidence suggests that worker effort in the first few hours on the job is considerably higher in the "gift" treatment than in the "non-gift treatment." After the initial few hours, however, no difference in outcomes is observed, and overall the gift treatment yielded inferior aggregate outcomes for the employer: with the same budget we would have logged more data for our library and raised more money for our research center by using the market-clearing wage rather than by trying to induce greater effort with a gift of higher wages.
John A List
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None
"Putting Economic Research into Practice at Businesses (to Inform Science and Major Social Challenges)"
Slides from ASSA NABE
Puppe Clemens,
Sebastian Kube,
Michel Marechal
Cited by*: 18 Downloads*: 25
We study the role of reciprocity in a labor market field experiment. In a recent paper, Gneezy and List (2006) investigate the impact of gift exchange in this context and find that it has only a transient effect on long run outcomes. Extending their work to examine both positive and negative reciprocity, we find consonant evidence in the positive reciprocity condition: the gift does not work well in the long run (if at all). Yet, in the negative reciprocity treatment we observe much stronger effects: a wage reduction has a significant and lasting negative impact on efforts. Together, these results highlight the asymmetry of positive and negative reciprocity that exists in the field, and provide an indication of the relative importance of each in the long run.
Syon Bhanot,
Gordon Kraft-Todd,
David Rand,
Erez Yoeli
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None
We partnered with the School District of Philadelphia (SDP) to run a randomized experiment testing interventions to increase teacher participation in an annual feedback survey, an uncompensated task that requires a teacher's time but helps the educational system overall. Our experiment varied the nature of the incentive scheme used, and the associated messaging. In the experiment, all 8,062 active teachers in the SDP were randomly assigned to receive one of four emails using a 2x2 experimental design; specifically, teachers received a lottery-based financial incentive to complete the survey that was either "personal" (a chance to win one of fifteen $100 gift cards for themselves) or "social" (a chance to win one of fifteen $100 gift cards for supplies for their students), and also received email messaging that either did or did not make salient their identity as an educator. Despite abundant statistical power, we find no discernible differences across our conditions on survey completion rates. One implication of these null results is that from a public administration perspective, social rewards may be preferable since funds used for this purpose by school districts go directly to students (through increased expenditure on student supplies), and do not seem less efficacious than personal financial incentives for teachers.
Syon Bhanot
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None
Perception of peer rank, or how we can perform relative to out peers, can be a powerful motivator. While research exists on the effect of social information on decision making, there is less work on how ranked comparisons with our peers influence our behavior. This paper outlines a field experiment conducted with 3896 households in Castro Valley, California, which uses household mailers with various forms of social information and peer rank messaging to motivate water conservation. The experiment tests the effect of a visible peer rank on water use, and how the competitive framing of rank information influences behavioral response. The results show that households with relatively low or high water use in the pre-treatment period responded differently to how rank information was framed. I find that a neutrally-framed peer rank caused a small "boomerang effect" (i.e., an increase in average water use) for low water households, but this effect was eliminated by competitive framing. At the same time, a competitively-framed peer rank demotivated high water use households, increasing their average water use over the full period of the experiment. This result is supported by evidence that the competitive frame on rank information increased water use for households who ranked "last" in the peer group - a detrimental "last place effect" from competitively-framed rankings.
John A List,
Warren McHone
Cited by*: 7 Downloads*: 2
This paper uses state-level pollution data from 1986-1997 to construct two indices that rank U.S. states according to environmental outputs. A major finding is that marginal performers in other indices, such as Wyoming, garner top spots in these ranking systems. The paper also presents findings from fixed and random effects models of panel data that imply state income levels are positively associated with environmental outputs after a threshold level of income is obtained.
Aaron Arndt,
David M Harrison,
Mark A. Lane,
Michael J. Seiler,
Vicky L Seiler
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 17
We investigate whether customers' overall impression of online property listings can be influenced by the real estate agent, and whether this influence depends on the customer's demographic characteristics. A sample of 1,594 potential homebuyers took an online audio/visual tour of a typically priced home in their area. Subjects were shown one of eight conditions in which we varied agent gender (male/female), agent attractiveness (attractive/less attractive), and pathos (used/not used). The results show that segments of customers are drawn to different real estate agents, but contrary to our expectations, customers were not necessarily drawn to similar agents or more attractive ones.
