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Jeffrey A Flory, Uri Gneezy, Kenneth Leonard, John A List

Cited by*: 7 Downloads*: 68

Gender differences in competitive behavior have received much attention, demonstrating a systematic gap between males' and females' tendencies to compete. Theories predict a biological factor linked to an evolutionary response to the different paths to reproductive success for men and women. Since strategies for reproductive success change over the female life-cycle, the gender gap is predicted to be largest for young adults but after menopause women should be as competitive as men. Using data drawn from two very different societies, we find strong support for this theoretical prediction: competitiveness in women is tightly linked to their biological roles in childrearing.

Craig E Landry, Andreas Lange, John A List, Michael K Price, Nicholas G Rupp

Cited by*: 18 Downloads*: 17

This study develops theory and conducts an experiment to provide an understanding of why people initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate these influences. Using an experimental design that links donations across distinct treatments separated in time, we present several insights. For example, we find that previous donors are more likely to give, and contribute more, than donors asked to contribute for the first time. Yet, how these previous donors were acquired is critical: agents who are initially attracted by signals of charitable quality transmitted via an economic mechanism are much more likely to continue giving than agents who were initially attracted by non-mechanism factors.

Steffen Andersen, Seda Ertac, Uri Gneezy, Moshe Hoffman, John A List

Cited by*: 37 Downloads*: 26

One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger stakes than in the literature, we are able to examine stakes' effects over ranges of data that are heretofore unexplored. Our main result is that proportionally equivalent offers are less likely to be rejected with high stakes. In fact, our paper is the first to present evidence that as stakes increase, rejection rates approach zero.

Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John A List, Ty Turley, Maarten Voors

Cited by*: 27 Downloads*: 78

We use a sample of subsistence farmers in Sierra Leone as respondents to compare behavior in a context-free experiment (a standard public goods game) and behavior in the field (a real development intervention). There is no meaningful correlation in behavior across contexts. This casts doubt on the prospect of using lab experiments as "predictors" of behavior in real life.

Craig E Landry, Andreas Lange, John A List, Michael K Price, Nicholas G Rupp

Cited by*: 160 Downloads*: 21

This study develops theory and uses a door-to-door fundraising field experiment to explore the economics of charity. We approached nearly 5000 households, randomly divided into four experimental treatments, to shed light on key issues on the demand side of charitable fundraising. Empirical results are in line with our theory: in gross terms, our lottery treatments raised considerably more money than our voluntary contributions treatments. Interestingly, we find that a one standard deviation increase in female solicitor physical attractiveness is similar to that of the lottery incentive--the magnitude of the estimated difference in gifts is roughly equivalent to the treatment effect of moving from our theoretically most attractive approach (lotteries) to our least attractive approach (voluntary contributions).

Avner Ben-Ner, John A List, Louis Putterman, Anya Samek

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 43

An active area of research within the social sciences concerns the underlying motivation for sharing scarce resources and engaging in other pro-social actions. We develop a theoretical framework that sheds light on the developmental origins of social preferences by providing mechanisms through which parents transmit preferences for generosity to their children. Then, we conduct a field experiment with nearly 150 3-5 year old children and their parents, measuring (1) whether child and parent generosity is correlated, (2) whether children are influenced by their parents when making sharing decisions and (3) whether parents model generosity to children. We observe no correlation of independently measured parent and child sharing decisions at this young age. Yet, we find that apart from those choosing an equal allocation of resources between themselves and another child, children adjust their behaviors to narrow the gap with their parent's or other adult's choice. We find that fathers, and parents of initially generous children, increase their sharing when informed that their child will be shown their choice.

Daniel Houser, John A List, Marco Piovesan, Anya Samek, Joachim Winter

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 56

Acts of dishonesty permeate life. Understanding their origins, and what mechanisms help to attenuate such acts is an under explored area of research. This study takes an economics approach to explore the propensity of individuals to act dishonestly across different economic environments. We begin by developing a simple model that highlights the channels through which one can increase or decrease dishonest acts. We lend empirical insights into this model by using an experiment that includes both parents and their young children as subjects. We find that the highest level of dishonesty occurs in settings where the parent acts alone and the dishonest act benefits the child rather than the parent. In this spirit, there is also an interesting effect of children on parents' behavior: in the child's presence, parents act more honestly, but there are gender differences. Parents act more dishonestly in front of sons than daughters. This finding has the potential of shedding light on the origins of the widely documented gender differences in cheating behavior observed among adults.

