Search Papers

John A List, Michael Margolis, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 8 Downloads*: 6

Evidence suggests the calibration of hypothetical and actual behavior is good-specific. We examine whether clustering commodities into mutual categories can reduce the burden. While we reject a common calibration across sets of commodities, a sport-specific calibration function cannot be rejected.

John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 19 Downloads*: 20

This paper calibrates real and hypothetical willingness-to-accept estimates elicited for consumer goods in a multi-unit, random nth-price auction. Using a within-subject experimental design, we find that people understated their real willingness to accept in the hypothetical regimes, framed both as demand and non-demand revealing. After controlling for personspecific effects, however, hypothetical and real statements are equivalent on the margin.

John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 78 Downloads*: 21

We design and implement a field experiment to elicit and calibrate in-sample hypothetical and actual bids given the presence of other goods and intensity of market experience. Using market goods that possess characteristics beyond the norm but yet remain deliverable, bidding behavior was consistent with theory. But we also observe the average calibration factor for hypothetical bids in the auction with other goods to be more severe (0.3) than for the auction without the goods (0.4). The results support the view that the calibration of hypothetical and actual bidding is good- and context-specific.

John A List, Jason F Shogren, Michael Spencer , Stephen Swallow

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 5

This paper considers how six alternative rebate rules affect voluntary contributions in a threshold public-good experiment. The rules differ by (1) whether an individual can receive a proportional rebate of excess contributions, a winner-takes-all of any excess contributions, or a full rebate of one's contribution in the event the public good is provided and excess contributions exist, and (2) whether the probability of receiving a rebate is proportional to an individual's contribution relative to total contributions or is a simple uniform probability distribution set by the number of contributors. The paper adds to the existing experimental economics literature on threshold public goods by investigating both aggregate and individual demand revelation under the winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules. Half of the rules (proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and random full-rebate with uniform probability) provide total contributions that nearly equal total benefits, while the rest (winner-take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only, and random full-rebate with proportional probability) exceed benefits by over 30 percent. Only the proportional rebate rule is found to achieve both aggregate and individual demand revelation. Our experimental results have implications for both fundraisers and valuation practitioners.

Erwin Bulte, John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 2

An important public policy question that remains unresolved is whether devolution will enhance sensible policy making by exploiting informational asymmetries or, instead, trigger a "beggar thy neighbor" response and stimulate free riding amongst localities. We analyze this question within the framework of U.S. environmental policy making by scrutinizing a unique panel data set on state-level endangered species expenditure patterns. Our empirical estimates are consistent with the notion that states free ride, which may lead to an expenditure equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient.

Sungwon Cho, Cannon Koo, John A List, Changwon Park , Pablo Polo, Jason F Shogren, Robert Wilhelmi

Cited by*: 18 Downloads*: 9

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms - the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, the second-price auction, and the random nth-price auction - in the measurement of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) measures of value. Our results show that initial bidding in trial 1 in each auction does not contradict the endowment effect; but that, if it is the endowment effect that governs people's initial bidding behavior, it can be eliminated with repetitions of a second-price or random nth-price auction; and if the thesis is that the effect should persist across auctions and across trials is right, our results suggest that there is no fundamental endowment effect.

Cannon Koo, John A List, Michael Margolis, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 31 Downloads*: 9

Second-price auctions are designed to induce people to reveal their private preferences for a good. Laboratory evidence suggests that while these auctions do a reasonable job on aggregate, they fall short at the individual level, especially for bidders who are off-margin of the market-clearing price. Herein we introduce and explore whether a random nth-price auction can engage all bidders to bid sincerely. Our results first show that the random nth-price auction can induce sincere bidding in theory and practice. We then compare the random nth-price to the second-price auction. We find that the second-price auction works better on-margin, and the random nth-price auction works better off-margin.

Dermot Hayes , John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 13 Downloads*: 4

This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference learning-bids reflect a person's desire to learn how an unfamiliar good fits into their preference set. Subjects bid in four consecutive experimental auctions for three goods that vary in familiarity, candy bars, mangos, and irradiated meat. Our results suggest that preference learning is the main source of the high premia, and that novelty of the experimental experience does not in itself artificially inflate valuations.