Juan-Camilo Cardenas
Cited by*: 5 Downloads*: 30
This paper explores how wealth and inequality can affect self-governed solutions to commons dilemmas by constraining group cooperation. It reports a series of experiments in the field where subjects are actual commons users. Household data about the participants? context explain statistically the usually observed wide variation found within and across groups in similar experiments. Participants wealth and inequality reduced cooperation when groups were allowed to have face-toface communication between rounds. There are implications for a greater awareness of nonpayoff asymmetries affecting cooperation in heterogeneous groups, apart from heterogeneity in the payoffs structure of the game.
John A List,
Jason F Shogren,
Michael Spencer ,
Stephen Swallow
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 5
This paper considers how six alternative rebate rules affect voluntary contributions in a threshold public-good experiment. The rules differ by (1) whether an individual can receive a proportional rebate of excess contributions, a winner-takes-all of any excess contributions, or a full rebate of one's contribution in the event the public good is provided and excess contributions exist, and (2) whether the probability of receiving a rebate is proportional to an individual's contribution relative to total contributions or is a simple uniform probability distribution set by the number of contributors. The paper adds to the existing experimental economics literature on threshold public goods by investigating both aggregate and individual demand revelation under the winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules. Half of the rules (proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and random full-rebate with uniform probability) provide total contributions that nearly equal total benefits, while the rest (winner-take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only, and random full-rebate with proportional probability) exceed benefits by over 30 percent. Only the proportional rebate rule is found to achieve both aggregate and individual demand revelation. Our experimental results have implications for both fundraisers and valuation practitioners.
Anya Samek,
Roman Sheremeta
Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 3
We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of contributors and cost of information on public good contributions. First, we vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Second, we investigate the effect of imposing a cost on viewing contributors. Recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline, even when viewing contributors' information is costly. This effect holds even though the identities of contributors are viewed less than ten percent of the time. Recognizing only highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, but recognizing only lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.
Anya Samek,
Roman Sheremeta
Cited by*: 19 Downloads*: 4
We experimentally investigate the impact of recognizing contributors on public good contributions. We vary recognizing all, highest or lowest contributors. Consistent with previous studies, recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the highest contributors does not increase contributions compared to not recognizing contributors, while recognizing only the lowest contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. These findings support our conjecture that aversion from shame is a more powerful motivator for giving than anticipation of prestige.
Snigdha Gupta,
Maggie C. Kane,
John A List,
Liz Sablich,
Lauren Supplee,
Dana L Suskind
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None
Recommendations for Mitigating Threats to Scaling
Amanda Kowalski
Cited by*: None Downloads*: None
A headline result from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment is that emergency room (ER) utilization increased. A seemingly contradictory result from the Massachusetts health reform is that ER utilization decreased. I reconcile both results by identifying treatment effect heterogeneity within the Oregon experiment and extrapolating it to Massachusetts. Even though Oregon compliers increased their ER utilization, they were adversely selected relative to Oregon never takers, who would have decreased their ER utilization. Massachusetts expanded coverage from a higher level to healthier compliers. Therefore, Massachusetts compliers are comparable to a subset of Oregon never takers, which can reconcile the results.