Craig E Landry, Andreas Lange, John A List, Michael K Price, Nicholas G Rupp

Cited by*: 4 Downloads*: 0

Several recent laboratory experiments have shown that the use of explicit incentives--such as conditional rewards and punishment--entail considerable "hidden" costs. The costs are hidden in the sense that they escape our attention if our reasoning is based on the assumption that people are exclusively self-interested. This study represents a first attempt to explore whether, and to what extent, such considerations affect equilibrium outcomes in the field. Using data gathered from nearly 3000 households, we find little support for the negative consequences of control in naturally-occurring labor markets. In fact, even though we find evidence that workers are reciprocal, we find that worker effort is maximized when we use conditional--not unconditional--rewards to incent workers.

Omar Al-Ubaydli, John A List, Danielle LoRe, Dana L Suskind

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 7

No abstract available

Avner Ben-Ner, John A List, Louis Putterman, Anya Samek

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An active area of research within the social sciences concerns the underlying motivation for sharing resources and engaging in other pro-social actions. In this paper we ask: do parents model social preference behavior to children, and do children emulate this behavior? We develop a theoretical framework to examine this question, and conduct an experiment with 147 3 to 5 year old children and their parents, using dictator games to measure generosity. We find (1) evidence of parental teaching/modeling in the case of fathers and in that of parents of relatively generous children, and (2) an emulation effect such that children who initially share less than half of their endowment subsequently share more the more they see a parent or other adult share. We find little correlation between baseline sharing of children and the parents, with the possible exception of the oldest children.

Omar Al-Ubaydli, John A List, Claire Mackevicius, Min Sok Lee, Dana L Suskind

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Policymakers are increasingly turning to insights gained from the experimental method as a means to inform large scale public policies. Critics view this increased usage as premature, pointing to the fact that many experimentally-tested programs fail to deliver their promise at scale. Under this view, the experimental approach drives too much public policy. Yet, if policymakers could be more confident that the original research findings would be delivered at scale, even the staunchest critics would carve out a larger role for experiments to inform policy. Leveraging the economic framework of Al-Ubaydli et al. (2019), we put forward 12 simple proposals, spanning researchers, policymakers, funders, and stakeholders, which together tackle the most vexing scalability threats. The framework highlights that only after we deepen our understanding of the scale up problem will we be on solid ground to argue that scientific experiments should hold a more prominent place in the policymaker's quiver.

Luigi Butera, Philip J Grossman, Daniel Houser, John A List, Marie-Claire Villeval

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Creation of empirical knowledge in economics has taken a dramatic turn in the past few decades. One feature of the new research landscape is the nature and extent to which scholars generate data. Today, in nearly every field the experimental approach plays an increasingly crucial role in testing theories and informing organizational decisions. Whereas there is much to appreciate about this revolution, recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that an important component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. Indeed, while the importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, current incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications from the individual researcher's perspective. We propose a novel mechanism that promotes replications by leveraging mutually beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We develop a model capturing the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission of a paper to journals. We showcase our method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation rates in public goods games, a pervasive and yet largely unexplored feature in the literature.

Matilde Giaccherini, David H Herberich, David Jimenez-Gomez, John A List, Giovanni Ponti, Michael K Price

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This paper uses a field experiment to estimate the effects of prices and social norms on the decision to adopt and efficient technology. We find that prices and social norms influence the adoption and decision along different margins: while prices operate on both the extensive and intensive margins, social norms operate mostly through the extensive margin. This has both positive and normative implications, and suggests that economics and psychology may be strong complements in the diffusion process. To complement the reduced form results, we estimate a structural model that points to important household heterogeneity: whereas some consumers welcome the opportunity to purchase and learn about the new technology, for others the inconvenience and social pressure of the ask results in negative welfare. As a whole, our findings highlight that the design of optimal technological diffusion policies will require multiple instruments and a recognition of household heterogeneity.

Kentaro Asai, Seda Ertac, Ali Hortacsu, John A List, Howard Nusbaum, Lester Tong, Karen Ye

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People often demand a greater price when selling goods that they own than they would pay to purchase the same goods- a well-known economic bias called the endowment effect. The endowment effect has been found to be muted among experienced traders, but little is known about how trading experience reduces the endowment effect. We show that when selling, experienced traders exhibit lower right anterior insula activity, but no differences in nucleus accumbens or orbitofrontal activation, compared with inexperienced traders. Furthermore, insula activation mediates the effect of experience on the endowment effect. Similar results are obtained for inexperienced traders who are incentivized to gain trading experience. This finding indicates that frequent trading likely mitigates the endowment effect indirectly by modifying negative affective responses in the context of selling.

