Eric Floyd,
						
							Michael Hallsworth,
						
							John A List,
						
							Robert D Metcalfe,
						
							Kristian Rotaru,
						
							Ivo Vlaev
						
						
						
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							In this study, we first present a large natural field experiment that tested messages 
aimed at increasing tax compliance. We find that the main drivers of changes in 
compliance are messages describing the monitoring and enforcement behavior of 
the tax collector. A second natural field experiment built on the results of the first 
experiment to further investigate what kinds of costs resulting from tax collector 
oversight are salient to taxpayers. Specific time and cognitive incentives did not
significantly increase payment rates, whereas stating non-specific costs of inaction 
did. Additional analyses suggest the increase in compliance is likely due to a 'fill 
in the blank' effect in which taxpayers assume the consequence is a fine.
Interestingly, specifically stating maximum fine or jailtime consequences have the 
largest effect in a laboratory setting but only if the consequences are interpreted as 
realistic. Overall, our study reinforces that tax authorities can use short messages 
to increase tax compliance; the estimated accelerated revenue from the two field 
studies amounts to 9.9m GBP.