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Steven D Levitt, John A List, Sally Sadoff

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Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games--Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.

John Horowitz, John A List, Kenneth E McConnell

Cited by*: 2 Downloads*: 14

The notion of diminishing marginal value had a profound impact on the development of neoclassical theory. Early neoclassical scholars had difficulty convincing contemporaries of the new paradigm's value until political economists used the critical assumption of diminishing marginal value to link utility and demand. While diminishing marginal value remains a key component of modern economic intuition, there is little direct verification of this behavioral property. This paper reports experiments on a myriad of subject pools to examine behavior in both price and exchange settings. We report results from nearly 900 subjects across 19 treatments and find strong evidence of diminishing marginal value.

John A List, Michael Margolis, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 8 Downloads*: 6

Evidence suggests the calibration of hypothetical and actual behavior is good-specific. We examine whether clustering commodities into mutual categories can reduce the burden. While we reject a common calibration across sets of commodities, a sport-specific calibration function cannot be rejected.

John A List, Daniel Rondeau

Cited by*: 31 Downloads*: 11

This study designs a natural field experiment linked to a controlled laboratory experiment to examine the effectiveness of matching gifts and challenge gifts, two popular strategies used to secure a portion of the $200 billion annually given to charities. We find evidence that challenge gifts positively influence contributions in the field, but matching gifts do not. Methodologically, we find important similarities and dissimilarities between behavior in the lab and the field. Overall, our results have clear implications for fundraisers and provide avenues for future empirical and theoretical work on charitable giving.

Andreas Lange, John A List, Michael K Price

Cited by*: 35 Downloads*: 33

This study explores the economics of charitable fund-raising. We begin by developing theory that examines the optimal lottery design while explicitly relaxing both risk-neutrality and preference homogeneity assumptions. We test our theory using a battery of experimental treatments and find that our theoretical predictions are largely confirmed. Specifically, we find that single and multiple prize lotteries dominate the voluntary contribution mechanism both in total dollars raised and the number of contributors attracted. Moreover, we find that the optimal fund-raising mechanism depends critically on the risk postures of potential contributors and preference heterogeneity.

Junsoo Lee, John A List

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Despite its growth in other areas of economics,time series econometric methods have not been widespread in the area of environmental and resource economics. We illustrate one use of time series methods by examining the time path of US nitrogen oxide (NOx) emission data over the period 1900-1994. The analysis highlights that proper time series methods can aid in optimal regulatory policy as well as developing empirical verification of theories put forth to explain economic phenomena. In addition, several interesting results emerge. First, we find that the emissions series contains both a permanent and random component. Second, if one attributed all of the emissions reductions to regulatory policy, intervention analysis suggests that the 1970 Clean Air Act(CAA) did not merely have transitory effects,but permanently influenced the NOx emission path. In terms of total regulatory impact, an upper bound on the emissions saved due to the 1970 CAA is in the range of 27%-48%.

John A List, Warren McHone , Daniel L Millimet

Cited by*: 11 Downloads*: 8

Whether lax environmental regulations are an important attraction for mobile capital remains one of the most controversial issues in the area of regulatory federalism. While the extant literature does a nice job of estimating the effects of environmental regulation on the spatial allocation of new plant births, one neglected area of research is the effect that environmental regulation has on plant relocation decisions. This paper uses an annual (1980-90) county level panel data set to examine the relationship between air quality regulatory stringency and the destination choice of relocating plants. We estimate empirical models using both parametric and semi-nonparametric specifications. Empirical results from both models suggest that air quality regulations alter significantly the destination choices of relocating plants.

Craig Gallet, John A List

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This paper uses market share data to infer the nature of rivalry in the U.S. cigarette industry over the 1934-94 period. Unlike previous studies, which measure rivalry from various constructs of market share instability, we examine the time-series properties of market shares to determine whether or not rivalry is evident. Our empirical results imply that a majority of firm-level market shares are martingales, suggesting market shares have been unstable from 1934-94. This result leads us to conclude that rivalry in the cigarette industry has remained strong.

Dermot Hayes , John A List, Jason F Shogren

Cited by*: 13 Downloads*: 4

This paper explores the origins of the strikingly high price premia paid for new food products in lab valuation exercises. Our experimental design distinguishes between two explanations of this phenomenon: novelty of the experimental experience versus the novelty of the good, i.e., preference learning-bids reflect a person's desire to learn how an unfamiliar good fits into their preference set. Subjects bid in four consecutive experimental auctions for three goods that vary in familiarity, candy bars, mangos, and irradiated meat. Our results suggest that preference learning is the main source of the high premia, and that novelty of the experimental experience does not in itself artificially inflate valuations.

Catherine Co , John A List

Cited by*: 47 Downloads*: 13

This paper employs a conditional logit model to estimate the effects of state environmental regulations on foreign multinational corporations' new plant location decisions from 1986 to 1993. The relationship between site choice and state environmental regulations is explored, using four measures of regulatory stringency. We find evidence that heterogeneous environmental policies across states do matter.

John A List, Warren McHone

Cited by*: 7 Downloads*: 2

This paper uses state-level pollution data from 1986-1997 to construct two indices that rank U.S. states according to environmental outputs. A major finding is that marginal performers in other indices, such as Wyoming, garner top spots in these ranking systems. The paper also presents findings from fixed and random effects models of panel data that imply state income levels are positively associated with environmental outputs after a threshold level of income is obtained.