John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 24 Downloads*: 1

Examining panel data on bidding behavior in over forty second-price auction markets with repeated trials, we observe that (i) posted prices influence the behavior of the median naive bidder; (ii) posted prices do not affect the behavior of the median experienced bidder or the bidder for familiar goods; and (iii) anticipated strategic behavior wanes after two trials. The results suggest that while affiliation might exist in auctions for new goods, the repeated trial design with nonprice information removes the correlation of values and provides the experience that bidders need to understand the market mechanism.

John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 9 Downloads*: 8

n/a

John A List, Michael Margolis, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 0

Evidence suggests the calibration of hypothetical and actual behavior is good-specific. We examine whether clustering commodities into mutual categories can reduce the burden. While we reject a common calibration across sets of commodities, a sport-specific calibration function cannot be rejected.

U. Rashid Sumalia, Daniel J Skerritt, Anna Schuhbauer, Sebastian Villasante, Andres M Cisneros-Montemayor, Hussain Sinan, Duncan Burnside, Patrízia Raggi Abdallah, Keita Abe, Juliano Palacios Abrantes, Kwasi A Addo, Julia Adelsheim, Ibukun J Adewumi, Olanike K Adeyemo, Neil Adger, Joshua Adotey, Sahir Advani, Zahidah Afrin, Denis Aheto, Shehu L Akintola, Wisdom Akpalu, Lubna Alam, Juan José Alava, Edward H Allison, Diva J Amon, John M Anderies, Christopher M Anderson, Evan Andrews, Ronaldo Angelini, Zuzy Anna, Werner Antweiler, Evans K Arizi, Derek Armitage, Robert I Arthur, Noble Asare, Frank Asche, Berchie Asiedu, Francis Asuquo, Marta Flotats Aviles, Lanre Badmus, Megan Bailey, Natalie Ban, Edward B Barbier, Shanta Barley, Colin Barnes, Scott Barrett, Xavier Basurto, Dyhia Belhabib, Nathan J Bennett, Elena Bennett, Dominique Benzaken, Robert Blasiak, John J Bohorquez, Cesar Bordehore, Virginie Bornarel, David R Boyd, Denise Breitburg, Cassandra Brooks, Lucas Brotz, Duncan Burnside, Donovan Campbell, Sara Cannon, Ling Cao, Juan C Cardenas Campo, Griffin Carpenter, Steve Carpenter, Richard T Carson, Adriana R Carvalho, Mauricio Castrejón, Alex J Caveen, M Nicole Chabi, Kai M A Chan, F Stuart Chapin, Tony Charles, William Cheung, Villy Christensen, Ernest O Chuku, Trevor Church, Andrés M Cisneros-Montemayor, Colin Clark, Tayler M Clarke, Andreea L Cojocaru, Brian Copeland, Brian Crawford, Anne-Sophie Crépin, Larry B Crowder, Philippe Cury, Allison N Cutting, Gretchen C Daily, Jose Maria Da-Rocha, Abhipsita Das, Savior K S Deikumah, Mairin Deith, Santiago de la Puente, Boris Dewitte, Nancy Doubleday, Carlos M Duarte, Nicholas K Dulvy, Bárbara B Horta e Costa, Tyler Eddy, Maeghan Efford, Paul R Ehrlich, Laura G Elsler, Kafayat A Fakoya, A Eyiwunmi Falaye, Jessica Fanzo, Clare Fitzsimmons, Ola Flaaten, Katie R N Florko, Carl Folke, Andrew Forrest, Peter Freeman, Kátia M F Freire, Rainer Froese, Thomas L Frölicher, Austin Gallagher, Veronique