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Adriaan R Soetevent

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The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a field experiment performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the means by which offerings are gathered is determined by chance, prescribing for each offering the use of either 'closed' collection bags or open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendants' contributions can be identified by their direct neighbors, and attendants can observe the total amount given by the people who preceded them. Initially, contributions to the services' second offerings increase by 10% when baskets are used, whereas no effect is found for first offerings. The positive effect of using baskets peters out over the experimental period. Additional data on the coins collected show that in both offerings, people switch to giving larger coins when baskets are used.

Adriaan R Soetevent

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This paper examines the impact of payment choice on charitable giving with a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment. Respondents can donate cash only, use debit only, or have both options. Cash donations have lower visibility vis-a-vis solicitors than debit card donations. When debit replaces cash, participation drops by 87 percent. Conditional on participation, donors in the Debit-only treatment give more than donors in Cash-only. In Cash&Debit, almost all donors prefer cash; participation decreases compared to Cash-only. Physical attractiveness of both female and male solicitors increases contributions. Solicitor self-confidence has a negative impact.

Sander Onderstal, Arthur J.H.C. Schram, Adriaan R Soetevent

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In a door-to-door fundraising field experiment, we study the impact of fundraising mechanisms on charitable giving. We approached about 4500 households, each participating in an all-pay auction, a lottery, a non-anonymous voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), or an anonymous VCM. In contrast to the VCMs, households in the all-pay auction and the lottery competed for a prize. Although the all-pay auction is the superior fundraising mechanism both in theory and in the laboratory, it did not raise the highest revenue per household in the field and even raised significantly less than the anonymous VCM. Our experiment reveals that this can be attributed to substantially lower participation in the all-pay auction than in the other mechanisms while the average donation for those who contribute is only slightly (and statistically insignificantly) higher. We explore various explanations for this lower participation and favor one that argues that competition in the all-pay mechanism crowds out intrinsic motivations to contribute.

Gert-Jan Romensen, Adriaan R Soetevent

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An often-voiced concern with relative performance feedback is that it may not improve workplace productivity if workers become demotivated and see no way to improve. Targeting feedback at specific productivity measures over which workers have direct control may in such cases prevent demotivation and focus attention. Does targeting improve worker productivity? We partner with a large bus company and experimentally vary the nature and number of peer-comparison messages which 409 bus drivers receive in their monthly feedback report. Messages are targeted at concrete driving behaviors and aimed at improving comfort and fuel efficiency. Using over 800,000 trip-level observations, we find that these targeted peer-comparison messages do not improve aggregate (fuel economy) or disaggregate measures (such as acceleration) of driving behavior. Further analyses also reveal no temporal or heterogeneous effects of the targeted messages.

Toke R. Fosgaard, Adriaan R Soetevent

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Given the replacement of cash with cell phone payments, people who are asked to donate to charity can easily promise a donation but delay the transfer until a later date. This may be a way to get out of the ask-situation with a positive image while maintaining the flexibility not to donate. This study explores whether charities can make people keep their promises by making such promises more explicit and more formal. In a door-to-door fund-raising field experiment, we vary the strength of the promise that donors make. Besides a control group where people can promise to donate, we apply two treatment groups. In the first treatment, donors are asked to verbally pledge a precise amount. In a second treatment, this amount is in addition put on paper with the solicitor's signature added. Both treatments are aimed at making it morally more expensive not to keep promises. Our results show that: (1) the majority of people do not follow through on their promise to donate; (2) donors who pledge an explicit amount more often keep their promise. The more formal the commitment, the closer the amount donated is to the amount promised; (3) many participants refuse to pledge a donation amount when asked, and those who refuse donate significantly less.

Anouk L. Schippers, Adriaan R Soetevent

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Informal peer-to-peer services to share or barter goods often succumb to free riding behavior because they lack the tools to enforce compliance and reciprocity. We collect unique quantitative data on a form of unregulated peer-to-peer in-kind exchange that appears internationally viable: the free exchange of books via privately owned public bookcases, also known as little free libraries. Other than previously studied honor-based exchanges, little free libraries use a non-monetary one-to-one book exchange rate. We find surprisingly limited free riding in this market. Users return 9 books for every 10 taken. An incentivized survey points to strong social norms and preferences for cooperation among owners and users as key behavioral primitives that can explain the observed high and stable level of reciprocal exchange.