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Xavier Gine, Pamela Jakiela, Dean S Karlan, Jonathan Morduch

Cited by*: 3 Downloads*: 15

Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts.

Nava Ashaf, Xavier Gine, Dean S Karlan

Cited by*: 1 Downloads*: 41

This paper evaluates a program in Kenya that encourages the production of export oriented crops by providing smallholder farmers with credit linked to agricultural extension and marketing services. We use an experimental design in which farmer selfhelp groups are randomly assigned to either a control group, a group receiving all DrumNet services, or a group receiving all services except credit. Among the services offered by DrumNet, credit is the most important. Since the production of export crops requires a significant investment in capital and inputs, without credit farmers are less likely to plant the mentioned crops. Overall, the results show that DrumNet is an effective model for encouraging the production of export oriented crops.

Xavier Gine, Dean S Karlan

Cited by*: 12 Downloads*: 19

Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender's overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. We worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. We randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability centers of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.