Garcon, Maria A Gasalla, Mark Gibbons, Kyle Gillespie, Alfredo Giron-Nava, Kristina Gjerde, Sarah Glaser, Christopher Golden, Line Gordon, Hugh Govan, Rowenna Gryba, Benjamin S Halpern, Quentin Hanich, Mafaniso Hara, Christopher D G Harley, Sarah Harper, Michael Harte, Rebecca Helm, Cullen Hendrix, Christina C Hicks, Lincoln Hood, Carie Hoover, Kristen Hopewell, Jonathan D R Houghton, Johannes A Iitembu, Moenieba Isaacs, Sadique Isahaku, Gakushi Ishimura, Monirul Islam, Ibrahim Issifu, Jeremy Jackson, Jennifer Jacquet, Olaf P Jensen, Xue Jin, Alberta Jonah, Jean-Baptiste Jouffray, S Kim Juniper, Sufian Jusoh, Isigi Kadagi, Masahide Kaeriyama, Michel J Kaiser, Brooks Alexandra Kaiser, Omu Kakujaha-Matundu, Selma T Karuaihe, Mary Karumba, Jennifer D Kemmerly, Ahmed S Khan, Katrick Kimani, Kristin Kleisner, Nancy Knowlton, Dawn Kotowicz, John Kurien, Lian E Kwong, Steven Lade, Dan Laffoley, Vicky W L Lam, Glenn-Marie Lange, Mohd T Latif, Philippe Le Billon, Valérie Le Brenne, Frédéric Le Manach, Simon A Levin, Lisa Levin, Karin E Limburg, John A List, Amanda T Lombard, Priscila F M Lopes, Heike K Lotze, Tabitha G Mallory, Roshni S Mangar, Daniel Marszalec, Precious Mattah, Juan Mayorga, Carol Mcausland, DOuglas J McCauley, Jeffrey McLean, Karley McMullen, Frank Meere, Annie Mejaes, Michael Melnychuk, Jaime Mendo, Fiorenza Micheli, Katherine Millage, Dana Miller, Kolliyil Sunil Mohamed, Essam Mohammed, Mazlin Mokhtar, Lance Morgan, Umi Muawanah, Gordon R Munro, Grant Murray, Saleem Mustafa, Prateep Nayak, Dianne Newell, Tu Nguyen, Frederik Noack, Adibi M Nor, Francis K E Nunoo, David Obura, Tom Okey, Isaac Okyere, Paul Onyango, Maartje Oostdijk, Polina Orlov, Henrik Österblom, Tessa Owens, Dwight Owens, Mohammed Oyinlola, Nathan Pacoureau, Evgeny Pakhomov, Unai Pascual, Aurélien Paulmier, Daniel Pauly, Rodrigue Orobiyi Edéya Pèlèbè, Daniel Peñalosa, Maria G Pennino, Garry Peterson, Thuy T T Pham, Evelyn Pinkerton, Stephen Polasky, Nicholas V C Polunin, Ekow Prah, Ingrid Van Putten, Jorge Ramírez, Jorge Jimenez Ramon, Veronica Relano, Gabriel Reygondeau, Don Robadue, Callum Roberts, Alex Rogers, Katina Roumbedakis, Enric Sala, Gret Van Santen, Marten Scheffer, Anna Schuhbauer, Kathleen Segerson, Juan Carlos Seijo, Karen C Seto, Jason F Shogren, Jennifer J Silver, Hussain Sinan, Gerald Singh, Daniel J Skerritt, Ambre Soszynski, Dacotah-Victoria Splichalova, Margaret Spring, Jesper Stage, Fabrice Stephenson, Bryce D Stewart, Riad Sultan, U Rashid Sumaila, Curtis Suttle, Alessandro Tagliabue, Amadou Tall, Nicolás Talloni-Álvarez, Alessandro Tavoni, D R Fraser Taylor, Lydia C L Teh, Louise S L Teh, Jean-Baptiste Thiebot, Torsten Thiele, Shakuntala H Thilsted, Romola V Thumbadoo, Michelle Tigchelaar, Richard S J Tol, Philippe Tortell, Max Troell, M Selçuk Uzmanoglu, Sebastian Villasante, Juan Villaseñor-Derbez, Colette C C Wabnitz, Melissa Walsh, J P Walsh, Nina Wambiji, Elke U Weber, Frances Westley, Stella Williams, Mary S Wisz, Boris Worm, Lan Xiao, Nobuyuki Yagi, Satoshi Yamazaki, Hong Yang, Aart de Zeeuw, Dirk Zeller

Cited by*: Downloads*:

Letter in Science Magazine