Snigdha Gupta, John A List, Lauren Supplee, Dana L Suskind

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Failed to Scale: Embracing the Challenge of Scaling in Early Childhood

Eric Floyd, Michael Hallsworth, John A List, Robert D Metcalfe, Kristian Rotaru, Ivo Vlaev

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In this study, we first present a large natural field experiment that tested messages aimed at increasing tax compliance. We find that the main drivers of changes in compliance are messages describing the monitoring and enforcement behavior of the tax collector. A second natural field experiment built on the results of the first experiment to further investigate what kinds of costs resulting from tax collector oversight are salient to taxpayers. Specific time and cognitive incentives did not significantly increase payment rates, whereas stating non-specific costs of inaction did. Additional analyses suggest the increase in compliance is likely due to a 'fill in the blank' effect in which taxpayers assume the consequence is a fine. Interestingly, specifically stating maximum fine or jailtime consequences have the largest effect in a laboratory setting but only if the consequences are interpreted as realistic. Overall, our study reinforces that tax authorities can use short messages to increase tax compliance; the estimated accelerated revenue from the two field studies amounts to 9.9m GBP.

Uri Gneezy, Moshe Hoffman, Mark A. Lane, John A List, Jeffrey A Livingston, Michael J. Seiler

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Recent theoretical work shows that the better-than-average effect, where a majority believes their ability to be better than average, can be perfectly consistent with Bayesian updating. However, later experiments that account for this theoretical advance still find behavior consistent with overconfidence. The literature notes that overoptimism can be caused by either overconfidence (optimism about performance), wishful thinking (optimism about outcomes), or both. To test whether the better-than-average effect might be explained by wishful thinking instead of overconfidence, we conduct an experiment that is similar to those used in the overconfidence literature, but removes performance as a potential channel. We find evidence that wishful thinking might explain overconfidence only among the most optimistic subjects, and that conservatism is possibly more of a worry; if unaccounted for, overconfidence might be underestimated.

Majid Ahmadi, Nathan Durst, Jeff Lachman, John A List, Mason List, Noah List, Atom Vayalinkal

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Recent models and empirical work on network formation emphasize the importance of propinquity in producing strong interpersonal connections. Yet, one might wonder how deep such insights run, as thus far empirical results rely on survey and lab-based evidence. In this study, we examine propinquity in a high-stakes setting of talent allocation: the Major League Baseball (MLB) Draft. We examine draft picks from 2000-2019 across every MLB club of the nearly 30,000 players drafted (from a player pool of more than a million potential draftees). Our findings can be summarized in three parts. First, propinquity is alive and well in our setting, and spans even the latter years of our sample, when higher-level statistical exercises have become the norm rather than the exception. Second, the measured effect size is important, as MLB clubs pay a real cost in terms of inferior talent acquired due to propinquity bias: for example, their draft picks appear in 25 fewer games relative to teams that do not exhibit propinquity bias. Finally, the effect is found to be the most pronounced in later rounds of the draft (after round 15), where the Scouting Director has the greatest latitude.

Alec Brandon, Christopher M Clapp, John A List, Robert D Metcalfe, Michael K Price

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Smart-home technologies have been heralded as an important way to increase energy conservation. While in vitro engineering estimates provide broad optimism, little has been done to explore whether such estimates scale beyond the lab. We estimate the causal impact of smart thermostats on energy use via two novel framed field experiments in which a random subset of treated households have a smart thermostat installed in their home. Examining 18 months of associated high-frequency data on household energy consumption, yielding more than 16 million hourly electricity and daily natural gas observations, we find little evidence that smart thermostats have a statistically or economically significant effect on energy use. We explore potential mechanisms using almost four million observations of system events including human interactions with their smart thermostat. Results indicate that user behavior dampens energy savings and explains the discrepancy between estimates from engineering models, which assume a perfectly compliant subject, and actual households, who are occupied by users acting in accord with behavioral economists' conjectures. In this manner, our data document a keen threat to the scalability of new user-based technologies.

Pradhi Aggarwal, Alec Brandon, Ariel Goldszmidt, Justin Holz, John A List, Ian Muir, Gregory Sun, Thomas Yu

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Prior research finds that, conditional on an encounter, minority civilians are more likely to be punished by police than white civilians. An open question is whether the actual encounter is related to race. Using high-frequency location data of rideshare drivers operating on the Lyft platform in Florida, we estimate the effect of driver race on traffic stops and fines for speeding. Estimates obtained across traditional and machine learning approaches show that, relative to a white driver traveling the same speed, minorities are 24 to 33 percent more likely to be stopped for speeding and pay 23 to 34 percent more in fines. We find no evidence that these estimates can be explained by racial differences in accident and re-offense rates. Our study provides key insights into the total effect of civilian race on outcomes of interest and highlights the potential value of private sector data to help inform major social challenges.