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William T Harbaugh, Kate Krause

Cited by*: 46 Downloads*: 23

We examine the development of altruistic and free-riding behavior in 6-12-year-old children. We find that the level of altruistic behavior in children is similar to that of adults but that repetition has a different effect. Younger children's contributions tend to increase in later rounds of the experiments, whereas the contributions of older children, like those of adults, tend to decline. Group attachment is associated with higher contributions. Contributions in a subsequent dictator experiment are correlated with first-roundn contributions in the public good experiment, but are not strongly correlated with last-round contributions.

William T Harbaugh, Kate Krause, Lise Vesterlund

Cited by*: 77 Downloads*: 13

In this paper we examine how risk attitudes change with age. We present participants from age 5 to 65 with choices between simple gambles and the expected value of the gambles. The gambles are over both gains and losses, and vary in the probability of the non-zero payoff. Surprisingly, we find that many participants are risk seeking when faced with high-probability prospects over gains and risk averse when faced with small-probability prospects. Over losses we find the exact opposite. Children's choices are consistent with the underweighting of low-probability events and the overweighting of high-probability ones. This tendency diminishes with age, and on average adults appear to use the objective probability when evaluating risky prospects.

Timothy R Berry, William T Harbaugh, Kate Krause

Cited by*: 47 Downloads*: 11

In this paper we examine the extent to which consumption choices by 7 and 11-year-old children and college undergraduates satisfy the axioms of revealed preference. We find that choices by even the 7-year-olds are considerably more likely to obey revealed preference axioms than would be true if they were choosing randomly. 11-year-olds do better still, while college students do no better than 11-year-old children. We also find that mathematical ability is not correlated with choosing rationally. We argue that this evidence suggests that the ability to choose rationally is not innate, but that it does develop quickly.