John A List, Warren McHone

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 9

In this article, we use annual (1980-90) county-level manufacturing plant location data for New York State to examine the effects of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments on the location decisions of new pollution-intensive manufacturing plants in the "neo-regulatory" (1980-84) and "mature-regulatory" (1985-90) phases of the Act's implementation. Our results suggest that the temporal effects of regulation vary. Whereas the location decisions of pollution intensive manufacturing firms were unaffected by the Act's regulatory restrictions in the "neo-regulatory" period, the restrictions appear to have had a significant negative impact on the location decisions of these types of firms in the Act's "mature-regulatory" phase. The diversion of new pollution intensive plants to counties with less stringent environmental regulations suggests that current US environmental regulations may be leading to a "browning process" whereby counties historically free of pollution become havens for polluters.

Craig Gallet, John A List

Cited by*: 61 Downloads*: 10

This paper uses a new panel data set on state-level sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from 1929-1994 to test the appropriateness of the 'one size fits all' reduced-form regression approach commonly used in the environmental Kuznets curve literature. Empirical results provide initial evidence that an inverted-U shape characterizes the relationship between per capita emissions and per capita incomes at the state level. Parameter estimates suggest, however, that previous studies, which restrict cross-sections to undergo identical experiences over time, may be presenting statistically biased results.

Jeffrey A Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 85

Workplace misbehaviors are often governed by explicit monitoring and strict punishment. Such enforcement activities can serve to lessen worker productivity and harm worker morale. We take a different approach to curbing worker misbehavior-bonuses. Examining more than 6500 donor phone calls across more than 80 workers, we use a natural field experiment to investigate how different wage contracts influence workers' propensity to break workplace rules in harmful ways. Our findings show that even though standard relative performance pay contracts, relative to a fixed wage scheme, increase productivity, they have a dark side: they cause considerable cheating and sabotage of co-workers. Yet, even in such environments, by including an unexpected bonus, the employer can substantially curb worker misbehavior. In this manner, our findings reveal how employers can effectively leverage bonuses to eliminate undesired behaviors induced by performance pay contracts.

James Andreoni, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 0

No abstract available

Jeffrey A Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt, John A List

Cited by*: 0 Downloads*: 109

Workplace misbehaviors are often governed by explicit monitoring and strict punishment. Such enforcement activities can serve to lessen worker productivity and harm worker morale. We take a different approach to curbing worker misbehaviour - bonuses. Examining more than 6500 donor phone calls across more than 80 workers, we use a natural field experiment to investigate how different wage contracts influence workers' propensity to break workplace rules in harmful ways. Our findings show that even though standard relative performance pay contracts, relative to a fixed wage scheme, increase productivity, they have a dark side: they cause considerable cheating and sabotage of co-workers. Yet, even in such environments, by including an unexpected bonus, the employer can substantially curb worker misbehavior. In this manner, our findings reveal how employers can effectively leverage bonuses to eliminate undesired behaviors induced by performance pay contracts.

Erwin Bulte, John A List, Daan van Soest

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Incomplete contracts are the rule rather than the exception, and any incentive scheme faces the risk of improving performance on incented aspects of a task at the detriment of performance on non-incented aspects. Recent research documents the effect of loss-framed versus gain-framed incentives on incentivized behavior, but how do such incentives affect overall performance? We explore potential trade-offs by conducting field experiments in an artificial "workplace". We explore two types of incentive spillovers: those contemporaneous to the incented task and those subsequent to the incented task. We report three main results. First, consonant with the extant literature, a loss aversion incentive induces greater effort on the incented task. Second, offsetting this productivity gain, we find that the quality of work decreases if quality is not specified in the incentive contract. Third, we find no evidence of harmful spillover effects to subsequent tasks; if anything, the loss aversion incentive induces more effort in subsequent tasks. Taken together, our results highlight that measuring and accounting for incentive spillovers are important when considering their overall impact.

John A List, Azeem M Shaikh, Atom Vayalinkal

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List et al. (2019) provides a framework for testing multiple null hypotheses simultaneously using experimental data in which simple random sampling is used to assign treatment status to units. As in List et al. (2019), we rely on general results in Romano and Wolf (2010) to develop under weak assumptions a procedure that (i) asymptotically controls the familywise error rate – the probability of one or more false rejections – and (ii) is asymptotically balanced in that the marginal probability of rejecting any true null hypothesis is approximately equal in large samples. Our analysis departs from List et al. (2019) in that it further exploits observed, baseline covariates. The precise way in which these covariates are incorporated is based upon results in Ye et al. (2022) in order to ensure that inferences are typically more powerful in large samples.

John A List, Rohen Shah

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In organizations, teams are ubiquitous. "Weakest Link" and "Best Shot" are incentive schemes that tie a group member's compensation to the output of their group's least and most productive member, respectively. In this paper, we test the impact of these incentive schemes by conducting two pilot RCTs (one in-person, one online), which included more than 250 graduate students in a graduate math class. Students were placed in study groups of three or four students, and then groups were randomized to either control, Weakest Link, or Best Shot incentives. We find evidence that such incentive approaches can affect test scores, both in-person and online.

Omar Al-Ubaydli, Faith Fatchen, John A List

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Field experiments are a useful empirical tool that can be deployed in any sub-discipline - including institutional economics - to enhance the sub-discipline's empirical insights. However, we here argue that there exist fundamental barriers to the use of field experiments in understanding the impact of institutions on economic growth. Despite these obstacles, we present some significant scholarly contributions that merit exposition, while also proposing some future methods for using field experiments within institutional economics. While field experiments may be limited in answering questions in institutional economics with macroeconomic outcomes, there is great potential in employing field experiments to answer micro founded questions.