Daniel J Benjamin,
James O Berger,
Magnus Johannesson,
Brian A Nosek,
E. J Wagenmakers,
Richard Berk,
Kenneth A Bollen,
Bjorn Brembs,
Lawrence Brown,
Colin F Camerer,
David Cesarini,
Christopher D. Chambers,
Merlise Clyde,
Thomas D Cook,
Paul De Boeck,
Zoltan Dienes,
Anna Dreber,
Kenny Easwaran,
Charles Efferson,
Ernst Fehr,
Fiona Fidler,
Andy P. Field,
Malcom Forster,
Edward I. George,
Tarun Ramadorai,
Richard Gonzalez,
Steven Goodman,
Edwin Green,
Donald P Green,
Anthony Greenwald,
Jarrod D. Hadfield,
Larry V. Hedges,
Leonhard Held,
Teck Hau Ho,
Herbert Hoijtink,
James Holland Jones,
Daniel J Hruschka,
Kosuke Imai,
Guido Imbens,
John P.A. Ioannidis,
Minjeong Jeon,
Michael Kirchler,
David Laibson ,
John A List,
Roderick Little,
Arthur Lupia,
Edouard Machery,
Scott E. Maxwell,
Michael McCarthy,
Don Moore,
Stephen L. Morgan,
Marcus Munafo,
Shinichi Nakagawa,
Brendan Nyhan,
Timothy H Parker,
Luis Pericchi,
Marco Perugini,
Jeff Rouder,
Judith Rousseau,
Victoria Savalei,
Felix D. Schonbrodt,
Thomas Sellke,
Betsy Sinclair,
Dustin Tingley,
Trisha Van Zandt,
Simine Vazire,
Duncan J. Watts,
Christopher Winship,
Robert L. Wolpert,
Yu Xie,
Cristobal Young,
Jonathan Zinman,
Valen E. Johnson
Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 965
We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance for claims of new discoveries from 0.05 to 0.005.
Claude Montmarquette,
Jean-Louis Rulliere,
Marie-Claire Villeval,
Romain Zeiliger
Cited by*: 10 Downloads*: 5
After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven.
Julian Conrads,
Tommaso Reggiani,
Rainer M Rilke
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 51
Ambiguity about the chances of winning represents a key aspect in lotteries. By means of a controlled field experiment, we exogenously vary the degree of ambiguity about the winning chances of lotteries organized to incentivize the contribution for a public good. In one treatment, people have been simply informed about the maximum number of potential participants (i.e. the number of lottery tickets released). In a second treatment, this information has been omitted as in all traditional lotteries. Our general finding shows that simply reducing the degree of ambiguity of the lottery leads to a sizable and significant increase (67%) in the participation rate. This result is robust to alternative prize configurations.
Christopher Blattman,
Julian C. Jamison,
Margaret Sheridan
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 40
We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment.
Christopher Blattman,
Julian C. Jamison,
Margaret Sheridan
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 26
We show that a number of "non cognitive" skills and preferences, including patience and identity, are malleable in adults, and that investments in them reduce crime and violence. We recruited criminally-engaged men and randomized half to eight weeks of cognitive behavioral therapy designed to foster self-regulation, patience, and a noncriminal identity and lifestyle. We also randomized $200 grants. Cash alone and therapy alone initially reduced crime and violence, but effects dissipated over time. When cash followed therapy, crime and violence decreased dramatically for at least a year. We hypothesize that cash reinforced therapy's impacts by prolonging learning-by-doing, lifestyle changes, and self-investment.
Juan-Camilo Cardenas
Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 13
The internalization of external costs arising from a group dilemma between the individual and social interests require the design of institutions through the market, the state or self-governance that are able to induce in the agents a change in their pecuniary and non-material incentives so that their choices are socially desirable. The conventional approach in the economic analysis of the enforcement of the law based mostly on the work of Becker is based on the postulate that those not complying with the law are rationally perceiving a greater benefit from doing so if compared to the expected cost of the sanction by the state, that is the value of the sanction for the law violator multiplied by the probability of detection. Through a series of economic experiments we explore this hypothesis for the case of a typical public good or resource extraction where there is a group externality, and an external regulation that is partially enforced. The results suggest that the strategic response by the agents to the different expected costs of the sanction confirm only partially the hypothesis in the sense that the differences are less than proportional to the differences to the expected costs for the regulated agents. Further, when the results here are compared to exact replications of the experiments with people in the field that face these kinds of dilemmas, the differences in individual behavior across levels of expected costs virtually vanish. It is suggested here that along with the material costs for violators, the individuals may incorporate additional elements in their cognitive process which are consistent with findings from experimental and behavioral economics studies.