Author(s)

• Ginger Z Jin
• Andrew Kato

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Cited by*: 6 Downloads*: 27

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Abstract

Economists accept consumer frauds as an equilibrium outcome of information costs. This paper empirically investigates what information is costly, what contribute to the information costs, and what institutions are more effective in reducing the information costs. We focus on one of the most complained about markets - Internet auctions. In a field experiment, we obtain actual baseball cards from both online and retail markets whose quality are then professionally graded and compared to the prices paid by online buyers for goods with similar claims. The experiment allows us to obtain a key variable - true quality - on top of price and seller ratings used in the existing literature. Our findings indicate that some naive buyers in the online ungraded market are misled by non-credible claims of quality. They pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often. In comparison, claim-driven frauds do not exist in retail or graded markets where buyers can observe card quality either through careful quality examination before purchase or a third-party grading service. Online seller reputation is found to be effective for identifying good-faith sellers. But conditional on completed auctions, reputable sellers do not provide better quality. More disturbingly, the price increase from making non-credible claims more than compensates for the lower likelihood of sale for sellers with low reputations. We attribute the naivete to misleading signals in the online ungraded market and two loopholes in the eBay rating system, namely universal rating and costless switching of anonymous identities. These loopholes reduce the precision and accessibility of seller information, and therefore add difficulties for naive buyers to become sophisticated. We also point out that naive buyers could impose several negative externalities on the other good-faith players in the market.